LEONISA O. GONZALES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RICARDO C. PARRENAS, RESPONDENT.

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 4, 1977, Leonisa O. Gonzales charged Atty. Ricardo C. Parrenas with having culpably violated his lawyer’s oath
when he amicably settled for the amount of P1,000.00 the former’s
complaint for libel against Erna Tumala, Nemesia
Vizconde and Patria Tumala,
then pending before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, without complainant’s
knowledge and consent, and, thereafter, misappropriated said amount.^[1]

Complainant alleged that in March, 1971 she engaged the legal
services of respondent to represent her in the aforesaid libel case which was
docketed in the City Fiscal’s Office as I.S. No.
71-5175 and assigned to Assistant City Fiscal F. Abasolo
for investigation; that during the scheduled hearing, complainant was advised
by the respondent not to appear, and was assured that he would handle the
matter himself; that subsequently, however, complainant learned that respondent
settled the case for the amount of P1,000.00 without her knowledge and consent;
that complainant confronted the respondent who promised to pay her but failed to
do so despite repeated demands; and, that in view thereof, complainant filed
against respondent a criminal case for estafa which
has remained pending with the City Court of Manila since 1972.  Contending that the foregoing alleged actuations of the respondent
constitute culpable violation of his lawyer’s oath, complainant prays for his
disbarment.^[2]

On September 2, 1977
respondent was required to comment on the complaint.^[3]
On October 24, 1977,
respondent filed his “Comment and Manifestation” wherein he denied
the charges against him and manifested that he is ready to defend himself in this administrative case but only after the
termination of the criminal action for estafa.  He contended that because of the pendency of said criminal case, “it would be a violation
of (his) constitutional right (against) self-incrimination to expose his
defense in the administrative investigation.”^[4]

On November 21, 1977,
this Court re­solved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.^[5]

Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted an
investigation of the charges against respondent.  But despite due notice, respondent Parrenas never appeared on the scheduled hearings.  Whereupon, the complainant was allowed to
present her oral and documentary
evidence.^[6]

On the basis of complainant’s unrebutted
evidence, the Solicitor General found -?

“(T)hat respondent committed serious acts of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct in office, namely:  (1) com­promising the case of libel with­out
the knowledge and consent of complainant, even deciding the terms of the
settlement him­self; and (2) after receiving the financial settlement of P800.00, he did not give it to complainant
but instead mis­appropriated the same.”^[7]

In view of such finding, the Solicitor General filed with this
Court, along with his “Report and Recommendation”, a complaint for
disbarment charging respondent Parrenas with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct and praying that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys and
that he be forever prohibited from practicing law in the Philippines.^[8]

 On November 20, 1978
respondent was required to answer, which he did on January 5, 1979.^[9]
He admitted that the complainant engaged his services to represent her in the
preliminary investigation of the complaint for libel which she filed against Erna Tumala, Patria Tumala and Nemesia Vizconde.  He, how­ever, denied having settled said case
without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, contending that it was
the complainant her­self who requested him to settle the case for the amount of
P1,000.00 to be applied as follows: 
P600.00 for the respondent as his attorney’s fee; P200.00 for the
counsel of the Tumalas; and P200.00 for the
complainant to be collected by her from
the ex-mayor who interceded in behalf of the Tumalas.  Respondent further denied having
misappropriated the amount of P800.00, contending that he turned over
the sum of P600.00 to complainant, but that the latter returned the amount to
him as his attorney’s fee.  Finally,
respondent denied having violated his lawyer’s oath and cited his twenty five
(25) years of service in the government — holding various positions therein —
as proof of his “unstained service to country”.  Although he reiterated his previous request
to this Court to hold in abeyance the adminis­trative investigation until the
termination of the criminal case pending before the City Court of Manila,
respondent nevertheless prayed that after due hearing, this complaint for disbarment be dismissed.^[10]

Complainant, through the Solicitor General, filed a reply to the
answer of the respondent on February 28, 1979. 
She denied having agreed to dismiss her charge of libel against Erna Tumala, Patria Tumala and Nemesia Vizconde.  She
contended that she was completely unaware of the settlement which was entirely
the idea of the respondent.  And,
insisting that respon­dent was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct, the complainant reiterated her prayer for his disbarment.^[11]

The issues having been joined, and since respondent’s answer
contained no statement as to his desire to adduce evidence before a
commissioner to be appointed by this Court pursuant to Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
139 of the Rules of Court, the case was set for hearing on May 28, 1979, a Monday, at 10:30 a.m..^[12] However, respondent filed with this Court on
May 25, 1979 an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the hearing of this case
until the termination of the criminal action for estafa
so as not to expose his defense in said criminal case.^[13]
And on the scheduled hearing, only complainant, though Solicitor Romeo de la
Cruz, appeared.^[14]
Thereupon, this Court resolved to consider this case submitted for decision.^[15]

In the light of the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents,
three issues emerge for Our resolution, namely:

1.  May this administrative case be decided
despite respondent’s insistence that the same be held in abeyance until after
the termination of the pending criminal case for estafa
initiated against him for the same cause of action by the same complainant?

2.  In the affirmative, is
respondent guilty as charged on the basis of the records on hand?

3.  Again, in the
affirmative, what penalty may be imposed upon respondent?

1. The first issue is resolved in the affirmative.  Respondent’s contention that the proceedings in this case should be suspended
because of the pendency of the estafa
case is without merit.  For, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General –

“The issues in the estafa case are
not completely the same as the issues in this proceeding.  The point of in­quiry in this case is whether
respondent is fit to continue as a member of the legal pro­fession in view of
his above-mentioned conduct.  The issue
in the estafa case is whether respondent had caused
damage to complainant through
fraud.”^[16]

Respondent’s claim that “it would be a violation of (his)
constitutional right (against) self-incrimination to expose his defense in the
administrative investigation”,^[17]
is palpably erroneous and self-contradicting. 
For it is hard to see how the respondent’s defense in this
administrative case can incriminate him in the criminal proceeding.  And, as
the Solicitor General correctly argued –

“Indeed respondent
has the right to remain silent and he can invoke his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, but this does not mean that this case may not be continued and respondent’s moral unfitness
determined from evidence other than his admission.  Respondent cannot make use of his own
wrongdoing as a shield against adminis­trative sanctions imposable against
him.”^[18]

The record also shows that the pro­cedure prescribed by Rule 139
of the Rules of Court on “Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys” has
been faithfully, nay religiously, followed in the instant case.  Therefore, there is no legal impediment to
this case being now finally determined and decided by this Court.

Respondent’s right to procedural due process has thus been fully
respected.  He has been accorded
sufficient opportunity to present whatever defense he had and the evidence in
support thereof.  His refusal to appear,
des­pite due notice, at the hearings held, first, in the Office of the
Solicitor General, and, later, in this Court, should be construed as a waiver
of his right to present whatever evidence he had and should not in any way
defeat complainant’s right to the final resolution of her complaint for
disbarment.

2. The second issue is likewise resolved in the affirmative.

Respondent does not deny having amicably settled the libel case
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by his client (herein complainant)
against Erna Tumala, Nemesia Vizconde and Patria Tumala.  Neither does
he deny having received the amount of P800.00 as part of the settlement
price.  He, however, contends that it was
the complainant herself who requested him to settle the case and directed him
to take the amount of P600.00 as his attorney’s fee and to give the remaining
P200.00 to the lawyer of the Tumalas.  But he presents no evidence whatsoever to
support such contention.

On the other hand, the complainant pro­duced before the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General oral and documentary evidence
to support her charges of deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct.  And on the basis
of such evidence, the Solicitor General made the following findings and
conclusions:

“The unrebutted testimony of
complainant and her documentary evidence show that complainant filed a
complaint for libel docketed as I.S. No. 71-5175 in the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila against Erna Tumala,
Patria Tumala and Nemesia Vizconde (Exhibit B). 
To represent her during the hearing of the case, she en­gaged the
services of respon­dent (pp. 5-6, TSN, March 31, 1978).  A few days before one of the scheduled
hearings, res­pondent went to Iloilo City (p. 26, ibid).  In view of the absence of her counsel,
complainant went to his house to get the record of the case so that she can
arrange for representation during the hearing (p. 27, ibid).  When she got the record, much to her
surprise, she found a receipt (Exhibit C) signed by respondent stating that the
libel case has been settled in consideration of the amount of P800.00 received
by respondent and P200.00 still to be paid (p. 27, ibid).  Complainant went to the Fiscal’s
Office and her worst fears were confirmed for she found out that the case had
indeed been dismissed (pp. 8-9, ibid; Exhibit A).”

“Complainant tried to contact respondent in order to confront
him with the receipt and the dismissal of the case but to no avail.  Convinced that respondent was evading her,
complainant filed against him the case for estafa doc­keted
as Criminal Case No. F-145436 in the City Court of Manila (pp. 29-30, ibid;
Exhibit E).

“It is clear from the facts that respondent committed se­rious
acts of deceit, malprac­tice and gross misconduct in office, namely:  (1) compromising the case of libel with­out
the knowledge and consent of complainant, even deciding the terms of the
settlement himself; and (2) after receiving the financial settlement of
P800.00, he did not give it to complainant but instead he mis­appropriated the
same.”^[19]

This Court finds no reason to disagree with the foregoing
findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.

While it is true that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that
he is innocent of the charges proferred against him
until the contrary is proved and that
as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duty in
accordance with his oath,^[20] in the case at bar, such presump­tions have
been sufficiently overcome by the evidence presented by the complainant before
the Solicitor General which stand unrebutted.  Significantly, under Section 6, Rule 139 of
the Rules of Court, said evidence may be con­sidered by this Court in the final
decision of this case.  Consequently,
this Court holds respondent guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
in office for having amicably settled the libel suit filed by his client
without the latter’s knowledge and consent and having misappropriated the
settlement amount of P800.00.

3. Finally, as to the penalty to be imposed.  The Solicitor General recommends that
respondent’s name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys and that he be forever
prohibited from practicing law in the Philippines.

While it is true that the actuations of the respondent lawyer
deserve condemnation by this Court, the same are not, however, of such
magnitude as to merit the supreme sanction of disbarment.  Instead, a suspension of five years is deemed
adequate and commensurate to the charges proved and sufficient to serve as
warning against the commission of similar acts by the other members of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of FIVE YEARS from notice hereof.  Let this decision be noted in the records of
the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 1.

^[2]
Id., pp. 1-2.

^[3]
Id., p. 11.

^[4]
Id., p. 21.

^[5]
Id., p. 23.

^[6]
Id., pp. 25-28.

^[7]
Id., p. 28.

^[8]
Id., pp. 43-45.

^[9]
Id., pp. 57 and 66.

^[10]
Id., pp. 66-67.

^[11]
Id., pp. 77-79.

^[12]
Id., p. 81.

^[13]
Id., p. 87.

^[14]
Id., p. 89.

^[15]
Id., p. 90.

^[16]
Id., p. 29.

^[17]
Id., p. 21.

^[18]
Id., p. 29.

^[19]
Id., pp. 27-28.

^[20]
Santos v. Dischoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978, 84 SCRA 622.