A.C. No. 1601. January 31, 1977
DIONISIO C. REQUIO, COMPLAINANT, VS. WILLIAM DY-LIACCO, RESPONDENT.
AQUINO, J.:
Attorney William E. Dy-Liacco (admitted
to the bar in 1939) was the counsel of Dionisio C. Requio and Antonio Romano in Civil Case No. 5624 of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Naga
City branch entitled “Felipe Gonowon versus Dionisio Requio and Antonio Romano”.
That damage suit was filed in June, 1963. Gonowon prayed that
Requio and Romano be ordered to pay solidarily to him damages amounting to P10,000 which were allegedly suffered by him when his bus was
bumped by defendants’ bus.
As to the substantial legal services rendered by Atty. Dy-Liacco, the record shows that he filed an answer dated July 1, 1963 and a manifestation dated
September 16, 1965 as to
defendants’ admissions. He appeared at
eleven hearings, to wit: July 20, and
September 8, 1966, May 12, 1967, February 29, May 2, July 26 and October 3,
1968, and February 14 and 19, June 26 and October 2, 1969. Eight witnesses testified. More than thirty exhibits were offered in
evidence.
Atty. Dy-Liacco said that, for those
legal services, he received from Requio as
compensation the sum of P385, itemized as follows:
Date and Receipt No. Amount Paid
June, 1963, Receipt No. 75 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – P
50.00
December, 1963, Receipt No. 191 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 50.00
January, 1964, Receipt No. 5 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
20.00
February, 1964, Receipt No. 39 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 40.00
May, 1965, Receipt No. 80 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 100.00
August, 1965, Receipt No. 126 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 50.00
March, 1966, Receipt No. 50 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 50.00
May, 1968, Receipt No. 69 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 25.00
He said that Requio
had agreed to pay him P500 for handling the case in the trial court and that Requio owed him P115 as the unpaid balance of the
stipulated attorney’s fees.
The trial court in its decision dated April 20, 1970 ordered Requio
and Romano to pay solidarily to Gonowon
damages amounting to P5,920. (Requio had
“attached his bus operation to Romano’s franchise”). It found that Requio’s
bus, after having had a tire blowout, bumped Gonowon’s
bus, which had stopped to unload passengers.
The lower court found Requio’s tire to be “quite old and
unreliable”. It characterized the
accident as an allision, not a collision.
In Requio’s behalf, Atty. Dy-Liacco perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
that decision. The appeal was dismissed
in that Court’s resolution of February
27, 1973 because Atty. Dy-Liacco did not
file any brief. He explained that he did
not file any brief because Requio decided not to
“proceed with the appeal on account of financial reverses and difficulties
due to his illness and that of his wife”.
In a letter dated July 5,
1973 Atty. Dy-Liacco apprised Requio of the dismissal of the appeal and the fact that the lower
court’s judgment had become final.
He warned Requio: “We can therefore expect that the next
move of plaintiff is to ask for the execution of the lower court’s
decision.”
Two years and five months after receiving that letter, or on December 8, 1975, Requio
filed a complaint charging Atty. Dy-Liacco with
“serious misconduct and negligence”.
The issue is whether
under the pleadings herein Requio has shown a prima facie case against Atty. Dy-Liacco that would
warrant a full-dress investigation of his charges.
The gravamen
of Requio’s complaint is that he allegedly paid to
the respondent the total sum of P1,885 “for
expenses in the appeal of his case” and that, notwithstanding such
payment, the respondent did not file any appellant’s brief. Requio has no
receipts to substantiate that allegation.
When he was required to produce documentary evidence proving his
alleged payment of P1,885 to the respondent, he alibied
that the receipts, together with other papers, were left in a taxicab which he
and his wife took upon arrival at the Paco railroad
station on February 9, 1976 and that his efforts to locate the taxicab were
fruitless.
On the other hand,
respondent’s version is that, as already indicated, for his services in the
trial court, Requio paid him only P385 out of the
stipulated fee of P500; that he (respondent) advanced the sum of P120 as appeal
bond and has never been reimbursed of that amount; that Requio
abandoned the appeal because he had no money to defray the expenses for
prosecuting it, including respondent’s attorney’s fees (par. 6, Supplemental
Rejoinder, p. 34, Rollo); that another factor which
caused Requio to lose interest in the appeal was that
he had received from the insurer P3,500, and that Requio
told the respondent that, even if the decision against him were to be executed,
the judgment creditor would not get anything because he (Requio)
had no real properties declared in his name.
We have carefully weighed the conflicting contentions of the
parties. Our conclusion is that Requio has not shown in his pleadings any compelling justification for requiring respondent
lawyer to undergo the rigors of an investigation.
Requio’s allegation that he paid to the
respondent the total sum of P1,885 (P1,000 for the
prosecution of the appeal) and that the receipts were lost, when the baggage
where they were contained, was left in a taxicab on February 9, 1976, is not credible. Loss of papers, because they were left in a
motor vehicle, is a common subterfuge.
He could have attached copies of the receipts to the complaint. He did not do so although the receipts were
the bases of his complaint.
According to Requio’s explanation of October 6, 1976, the receipts were
lost when he and his wife boarded a taxicab. That allegation is inconsistent with his
wife’s affidavit, attached to the same explanation, that the baggage containing
the receipts was lost when she and her son, Rodrigo, and her compadre, Lucio Estares, boarded a taxicab at the Paco
railroad station. Requio,
the husband, is not mentioned in that affidavit.
Requio does not dispute respondent’s
allegation that he (Requio) was the one who paid
directly to the Court of Appeals the docket fee of P53 on July 26, 1972 as shown in Official Receipt No.
98442259. The respondent had wired Requio on July 25,
1972 that the docket fee should be paid on or before July 27, 1972.
If, according to Requio, he paid to the
respondent P1,000 to cover the expenses of the appeal,
then it would not have been necessary for the respondent to ask him to remit
P53 for the docket fee nor for Requio to pay that
amount to the Court of Appeals. But, as
above noted, Requio paid the docket fee. That payment signifies that he never gave any
amount to the respondent, much less the sum of P1,000,
to defray the expenses of the appeal.
Moreover, the lathes of Requio and the
other inconsistencies in his averments show that his complaint is devoid of merit.
Requio admits that in July, 1973 the
respondent wrote to him that the appeal was dismissed, that the lower court’s
judgment had become final, and that
execution would follow that dismissal.
Yet, in spite of that admission, he alleged in his complaint that
he came to know of the dismissal only in October, 1974, when he
conferred with the respondent. And in
that same complaint, he alleged that he came
to know of the dismissal on December
4, 1975 when he was shown in the Court of Appeals the
resolution dismissing his appeal.
It is manifest that Requio’s complaint
herein contains inconsistencies which are inconsistent with his admission that
he came to know of the dismissal in
July, 1973 when he received respondent’s letter apprising him that his appeal
was dismissed.
We are convinced that no malice or inexcusable neglect can be
imputed to the respondent in not filing the brief and that Requio,
who was unable to pay respondent’s fees and the expenses for printing the
brief, abandoned his appeal. (Compare
with Heredia vs. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157 where a lawyer
who did not seasonably appeal the adverse decision against his client was absolved
from the client’s suit for damages, and Ventanilla
vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811 where a lawyer who failed
to appeal was adjudged liable to pay P200 as damages to his client).
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Dy-Liacco is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo,
Antonio, and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.