FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO, RESPONDENT.

In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant Felicidad
Bariñan Tan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Galileo J. Trocio for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.

Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn
Vocational School in Baroy, Lanao
del Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about 8:30 PM, after
classes were dismissed, respondent, who is the legal counsel of the school,
overpowered her inside the office and, against her will, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her.  As a result, she begot a son on 5 February
1972 whom she named and registered as Jewel Tan.  She avers that respondent used to support
Jewel but subsequently lost interest in doing so
thereby neglecting to defray the needed expenses for Jewel’s well-being.  Complainant also alleges that the respondent
threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the authorities
since she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational school.  This threat, aside from the fact that Complainant is
a married
woman with eight children and a school directress at the time of the
sexual assault, made her desist from filing a charge against the respondent.
However, after eight years and thorough soul-searching, she decided to file this
administrative complaint.

Respondent,
in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of the vocational
school.  In fact, he contends that he had
also served
as the
lawyer of
the Complainant, her family and her parents-in–law.  Thus,
in 1971, he helped prosecute a case for robbery committed against Complainant’s mother and
sisters.  Also, in March of 1976, when a
fire of unknown origin gutted the school, he assisted the complainant in
collecting P10,000.00 from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00 from
Fortune Insurance Corporation as indemnities. 
With regard to the same case, he also represented complainant in a suit
involving a P130,000.00 claim against the Workmen’s Insurance Corporation
before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte.  Then in 1978, he was retained as a collaborating attorney by Complainant’s family in an inheritance case.  Further, her father-in-law had always
consulted him in matters affecting the former’s
store.

But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted
the Complainant.  He argues that her
motivation in filing this charge
was to get even with him after having been humiliated when he declined her
request to commit a “breach of trust.” He states that in the
inheritance case he handled for her family. Complainant insisted that he report
to her mother and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00 instead of
the P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket the
difference.  He refused and told the
Complainant to look for another lawyer. 
She tried twice to make peace with him but was unsuccessful.  Rebuffed, she promised to get even with
him.  Thus, this
complaint.

Another reason why Complainant filed the present case, respondent
claims, is to escape her indebtedness to him representing his services as legal
counsel of the school which were unpaid since 1974 and the accumulated
honoraria from her fire insurance claims. 
These obligations were left unpaid despite demand made when respondent
learned that Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.

On 2 June 1980,
the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the Answer already filed, referred the
case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On
19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the Complaint that the investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as she and
her witnesses could not afford
to come to Manila, referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of said province for the necessary proceedings.

Between September and October of 1980, hearings were conducted on the case.  In a Report and Recommendation, dated 16 January 1981,
the Provincial Fiscal stated that respondent
failed to attend the hearing despite the issuance of subpoenae;
that there was prima
facie evidence showing that respondent had committed
acts violative of his professional decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary action against him.  The records of the case were then forwarded to the Office of the
Solicitor General.

On 1 September 1982,
the Office of the Solicitor General returned the records to the Provincial
Fiscal of Lanao del Norte for re-investigation on the
ground that the investigation was
conducted in the absence of respondent, who did not appear despite subpoenas sent to him.  Thus, further
proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Fiscal wherein Respondent was allowed to
submit a sworn letter, dated 13 December 1985,
amplifying on the defenses contained in
his Answer.

On 13
February 1986, the
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte issued a Resolution adopting
his previous Report and Recommendation
of 16 January 1981, which
found prima
facie evidence to hold Respondent
administratively liable.  On the same day, the records of the case were referred back to the Office
of the Solicitor General.

On 16 May
1986, the Office of the Solicitor General
came up with its own Report recommending that Respondent be disbarred for gross
immoral conduct.  On 17 July 1986, as directed by the Court, the Solicitor General filed a formal Complaint for disbarment against
Respondent.  On 29 May
1990, the
case was raffled to this Second
Division and was included in the latter’s agenda on 13 June 1990.

Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while
Respondent’s Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received on 3 October 1990.  The
required pleadings being complete,
this case is now ripe for resolution.

The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should
be disbarred for immoral conduct.  This
in turn, hinges on the question of whether he had, in fact, sexually assaulted
the Complainant as a consequence of which the latter begot a child by him.

We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s charge.

The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April,
1971.  Yet, no criminal charge was filed,
and it was only about eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative complaint was
presented before this Court.  Complainant’s explanation that Respondent’s threat to cause the deportation of her alien husband should she report to
anyone made her desist from filing a charged is not credible as she had
admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned of respondent’s
transgression that very same evening
(p. 3, TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46, Rollo).  The fear that she speaks of, therefore, had become inexistent.

Another factor that
engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact that after the
alleged incident, she continued
having dealings with the Respondent
as if nothing had happened.  Thus, by Respondent’s own account, which was left uncontroverted
by the Complainant, the former
assisted her mother and sisters
prosecute a robbery
case.  Then in March, 1976, she
secured respondent’s services in claiming indemnity from three insurance companies when a fire burned
the school down.  Finally, respondent was
retained as a collaborating attorney by complainant’s
family in an inheritance case. 
These subsequent dealings are far from being the normal reaction of a woman who has been wronged.

Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued supporting the child
for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not been substantiated.  Truth to tell, the fact that she kept her
peace for so many years can even be construed
as a condonation of his alleged “immoral
conduct.” It is likewise strange that an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been,
should, of all names, be called “Jewel.”

During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the complainant, aside from herself,
presented two other witnesses, Eleuteria Garcia and Marilou
Pangandaman, both her domestic help, to
testify.  Among the three, it was Eleuteria who tried to establish the manner in which the sexual assault took place.  Thus:

“xxx

“Q –    You stated
in your affidavit marked Annex A that you heard Felicidad
Bariñan Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of
last week of April, 1971, can you tell
me or do you know why Mrs. Tan shouted for help?

“A 
–    Yes sir.  When I responded to the shout for help of Tan
I noticed that Atty. Galileo Trocio hurriedly left
the office leaving behind Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan.

“Q  –   Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad
Bariñan Tan why she was shouting for help?

“A  –      Before I could ask her the reason why she
shouted for help, she told me and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually abused by Atty. Galileo
J. Trocio.

“Q  –   What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan when you
responded to her shout for help?

“A 
–    She was crying and
trying to fix her dress.

“xxx (p.
52-53, Rollo).”

However, how near
to the crime scene said witness was, considering that it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. Her credibility is thus also put in issue.

The testimonies of Complainant
and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another
maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing
enough to prove paternity, as
Complainant would want us to believe. 
The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of
Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each
other.  Such evidence is inconclusive to
prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person
and honor.

More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical
access between the couple was impossible. 
From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof.  In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate
child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.

WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and
is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.