VIRGINIA DE GUZMAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ROMEO C. DE LEON, RESPONDENT.

De Guzman versus De Leon

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court by Virginia de Guzman against Judge Romeo C. de Leon of the Municipal Court of Antipolo, Rizal, charging him with oppression and grave misconduct and seeking his removal from office. The grievance arose from the judge's issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case against the complainant and her husband, which resulted in their loss of possession of a lot and, she alleged, the demolition of their hut. The case matters because it fixes the exacting standard of proof for administrative complaints against judges, and because it pairs a dismissal of the charge with a gentle reminder to municipal judges on how such writs ought to be issued and implemented.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court on December 8, 1975. By resolution, the Court required the respondent judge to comment, and he did so, denying any irregularity. The Court then referred the complaint to Executive Judge Ramon V. Jabson for investigation, report, and recommendation. Judge Jabson conducted hearings, gave both parties full opportunity to present evidence, received their memoranda, and submitted a nineteen-page report recommending dismissal and exoneration. The matter was then referred to the Acting Judicial Consultant, Justice Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of Appeals, who, in a memorandum dated May 31, 1976, concurred in the findings and recommendation. The case was thus decided by the Supreme Court as an original administrative action, not as an appeal from any lower court ruling.

Facts

Mario G. Carlos filed a forcible entry suit, Civil Case No. 817, against Virginia de Guzman and her husband Roman de Guzman before the Municipal Court of Antipolo, Rizal, presided over by Judge Romeo C. de Leon. Carlos moved for a preliminary mandatory injunction. The judge granted the motion after what he described as a full-dress hearing, with a transcript of ninety-eight pages, and after three postponements had been granted. The writ gave the spouses twenty-four hours to vacate the premises. It was issued on a Saturday, and the following Sunday the complainant's hut was allegedly demolished.

Virginia de Guzman then filed the administrative complaint, imputing bad faith and malice to the judge. She alleged that he refused to admit in evidence certain exhibits which, in her view, should have cautioned him against granting the motion, since granting it would render nugatory the government's efforts to cancel and revoke certain titles in Antipolo, Rizal, the subject of Civil Case No. 18914 pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. She charged that the forcible entry case was a diversionary tactic meant to sidestep that main case, that Carlos had no clear legal right or title because of the cancellation and reversion proceedings filed by the Solicitor General, and that the judge had allowed his office to be used as a tool of a devious scheme.

In his comment, the judge maintained that he acted only after a full hearing and was not precipitate or arbitrary. He stated that he learned of Civil Case No. 18914 only after the charges were filed, and that this case concerned a tract of land applied for by one Alfonso Doronilla, not the complainant's lessor, and that the certificate of title covering the land in the forcible entry case was not among those sought to be annulled by the Solicitor General. The investigation bore him out: the transcript showed no offer of the documents in evidence, the writ directed only eviction and not demolition, the spouses voluntarily vacated on April 26, 1974, the sheriff found the hut intact when he returned on May 26, 1974, and the complainant's own photographs belied the claim of demolition.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for oppression and grave misconduct in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the forcible entry case.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with bad faith, malice, or grave abuse of discretion in refusing to admit certain documents in evidence during the hearing on the application for the writ.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held accountable for the alleged demolition of the complainant's hut.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute or rule; it states the governing standard of proof by restating the doctrine of the leading case of In re Horrilleno, which it quotes verbatim:

For a complaint of this character to succeed, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that respondent Judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively.

This is the measure against which every charge of oppression and grave misconduct against a judge is tested, and it is the reason the complaint in this case failed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court dismissed the complaint. It agreed with Executive Judge Jabson and Justice Puno that the charge of oppression and grave misconduct was unsubstantiated. The respondent had shown that in issuing the writ he complied with the procedural requirements and reached the conclusion that granting the motion was warranted. There was no evidence that he exercised his judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner, or that he acted with cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or excessive use of authority. The Court recalled the Horrilleno doctrine and applied it:

For a complaint of this character to succeed, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that respondent Judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively.

On the second issue, the Court held that the judge could not be held accountable for the alleged failure to accept documents in evidence, because he had no opportunity to rule on their admissibility as they were not even presented. The transcript confirmed that no such offer was made, and the elementary rule is that the court considers only the evidence on record.

On the third issue, the Court found no basis to blame the judge for the demolition. The writ merely directed the defendants to vacate the premises and did not order the demolition of the hut. The sheriff's return, not disputed by the complainant, showed that the spouses voluntarily vacated on April 26, 1974, and the sheriff testified that he found the hut intact when he returned on May 26, 1974. The complainant's own photographs belied her claim. Even granting that Carlos demolished the hut, he alone would have to be blamed, for he did it not as an officer of the Court and without its sanction.

While dismissing the complaint, the Court added a caution: where an order of this nature is sought, the effect of which may be to cause great inconvenience, if not hardship, to a litigant, a municipal judge should avoid issuing it on a Saturday and should give more than twenty-four hours for its implementation, to manifest greater fealty to the concern shown by the government for the plight of the underprivileged.

Doctrine

First, an administrative complaint against a judge for oppression or grave misconduct requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the judge acted partially, maliciously, corruptly, arbitrarily, or oppressively. Suspicion, resentment, or disagreement with a ruling is not enough.

Second, a judge who issues a writ only after a full hearing, upon evidence on record, and in compliance with procedural requirements cannot be held administratively liable merely because a litigant disagrees with the result. The remedy against an erroneous order is the remedy provided by the Rules, not removal or disbarment.

Third, a judge cannot be faulted for failing to rule on the admissibility of documents that were never offered in evidence, since the court considers only the evidence on record.

Fourth, responsibility for acts done outside the court's authority, such as a demolition not ordered by the writ, rests on the person who committed them, not on the judge.

Disposition

The complaint against Judge Romeo C. de Leon for grave misconduct and oppression was dismissed, and a copy of the resolution was ordered entered into his record.

Remember This

Memorize the Horrilleno standard: proof beyond reasonable doubt that the judge acted partially, maliciously, corruptly, arbitrarily, or oppressively. Examiners use this case to test the quantum of proof in administrative complaints against judges and the rule that a judge is not liable for an erroneous or harsh order issued after hearing, the remedy being judicial, not administrative.