BELLA FALCIS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE VICENTE CUSI, JR., RESPONDENT.

This is an administrative complaint filed on September 9, 1977.

Complainant charges respondent judge under two specifications, to
wit:

“Specification No. 1

“Oppression, grave and serious misconduct in that the
respondent Judge, far from exercising his judicial functions free from outside
interferences and pressures, and with pre-determined and pre-conceived design
to do harm and injustice to complainant
at the importurnings of officials and key personnel of the Philippine National
Bank, Davao Branch, Davao City, against whom complainant made an expose with
PNB higher authorities and the Department of National Defense, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City, availed of and utilized then a
pending Criminal Case No. 2561 against the undersigned and being tried by
respondent judge — as a measure of retribution — and insured eventually
undersigned complainant’s conviction by the respondent judge.

“Specification No. 2

“Ignorance of the law, grave and serious misconduct,
harrassment and oppression in that respondent Judge, on 12 August 1977, after
promulgating the decision in Criminal Case No. 2561 convicting the undersigned
complainant, deliberately and with malice, refused to approve the bail bond for
the provisional release of herein complainant but instead ordered her immediate
incarceration, on representations made
by the officials of the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, Davao
City, such that respondent Judge approved only
the bail bond on August 15, 1977. 
It may be stated here that
respondent Judge ordered the commitment pending appeal of undersigned
complainant on a Friday, 12 August 1977 notwithstanding the presentation
of a bail bond with sufficient justification for his approval, but instead
wilfully and with malice aforethought delayed such approval up to Monday,
15 August 1977, all in violation of his oath of office that justice be
administered with an even heart and hand, if not existing circulars from higher
authorities that no arrests shall be made on days, of which the subject will be
unable to post a bond the  following day
for the reason that such following day is not a working day or is a
holiday.”

Complainant attached Annex “A”, her sworn statement,
and annexes thereto with the request that a formal investi­gation be conducted,
if evidence so warrants.

Complainant, in her sworn statement, states that she was a former
employee of PNB, Davao Branch, Davao City and as such employee, exposed to PNB
authorities’ anomalies being perpetrated by authorities and high ranking
officials of PNB; that she brought such anomalies to the attention of Sec. Juan
Ponce Enrile of National Defense, who is concurrently the Chairman of the Board
of PNB; that Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile ordered the military authorities to
step into the investigation which is under progress; that about the time the
military authorities were conducting the investigation of the bank anomalies,
the promulgation of the judgment in Crim. Case No. 2561, wherein complainant is
the accused, was scheduled by respondent judge who tried the case; that in view
of her conviction, complainant’s lawyer immediately submitted Surety Bond DAV
CR(2)-02333 FT/V 26212 in the amount of P6,000.00
as appeal bond, but which respondent judge refused, saying “I should be
put in jail” since “PNB officials have made represent­ation with him
that I have to be put in jail” (Annex “A-1); that complainant was
placed under arrest (Annex “A-2); that on August 15, 1977, respondent
judge approved the appeal bond pursuant to which complainant was released
(Annex “A-3); that respondent judge knowingly rendered unjust and illegal
order and allowed himself to be influenced by outside parties is ‘apparent by
the fact that his order of commitment was made on Friday, August 12, 1977, the following day being a Saturday
…” which constitute grave oppression, harrassment and grave, serious
misconduct that warrant disciplinary action (Annex “A-4)

The complaint was referred on
September 14, 1977 by the Acting Judicial Consultant to respondent
judge, who by way of traverse, filed his Answer per his 2nd Indorsement of
October 6, 1977.  Respondent’s answer, in
part, follow.

Answering “Specification No. 1″of the basic
communication, the undersigned has this to say. 
Long before the arraignment of the accused.  Bella Falcis, Msgr.. Fernando R. Capalla,
then Auxiliary Bishop of Davao City, went to the Chamber of the undersigned and requested him to give the accused an
opportunity to explain her side of the case. 
The undersigned told Msgr. Capalla that the time for her to explain her
side would be during the trial.  After
arraignment, Msgr. Capalla again went to the Chamber of the undersigned, told
him that she is a friend of his
family, and asked him what he could do for her. 
The undersigned assured the Monsignor that he would give her
justice.  The verity of these facts can
be verified from Msgr. Capalla, who is now assigned in Iligan City.

In spite of the intercession Of Msgr. Capalla in her behalf, the
undersigned found Bella Falcis guilty as charged and sentenced her to four
years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six years, eight months and twenty days, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify Simeon G. Salazar
in the amount of P13,754.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Thus, the statement in specification No. 1 that “. . , far
from exercising his judicial function free from outside interferences and
pressures . . .” is a lie because in spite of. . . outside interferences and pressures . . .” in her favor, the
undersigned convicted her because he was convinced of her guilt.  No personnel of the Philippine National Bank,
both of the Main Office and of the Davao City Branch, saw the undersigned in
connection with the above-entitled case during the pendency of the same, much
less influenced him to convict Bella Falcis. No one in Davao City or in any part of this Country was able to
influence the undersigned how to decide the cases pending in his Sala, much
less to send an innocent person to jail.

x x x

Specification No. 2 is another lie concocted by Bella Falcis.  As Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, the undersigned approved bonds in his office, on the streets and in his
residence on any day and at any time, whenever the same were sent to him for approval, provided that they
bear the initial of the Branch Clerk of Court to show that the bonding company
concerned Is free from “. . . outstanding liabilities, already due but
unsatisfied” and the corresponding documentary and science stamps are affixed to the bonds.  If the undersigned approved the bond
of Bella Falcis on August 15, 1977, it was because it was only on that day that
the bond was cleared for his signature, not”… on representations made by the officials of the Philippine National
Bank, Davao Branch, Davao City . . .” who have nothing to do with the
case.

Respondent enclosed the affidavits of Atty. Velona P. Durante,
Acting Branch Clerk of Court and Miss Lilia Togonon, clerk in charge of
criminal cases, in support of his Answer to specification 2.

1. The burden of complainant’s charge under Specification 1, is
that respondent judge instead of deciding Criminal Case No. 2561 for Estafa on
its merits alone, prostituted his Office by yielding to outside interferences
and pressures on the part of PNB officials to insure her conviction–a very serious charge indeed.

In support thereof, however, complainant in her sworn statement
states merely that as a former employee of the Philippine National Bank, Davao
Branch, she exposed PNB anomalies which she brought to the attention of
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, of the National Defense, who is con­currently
Chairman of the Board, Philippine National Bank; that among the information she
had furnished the Secretary was the
alleged anomalous grant of a loan to a dead applicant whose application was
subscribed and sworn to Atty. Raman Bullezer, an official of the PNB branch in
Davao (Complainant’s affidavit, par. 7, Rollo, p. 3).  Apart from the foregoing, complainant has not
come forward with any clear much less palpable evidence to show prima
face that respondent judge had been actuated by any consideration apart from
the merits of the criminal case of which complainant had been found guilty.

On the contrary, it was Mons. Fernando R. Capalla who went to see
respondent judge, on two occasions, to intercede in complainant’s behalf.  (Respondent’s Answer, pars. 3 & 4; Rollo,
p. 13).  Respondent, thus, in answer to
Specification 1, forthrightly and in all candor denied that there had been any
attempt on the part of the PNB officials to see him in con­nection with
complainant’s case; that instead of such alleged interference by PNB
authorities, respondent admitted the intercession
of Monsignor Capalla in complainant’s own behalf, wham respondent advised
“that the time for her to explain her side would be during the trial”
and that respondent “would give her justice”.

2. The thrust of complainant’s charge under Specification 2, on
the other hand, is that respondent judge refused to approve the bail bond
for her provisional release; instead ordered her immediate incarceration on
representations made by officials of the Philippine National Bank, Davao
Branch, again imputing to respondent judge motives other than the proper
exercise of his judicial functions on the matter of the approval of her bail
bond for her temporary release pending appeal. 
On this score, complainant merely adverts to respondent judge’s alleged
remarks that “I should be put in jail since the PNB officials had made
representations with him (sic) that I have to be jailed.”  (Complainant’s Affidavit, p. 2; Rollo, p. 4),
which is, to say the least, incredible.

By way of traverse to Specification 2, respondent asserts–and
this is a practice of wide observance–that he approves bail bonds in his
Office, on the streets, or in his residence at any day or any time any bond is presented to him for approval, provided
that it bears the initial of the Clerk of Court.

3.  A consideration of the
complainant’s affidavit – in support of her charges–which is prolix with
conclusions but is bereft of evidentiary support therefor, and respondent’s frank
and forthright answer–detailing not only the persons who saw him in connection with complainant’s case, and
enclosing, to boot, the affidavits of the personnel of his Office, Antonina B.
Escobilla, Branch Clerk of Court, and Lilia Togonon, the clerk in charge of
records of criminal cases, Branch I, Court of First Instance, Davao City–will
readily show not only that complainant failed miserably to show a prima facie case, but
instead, that respondent’s actuations in the premises of Criminal Case No. 2651
for Estafa against complainant were proper and above-board.

Complainant is a former employee of the Philippine National Bank,
Davao Branch, Davao City, and an accused before respondent’s court who stands
convicted for the offense of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2561.  Respondent on the other hand, is the
erstwhile Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch
I, with more than 47 years of service in the government, the last 19 years of
which were, served in the Judiciary, whose optional retirement was approved by
this Court on September 19, 1977, effective September 30, 1977.  The records also show that respondent had
been the subject of com­plaints under Adm Matters Nos. 829 and 841, CFI, but
which charges had been both dismissed “for failure to show a prima facie
case” per Resolution of this Court (Ist Division) dated January 21, 1976 (Rollos, Adm. Matters Nos.
829 and 841, CFI).

Considering that the complainant failed miserably to state any
basis by way of support for the serious charge of alleged ignorance of the law
and grave and serious misconduct; considering that respondent’s answer not only
denied the serious charges but substantiates and explains his actuations in the premises of complainant’s
case for Estafa, this complaint must fall, for failure to show a prima facie
case.

WHEREFORE, let this complaint be, as it is hereby,
DISMISSED, for failure to show a prima facie case.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.