DELFIN M. TOBIAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA, RESPONDENT.

A reading, even the most casual, of the administrative complaint
against respondent Judge Vicente Ericta would suffice
to make evident that it came from someone whose acquaintance with legal
concepts is of the slightest, if it could be said that.  It could justifiably have been dismissed
outright as being merely another manifestation of an offended party venting his
spleen on the unfortunate arbiter for failure to obtain in full measure the
retribution he would exact from someone who had done him wrong.  As evidently he was a layman, it did require
a certain degree of temerity to call to task respondent Judge for alleged
deficiency of legal knowledge.  Of
course, there was the further accusation of partiality.  Moreover, as the complaint was endorsed to us
by the Department of Justice and with complainant imputing to respondent Judge
bias in favor of the two accused, this Court deemed it best to require
comment.  After all it is a prized ideal,
one always to be approximated even if the imperfections of human nature prevent
its full realization, that everyone who has an interest in a court proceeding
is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.  Respondent Judge, however, instead of merely submitting his comments, chose
to file an answer.  What he did is
certainly not to be deplored.  For
thereby a clearer picture emerged.  The
conviction becomes even stronger than that there is no basis for the complaint
and that he is entitled to be
fully absolved.

The specific allegations,
in their totality, to follow the thinking of complainant, would demonstrate a
lack in the fund of legal expertise of respondent Judge as well as a
predilection in favor of the accused indicative of his bias.  It would be useful though to have first a
recital of the facts.  From the answer of
respondent Judge, the following appears: 
“On November 10, 1971, Assistant Fiscal Melencio
S. Peña of Quezon City
filed an information with the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City accusing two defendants of a crime he designates as ‘Robbery Hold-up’. * *
* The case was set for arraignment on December
13, 1971.  The two (2)
defendants, namely, Remigio Nadonga
y Manahan and Rolando Tupaz y Hernandez were
detention prisoners.  Both were arraigned
on December 13, 1971.  Because they had no counsel, the Court
appointed Atty. Abelardo Andal
as their counsel de-officio.  Upon their
arraignment, both defendants pleaded guilty. 
Thereupon, upon motion of Atty. Abelardo Andal, the defendants were allowed to prove the additional
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness. 
Defendant Remigio Nadonga
took the witness stand to prove drunkenness. 
After his testimony the fiscal did not ask for a chance to present
rebuttal evidence and the case was submitted for decision.  Hence, a judgment of conviction was forthwith
rendered and promulgated in open Court after the plea of guilty. * * *.”^[1]
The complainant in this case, Delfin M. Tobias, is
the offended party in the above criminal case.

The charges will now be examined one by one.  This is how respondent Judge refuted the
alleged unusual consideration shown both defendants:  “With respect to the first charge of
leniency, the law allows leniency in the imposition of the penalty to
defendants who plead guilty and who have mitigating circumstances in their
favor.  In this particular case, the
Court appreciated in favor of the defendants the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty
and drunkenness.  The penalty prescribed
for the offense charged in the information is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period or a range of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years.  In view of the concurrence of two mitigating
circumstances in favor of the defendants without any aggravating circumstances
to offset the same, the defendants were entitled to a penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed by law for the offense in accordance with Article 64,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. 
One degree lower is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional
in its medium period which ranges from four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months.  Under the
law, respondent Judge could have imposed upon the defendants even as low a
penalty as four (4) months and one (1) day. 
But he did not.  He imposed a
penalty of one (1) year.  Thus,
respondent Judge was not exactly very lenient. 
Even if he was, the penalty imposed was within the range fixed by
law.  Complainant claims he has evidence
of recidivism and use of motor vehicle against the defendants.  He should have so informed the fiscal before
the filing of the information in order that it could have been properly
alleged.  The information filed alleges
no aggravating circumstance.”^[2]
No further attention need be paid to the second charge that respondent Judge
did not notify the offended party as to when the arraignment was set.  Clearly the law does not so require.  Nor did respondent Judge incur any failure to
comply with a duty the law imposes on him when he did not send a copy of his
decision to the offended party.  Equally so, there is no merit to the alleged
grievance of the offended party that while the information charges
“Robbery Hold-up”, the decision found the accused guilty of robbery merely.  As was noted in the answer of respondent
Judge, the appropriate legal terminology would be robbery with violence or
intimidation of persons.  It was
unfortunate that the fiscal who filed the information was guilty of legal
imprecision when he added the term “hold-up”.

Much less could there be any basis for the last specified
grievance, the alleged ignorance of respondent Judge when he failed to sentence
the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of inability to
pay the indemnity of P4,000.00.  It did
suffice for him in his answer to quote the letter of the then Undersecretary of
Justice, now Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza,
to complainant regarding this point. 
Thus:  “And insofar as the decision does not require subsidiary imprisonment, this is but in
accordance with Republic Act 5465 approved on April 24, 1965 which amends
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code by requiring subsidiary imprisonment only
in the event of failure to pay the fine imposed but not in case of failure to
pay reparation of damage caused.’“^[3] Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that
respondent Judge has not in any wise, in this particular case at least,
rendered himself susceptible to the accusation that he did not live up to the
exacting standard of the law.

One last word.  There
appears to be a querulous note in the answer of respondent Judge.  He was not at all happy about having to answer a complaint that, as he pointed out,
betrayed on its face ignorance of elementary legal doctrines.  Such reaction, while understandable is not
justifiable.  The constitutional right to
a petition, to enable the citizen to air his grievances,^[4]
would certainly be emasculated if the response of the governmental body to
which it is addressed is one of indifference. 
The fate of the people and the supremacy of the Constitution would
thereby be sorely tested.  What is worse,
a safety valve against a violent reaction would be closed.  This constitutional guarantee requires then
that complaints against officialdom be seriously attended to.  Where meritorious, the remedy could be
supplied.  If found to be devoid of
substance, the party charged is vindicated with the complainant having the
satisfaction of at least having been listened to.  There is thus fidelity to what the
Constitution ordains.

More specifically, if this Court were not to take pains to
inquire seriously into any imputation of misconduct on the part of a lower
court, it exposes itself to criticism. 
It may be indicted for not living up to its responsibility.  Care is to be taken then lest a failure to
pay attention to any administrative suit against a judge may be characterized
as abdication of a solemn trust.  Any
other norm of conduct might result in the diminution of the confidence reposed
in the judiciary.  At any rate,
respondent Judge was merely asked to comment. 
That is a midway step between a curt and summary dismissal of a complaint,
invariably the product of a sincere conviction that one has been wronged, even
if not infrequently, without sufficient basis, and giving it due course by
requiring an answer.  Apparently unaware
of such a difference, respondent Judge submitted an answer explaining in detail
his actuation.  As was noted at the
outset, it was well that he did so.  For,
as has been made so clearly evident, what was done by him was fully in accord
with the law.  Moreover, the least
suspicion that his conduct was impressed with leniency towards the accused
cannot justly be entertained.  His
vindication is thus entire and complete. 
Respondent Judge, under the circumstances, should be the last to begrudge
that part of his valuable time had to be devoted to putting things in their
true light for the benefit, not so much
of this Court, but of the complainant and the lay public.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent
Judge is hereby dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Answer, p. 2.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 3-4.

^[3]
Ibid, p. 7.

^[4]
According to Article III, Section 1,
par. 8 of the Constitution:  “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.”