CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ, AMADOR ALARCON AND LUIS AGAWAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, RESPONDENT.

Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32)
squatter families to own the land of approximately 50 square meters each on
which their respective homes were built. 
To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this
Court.  Thwarted, too, was the
benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its
property at a give-away price thinking that it was accommodating the landless
squatters.

The antecedent facts follow:

The Colegio de San
Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio,
for short) used to own a parcel
of land at the Seminary Road,
Barrio Bathala, Quezon City.  Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon
City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital
but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. 
Squatters, however, settled in the area since
1965 or 1966.

Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through
Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R.
Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his
residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement.  Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters,
Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to
the squatters.  Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization
and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler.  Following that advice, the squatters formed
the “Samahang Pagkakaisa
ng Barrio Bathala” (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe
Martin as President (Exhibit “24”, Robinol),
who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of
the land to them.

But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan,
Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with
whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members.  On 28 March 1971, the land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at P15 per square meter or a total consideration of
P41,961.65.  The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P100 to P120 per square
meter.  It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented
the squatters on the property.  On the
same date, 28 March 1971,
Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.

In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan
filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled “Celedonio Quilban, et al.,
Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants,”
with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the
corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio.  The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.

To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00
as attorney’s fees on 8 October 1975
(Exhibit “1”).  Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the
land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to
each of them.  What was initially a
verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit
“2”).

On 14 November 1978,
the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:

“(1)           ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants to execute a deed
of conveyance of the land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the
payment of the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of refusal or
failure on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute the same
in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel said certificate and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of
plaintiffs-appellants, upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be
executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering appellees
jointly and severally to pay appellants the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, plus costs.” (p. 30, Report and Recommendation)

To raise the amount of P41,961.65
ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment
of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation,
transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family.  The Treasurer, Luis Agawan,
issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.

On 18 May 1979,
the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00
respectively; and on 2 June 1979,
the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00.

After almost a year, the five
officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera.  When queried, Atty. Robinol
replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ
of Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. 
However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been
dismissed.  After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.

On 6 March
1980, 21 out of 32
plaintiffs arrived at a “first consensus” to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit “3”).  The officers of the Samahan
thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March
1980 containing the
consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. 
Upon Atty. Montemayor’s
advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to
terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00
deposited with him (Exhibit “5”). 
Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the
demand.  A subsequent letter of the same
tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit “6”), was
similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.

On 20 March
1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case
No. Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit “8”), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated 18 March
1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five
officers (Exhibit “9”).  Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the
defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the
plaintiffs (Exhibit “10”).  At
the hearing of the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol
manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution
by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits “11” &
“11-A”).

Because Atty. Robinol, however, still
questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the “second consensus” (Exhibit
“E”) was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect
that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as
their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.

Administrative Case No.
2144

On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers
filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the
investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return
the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over
members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. 
The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit
executed on 14 April 1980
describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.

In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains
that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of Appeals
after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attorney’s fees was on a contingent basis – if he obtains a
reversal of the lower Court Decision, they will give him a portion of the
property subject matter of the litigation equal to the portion that will
pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not
receive P70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P56,470.00; that
he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received
P70,000.00 only to save Complainants from embarrassment and shame should their
co-plaintiffs ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares,
which they have not; that the correct amount in his possession is only
P62,470.00 – it would really be P75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their
shares in the amount of P12,500,00 at P2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez
paid his balance of P30.00; that he had the right to hold the money in is
possession as guarantee for the payment of his attorney’s fees – instead of
getting a portion of the property that will pertain to each of the plaintiffs,
he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion
is P50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square
meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P500.00 up per square meter); that
considering that P50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/2) per cent of the
total value of the property, which
is more than a million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready
to give back the amount of P12,470.00, representing the difference between P50,000.00
and the amount of P62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make
this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the exclusive
disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court
cannot pass judgment on Complainants’ plea that the amount deposited by
respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an
ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate
the money in his possession (P62,470.00) for
himself, but he is holding it until his attorney’s fees are satisfied
there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants’ adamant
refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge;
and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without
his (Robinol’s) formal withdrawal and conformity.

Administrative Case No.
2180

Pursuing that tack, on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol
filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto
R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted
the case without his (Robinol’s) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing
fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.

For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied
that the attorney’s fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being
that the attorney’s fees were payable on a
cash basis of P2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed
by Atty. Robinol (Annex “1”), plus whatever
amount is adjudicated as attorney’s fees by the Court of Appeals; that the
contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the
result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil
Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement
(Annex “2”); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex “3”, which
is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he
agreed to act as counsel if only
to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most
members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no
formal Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in
Civil Case No. Q-16433 (Annex “8”), the written consent of the
clients (Annex “9”), notice to Atty. Robinol
of his discharge and substitution (Annexes “10” and “11”),
non-objection by Robinol of his appearance as counsel
(Annex “12′), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as
shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex “13”); that his professional
and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
Q-16433, CFI-Quezon
City, do not cause dishonor either
to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint against him should
be dismissed.

On 1 September 1980
and on 17 December 1980,
the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.  On 15 December 1988, the Solicitor General
submitted his compliance and recommended:

“1.     That Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for
refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty
will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered
to return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No. 2134,
the sum of P75,000.00.

“2.     That the case
against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor,
Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct
imputed to him by Atty. Robinol.” (pp. 59-60, Rollo)

Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations.

Re: Atty. Santiago
R. Robinol

Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty
of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue
in the practice of the profession.  After
the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he
had received the latter’s funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided
to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of
each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges
to be the monetary value of that area. 
Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to
unilaterally appropriate his clients’ money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because,
under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so.  His clients were mere squatters who could
barely eke out an existence.  They had
painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which
to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having
seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.

Atty. Robinol
has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he
had the legal right to retain the money in his possession.  Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his
discharge as counsel. 
His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in
dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound
to protect.  Secondly, even if there were
no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients’ funds
intended for a specific purpose – the purchase of land.  He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.

The principle of quantum meruit applies
if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which
case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned.  In this case, however, there was an express
contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. 
The implied assumpsit on quantum meruit, therefore, is
inapplicable.

But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon
the Court that he had received only the sum of P62,470.00 and not P75,000.00
claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had
not yet paid their shares totalling P12,500.00.

We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants’ evidence
on this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact, received the total
sum of P75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P12,500.00
of the five (5) officers of the Samahan.  For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion
for Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979;
and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made
mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted their
corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the five (5)
officers of the Samahan.

Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the
practice of law.  He has not only
violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his clients.  He has
also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it
full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire
a homelot they could call their own.

Re:  Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor

In so far as Atty. Montemayor is,
concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not
exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of
his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. Q-16433.

Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one
(21) had signed the first consensus of 6
March 1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer.  In as much as Atty. Robinol
sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of
their shares, only twenty-five (25) of them should be considered in determining
the majority.  Consequently, twenty-one
(21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the said consensus
binding.  It is more than a simple
majority.

Moreover, the following developments estop
Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel:  On 17 March 1980 he was informed in writing
by plaintiffs of the termination of his services (Exhibit “5”).  That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor
(Exhibit “6”).  In his
Memorandum of 12 December 1985
and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he
had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor’s
appearance in Civil Case Q-16433.  When
the latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself
that Atty. Robinol’s
services had been formally terminated. 
He had in no way encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague.

There is no gainsaying
that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any
time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.  In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil
suit below decided to change their lawyer. 
Atty. Robinol, for loss of
trust and confidence.  That act
was well within their prerogative.

In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor
is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit.

ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having
violated his lawyer’s oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary
relation between lawyer and client, and
proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law.  By reason of his unethical actuations, he is
hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney’s fees and is ordered
to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the
aforementioned Administrative Case.

2) Administrative Case. No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered
in the respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol
and Anacleto R. Montemayor.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.