MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, RESPONDENT.

Sebastian versus Bajar

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Manuel S. Sebastian filed a complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar, a lawyer then serving with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform, accusing her of obstructing and impeding final decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, of submitting those final decisions for review and reversal by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, an administrative body, and of contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole discipline of lawyers: the nature of disbarment proceedings, the quantum of proof, the meaning of a mere notation by the Court, the consequences of willful disobedience of court orders, and the limits of a lawyer's zeal for a client.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court on 18 October 1991. The Court required the respondent to comment, then to file a rejoinder, and later ordered her to show cause why she should not be disciplined for failing to comply. When she still did not comply, the Court imposed a fine or imprisonment and, eventually, ordered her arrest; she was detained at the National Bureau of Investigation for five days in October 1993. The Court then referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for hearing and decision. The Investigating Commissioner found violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Board of Governors adopted his recommendation of indefinite suspension, which the Court merely noted in January 1997 and circularized in 1999. Years later the respondent moved to consider the case closed and to lift her suspension, and the Court referred the matter back to the Integrated Bar, whose Board of Governors recommended disbarment in April 2004. The case thus reached the Court not by appeal but as an original administrative proceeding, and the Court itself rendered final action on the complaint.

Facts

The respondent represented Fernando Tanlioco, an agricultural lessee of land owned by the complainant's spouse and sister-in-law. The landowners filed an ejectment case grounded on a conversion order changing the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court ordered Tanlioco's ejectment subject to payment of disturbance compensation, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

Despite that finality, the respondent, as Tanlioco's counsel, filed a case for specific performance to produce the conversion order, which was dismissed on grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action. She then filed a case for maintenance of possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, raising the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. The complainant alleged that this was forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.

Throughout the proceedings, the respondent repeatedly ignored the Court's orders. She filed her rejoinder only in November 1993, after five days of detention, and answered another resolution almost four months late. She later admitted that she continued to practice law as a prosecutor in Mandaluyong City even after her indefinite suspension had been circularized, claiming she believed the Court's notation of the suspension did not implement it. At the hearings she also used disrespectful language and shouted at everyone present.

Issues

• Whether or not the complainant is the real party in interest and has the personality to file the disbarment complaint.
• Whether or not the respondent's failure to comply with the lawful orders of the Supreme Court constitutes gross misconduct and willful disobedience warranting disciplinary sanction.
• Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing cases with identical issues despite a final judgment.
• Whether or not the penalty of disbarment is proper, or whether a lesser penalty suffices.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

This is the provision the Court applies to the respondent's repeated disregard of its resolutions.

Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:

Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. — (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

This explains why the Integrated Bar's recommendation of indefinite suspension never attained finality until the Court itself acted on it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the procedural requirement in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party in interest may initiate a suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Any interested person, or the court on its own motion, may initiate disciplinary proceedings; the complainant is in no sense a party and generally has no interest in the outcome, and even a compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate the administrative complaint.

On the second issue, the Court found clear preponderant evidence that the respondent failed to comply with its lawful orders in two instances, and held that these acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the Court, which under Section 27 of Rule 138 is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. A Court's Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. The Court also held that this failure constitutes gross misconduct, which it defined as any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, they are first and foremost officers of the court, bound to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite a final ruling is beyond the bounds of the law and violates Canon 19, which mandates zealous representation within the bounds of the law.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court, but that it will not disbar a lawyer if a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. Finding gross misconduct, willful disobedience, and a violation of Canon 19, the Court imposed suspension rather than disbarment.

Doctrine

• Disbarment proceedings are sui generis — they belong to a class of their own, neither civil nor criminal, but investigations by the Court into the conduct of its own officers; they involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
• Any interested person, or the court on its own motion, may initiate disciplinary proceedings; the real party in interest rule does not apply, and withdrawal of the complaint does not terminate the case.
• Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.
• Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court is in itself a sufficient ground for suspension or disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
• A mere notation by the Court of an Integrated Bar resolution does not imply approval; the penalty attains finality only upon the Court's final action under Section 12 of Rule 139-B.
• A lawyer's zeal is bounded by Canon 19; forum-shopping to thwart a final judgment violates the lawyer's duty as an officer of the court.

Disposition

The Court suspended Atty. Emily A. Bajar from the practice of law for three years effective from notice, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely, and directed that copies of the decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a Court Resolution is not a mere request, and willful disobedience of a lawful order of a superior court is by itself a ground for suspension or disbarment. Examiners use this case for the real party in interest rule in disbarment, the meaning of a mere notation of an Integrated Bar resolution, and the limits of a lawyer's zeal under Canon 19.