CARMEN LAMES, COMPLAINANT, VS. FEDERICO A. LASCIERAS, RESPONDENT.

Federico A. Lascieras, 45, a resident of Sariaya, Quezon, who was
admitted to the bar in 1972, was charged by Carmen Lames with negligence in
handling the defense of her son in Criminal Case No. 6969 of the municipal
court of Sariaya, People vs. Fructuoso Lames, Jr.

In that case, the accused was convicted of qualified theft of
coconuts.  The judgment of conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  Mrs.
Lames also faulted the respondent for not appearing at the promulgation of the
judgment although she gave him ten pesos for transportation expenses.

Respondent lawyer in his answer to the charges alleged that as
counsel de oficio
he secured a bail bond for the accused and he acted as one of the sureties;
that during the trial a prosecution witness testified that she saw the accused
descending from a coconut tree owned by Escolastico Alivio, and that the
witness recognized Lames because of the moonlight.

The respondent disclosed in his answer that he presented three
witnesses for the defense of Lames.  One
witness, Cecilia Hermoso, testified that Lames slept in her house at the time
the alleged theft was committed.  Another
witness, Pedro Delfino, admitted that he was the one who climbed Alivio’s
coconut tree.  In view of that
confession, the respondent moved that the charge against Lames be dismissed and
that Delfino be indicted for qualified theft but the court denied his motion.

The respondent alleged that he submitted a memorandum in behalf
of Lames after telling his mother that he needed the transcripts of the
stenographic notes.  As he could not
attend the promulgation of the judgment, because he had a hearing in the
Circuit Criminal Court, he filed a manifestation in the municipal court stating
that he could not be present at the promulgation of the judgment and requesting that he be furnished with a copy of
the decision.

After learning of the judgment of conviction, the respondent
filed a notice of appeal.  Mrs. Lames
took the records of the case from him and then denounced him to the President
of the Philippines
in her letter dated May 22, 1978
which was referred to this Court and was treated as a complaint for disbarment.

We hold under the circumstances recited above that there is no
basis for taking disciplinary action against the
respondent.  His conduct as counsel de
oficio was not characterized by deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct
and incompetence.  Nor can any
dishonorable or corrupt motive be ascribed to him just because he failed to
obtain a verdict of acquittal.  The
respondent cannot be blamed for the
failure of the municipal judge to grant his motion for dismissal based on
Delfino’s judicial confession.  The
complainant and her present counsel should know that the respondent could not
guarantee the exoneration of the accused.

A lawyer under his oath pledges that he would conduct himself as
a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, “with all
good fidelity as well to the courts” as to his clients.  And in defense of the accused, he is required
to employ “all fair and honorable measures” and “to present
every defense that the law permits” so that the accused would not be
deprived of his life or liberty without due process of law.

As Justice Sanchez said, a counsel de oficio must
exert his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of an indigent
accused.  Said counsel should not
discharge his duties in a perfunctory manner. 
(In re Lope Adriano, People vs. Estebia,
L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106, 109).

There is no justification for holding in this case that the
respondent violated his oath as a lawyer or was remiss in the performance of
his duties.  There is no showing that he
suppressed facts or secreted witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of
the accused.

The possibility that a lawyer, more experienced and competent
than the respondent, could have defended complainant’s son with more skill and
ability, is not a ground for holding that the respondent is not fit to be a
member of the bar.

The complainant has the onus of showing that the respondent was
guilty of culpable negligence or grave omission in conducting the defense of
her son.  She failed to sutain that
burden of proof. “No es practica laudable echar la culpa a un compañero en
la profesion, a menos que las pruebas la demuestren claramente.  La presuncion es que todo abogado emplea
todos sus esfuerzos para servir los fines dela justicia” (People vs.
Mantawar, 80 Phil. 817, 822-3).  That
presumption was not overthrown in this case.

Complainant’s insinuation that the respondent wrongfully exacted
from her the amount of twenty-seven pesos is unwarranted because that amount
was used to pay for the transcripts of stenographic notes which respondent
needed in preparing his memorandum.

With respect to the sum of ten pesos, which the complainant paid
to the respondent, that amount was given for respondent’s transportation
expenses in going from his residence at Barrio Lutucan to the municipal court
in the poblacion.

We can visualize that the complainant, who is not an affluent
person, would not want that the sum of thirty-seven pesos, which she gave to the respondent, should be squandered
recklessly, but it does not appear that the respondent defrauded her of that
amount or that he misused and misappropriated it.

Respondent’s absence at the promulgation of the judgment is not a
sufficient ground for subjecting him to disciplinary action.  He satisfactorily explained why he could not
be present at that proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent
is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., did not take
part.