RE:  AGRIPINO A. BRILLANTES, ROMEO R. BRINGAS, COMPLAINANT.

This is a review of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Abra, Branch II, suspending Atty. Agripino A. Brillantes of Bangued, Abra from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.^[1]

On July 18, 1972,
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case 657, was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Abra, by the spouses Melchor
and Valentina Bernardez
against the spouses Joaquin and Angustia Balmaceda for recovery
of a parcel of land which said complainants allegedly
acquired from Tranquilina Vda.
de Pabalan under a deed of sale dated September
18, 1969, registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra on September
30, 1969.

At the pre-trial
conference of the above Civil Case 657 on September 13, 1972, the defendants,
thru their Counsel, the herein respondent Brillantes,
claimed that they were not the real parties in interest.  They exhibited a duplicate copy of a deed
of sale dated April 13, 1969 of the
land in dispute executed by Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan in favor of Dr. Restituto Balmaceda, an alleged
son of the defendants, which was notarized by the respondent Brillantes.  Due to
that manifestation, Dr. Balmaceda was named as an
additional defendant in Civil Case 657.

On January 8, 1973, the
parties entered into a stipulation of facts, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:

“1.  That there exists a duly notarized document,
dated September 18, 1969, marked Exhibit ‘A’, the due execution of which is
admitted by the defendants;

“x x x

“5.  That there exists, too, a document, dated
April 13, 1969, not notarized, marked as Exh, ‘1’ the
due execution of which is also admitted by the plaintiffs;

“x x x

“7.  That the parties hereby waive presentation of
further evi­dence and whatever claims for damages they may have against each
other.

“WHEREFORE, on the bases of the above stipulation of facts,
that is, which deed of sale shall prevail: 
a duly notarized one, executed later but duly registered, or a document,
not notarized, but executed earlier? — the parties hereto respectfully submit
the case for decision.”

Based
on that stipulation and the various documentary evidences presented by both
parties, the trial court, with Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella presiding, rendered its decision, dated February
7, 1973, declaring the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners of the land in
dispute.  The decision a quo
contained the follow­ing observation:

”Anent Exhibit ‘1’, its genuiness [sic]
is doubted by this Court.  It is very
obvious from the record that there are two documents marked as Exhibit ‘1’
personally presented and marked by counsel for the defendants, Atty. Agripino Brillantes.  The first document (Deed of Sale in favor of
Dr. Restituto Balmaceda)
marked as Exhibit ‘1’ is a carbon original copy duly notarized by Atty. Agripino Brillantes and sealed
with his notarial seal and is found on page 22 of the
record.  The second docu­ment marked as
Exhibit ‘1’ is the original copy of the first document but the acknowledgment
of Atty. Agripino Brillantes
is mutilated or cut-off, making it appear as an unnotarized
document.  However, the notarial seal of this document is clear and more so of its
being mutilated to make it appear as unnotarized docu­ment.

“On this point, the Court has taken judicial notice of the
records of Commissioned Notaries Public of the Province of Abra
and Atty. Agripino Brillantes
was never com­missioned as Notary Public and in fact, has no record particularly
for the year 1967 to the present.  This
explains the discrepancy and by logical deduction, Exhibit ‘1’ is a spurious
and falsified document drawn to suit defendants’ defense.”

Meanwhile, on December
15, 1972, Atty. Romeo R. Bringas, a nephew of the
defendants in Civil Case 657, filed with the Court of First Instance of Abra two sworn complaints against Atty. Brillantes
alleging that the latter notarized a deed of sale of real property on April 13,
1969 without being commissioned as a notary public in violation of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code^[2] and knowingly introduced the said deed as
evidence in Civil Case 657 in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code.^[3] The complaints were heard in preliminary
investigation by Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella who found a prima facie case against the
accused.  On March 16, 1973 two separate informations for falsification were filed against Atty. Brillantes.^[4]

Prior to the filing of
the charges by the fiscal, Atty. Bringas filed an unverified
motion in the sala of Judge Gironella
praying that Atty. Brillantes be suspended from the
practice of law in view of the “strong prima facie
cases” found against him.  Over his
objection, the trial judge ordered Atty. Brillantes
to file an answer.  Thereafter, the
matter was heard on the merits. 
Incidentally, on September 7, 1973, Judge Gironella
ordered his clerk of court to enter the case as a separate administrative case
on the notion that it cannot be merged with the “mother” criminal complaints.

On September 10, 1973,
Judge Gironella rendered a decision ordering the
suspension of Atty. Brillantes from the practice of
law for two years “effective upon receipt of this decision.” His
findings are as follows:

“On September 14, 1972, during the pendency
of Civil Case No. 657 before this Court, the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, the Hon. Juan P. Aquino, in answer to a letter inquiry from the Presiding
Judge of this Court, categorically stated that Atty. Agripino
Brillantes, respondent herein, was never commissioned
as Notary Public for the province of Abra since 1967
to the present (Exhi­bit A-1).  On the
basis of the two documents and the certification of the Hon. Juan P. Aquino, respondent was charged for Falsification of Public
Documents docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 242 and 243 for preliminary
investigation.  The Court found a strong
prima facie case against the respondent and accordingly, directed the
Provincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information x x
x.

“It is further established by the testimony of the Clerk of
Court, Atty. Gelacio Bolante,
that the signature appearing above the type-written name Atty. Agripino Bril­lantes, after the
acknowledgment, in Exhibit ‘A-1’ (Deed of Sale), is the genuine signature of
Atty. Agripino Brillantes
being familiar with it as the respondent had been practising
for a long time in Abra.

“The defense of respondent Atty. Agripino
Brillantes consisted of denial.  He denied that the signa­ture appearing in
Exhibit ‘B’ was his signature.  Except
for this denial by his testimony, no other evidence was introduced by him.

“After a painstaking study of the evidence for the complainant
and the respondent, the Court finds the evidence supporting the charge very
persuasive and positively point per adventure of doubt that respondent Atty. Agripino Brillantes acted as a
Notary Public and did [in] April, 1969, notarized [sic] Exhibit ‘B-3’ (Deed of
Absolute Sale) without being commissioned as such and intentionally presented
the same as exhibit during the pre-trial hearing on September 13, 1973 in Civil Case No. 657.  Thus, delaying the proceedings by causing the
plaintiffs in that case to amend their complaint (Exhibits B, B-1, B-3, C, C-1,
D, D-1, E, E-1, J and M).

“His denial that the signature appearing in Exhibit ‘A-1’
(notarized Deed of Sale) which he exhibited in Civil Case No. 657 stands
strongly contradicted by his own acts: 
First, as counsel for the defendants in Civil Case No. 657, he admitted
Exhibit ‘B’ being notarized (Exhibit B); Second, during the preliminary
investigation of Crim. Case No. 243, he admitted his
signature in Exhibit ‘B’ (Exhibit I); and, Third, having presented the same
notarized document during the pre-trial and marked and iden­tified the same as
Exhibit ‘1’ in Civil Case No. 657, fully aware of his signature in said
document.  On this score, the respondent
stated during the pre-trial: ‘x x
x It is contend­ed by the defendants that the land
now described in the complaint was previously sold to Dr. Resti­tuto
Balmaceda and that Deed of Sale is a carbon copy
all of which we asked that it be marked as Exhibit ‘1’ for the defendant and
that the real parties in interest being the vendee in Exhibit ‘1’ is Dr. Balmaceda.  Any
adjudication in this case as against the defendant in which Dr, Balmaceda is not included as party may not affect him but
although under the situation we may submit . . . we are submit­ting for
pre-trial in connection with this case for the purpose of giving appreciation
of proof x x x,’ (Exhibit ‘M-1’).  A xerox copy of
Exhibit ‘1’ referred to by the respondent is Exhibit B in this case.

“As an old brilliant practi­tioner, it cannot be said that he
was not aware of his signature affixed in Exhibit B when he pre­sented the same
in Civil Case No. 657.  Worse, he
introduced the original copy which was cut-off leaving the notarial
seal visible and readable.  All these
acts of the respondent strongly militate against him.  Comparing the genuine signature of the
respond­ent appearing in his
pleadings and other documents attached to the records of the case to that of
his signature in Exhibit ‘B-2,’ it is safe to conclude that the denied
signature is the genuine signature of the respondent.

“In view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of
this court that the acts of the res­pondent indubitably shown by the evidence
offered and admitted certainly constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in
the office of an attorney at law and a viola­tion of his oath of office ‘to do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court and to conduct himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity – to the courts’.  The Court sympathizes with the respondent
considering his being over 60 years old and allegedly a 10th placer of the Bar.  But, the law is the law and the honor and
dignity of the profession and the administration of justice shall be
upheld.  x x x“

Pursuant to Section 29,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, supra, the foregoing decision was elevated to this Court for review.

On November 6, 1973, this
Court denied a peti­tion of
respondent Atty. Brillantes to lift the immediate effectivity of his suspension.

On March 1, 1974, a
supplemental complaint was filed by Atty. Bringas in this Court, alleging as follows: (1) on July 31, 1972 the respondent;
without being commissioned as a notary
public, administered the oath in
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction filed in the Court of Appeals as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828; and (2) notwithstanding
his suspension, the respondent filed on behalf of the petitioner in C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-01828 a “Petition for Extension to Comply with Order” which
required him to comment on a telegram received by the Court of Appeals that he
(the res­pondent) was not a duly commissioned notary public in 1972 and a “Motion for Dismissal” of the
said case.  In this connection, the record of C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01828 shows that the
respondent did not directly and categorically answer the query
of the Court of Appeals, but merely replied that the petitioner in C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-01828 died on December 6, 1972 and the heirs could not be
contacted.  The motion for dismissal was
filed on December 26, 1973 to apprise the Court of Appeals that the
heirs of the deceased (Pedro Beroña) “have
decided not to continue this
case.”

On September 20, 1974,
acting on the mani­festation of Atty. Brillantes
that he was a duly commissioned notary for the 1968-1969 term [to support which
he submitted a carbon copy of his alleged commission, oath of office, and a
receipt by the clerk of court (whose name is not revealed thereon) of his notarial books and monthly reports typed on a small slip of
paper, all of which do not bear the seal of the court a quo and
showed only an undecipherable initial over the typewritten name of Judge Macario M. Ofilada, who allegedly
issued the respondent’s commission, and a deputy clerk of court, Isidoro B. Valera, who allegedly adminis­tered the oath], this Court required (1) the
respondent to submit the original of his appoint­ment and oath of office; (2)
Judge Ofilada to certify to the truth of the
appointment claimed; and (3) deputy clerk of court Valera
to certify to his administration of the oath of office to the respondent.

On October 22, 1974,
Judge Ofilada filed a manifestation that “to his
best recollection, Mr. Agripino A. Brillantes was not appointed notary public for the term
beginning January 8, 1968 and ending December 31, 1969.” Gelacio B. Bolante, clerk of
court below, reported that “according to the records available in his
office, Atty. Agripino A. Brillantes
was not appointed Notary Public for the term” 1968-1969.  A check of the certified list of commissioned
notaries for the province of Abra, covering the years
1966 to 1973, also showed that the respondent was not appointed a notary in any
of those years.  Deputy Clerk of Court Valera did not make any reply to this Court’s summons.

The defenses interposed
by the respondent in the court a quo and as well in this Court may be briefly stated
as follows:

1. It is the Supreme Court alone under Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court, and therefore, not the court a quo, which has jurisdiction
over a complaint for suspension of an attorney. 
Said complaint should also be under oath.

2. Under Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which took effect on
January 16, 1973, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru an appro­priate
grievance committee rather than courts of first instance, that has jurisdiction
to try cases involving suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar,

3. The deed of sale marked Exhibit “1” in Civil Case 657
is a genuine document as admitted by the parties themselves in their
stipulation of facts.  Consequently, the
acknowledgment thereof before a notary public is no longer necessary or relevant.  Moreover, the finding below that the said
deed is “spurious” is a prejudicial question which has not yet been
finally disposed of by the appellate courts.

4. The charges in the instant case are identical with those made
in the criminal information filed against the respondent.  The final disposition of said criminal cases
should, there­fore, be awaited as they pose prejudicial questions.

5. The constitutional right of the respond­ent to an impartial
trial was violated by the refusal of Judge Gironella
to inhibit himself from presiding over the trial of the administrative
complaint.

6. The allegations, contained in the supple­mental complaint of
Atty. Bringas are not true.

7. As to the charge contained in the second supplemental complaint
of Atty. Bringas, the Rules of Court allows any
person, who need not be a member of the Bar, to appear as a friend of a party
before the municipal courts.

We shall discuss seriatim
the merits of the foregoing arguments.

1. The theory that it is only this Court which may proceed to take
cognizance of a suspen­sion or disbarment proceeding in accordance with the
procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Rules of Court was already put in issue
before and rejected.  In Tajam vs. Cusi,^[5]
this Court held that the con­tention ignores the fact that Rule 139 pertains to
the rules for investigation and hearing of a suit started in or by the Supreme
Court.  It does not necessarily cover
proceedings initiated in or by courts of first instance which are authorized to
do so by Rule 138 of the Rules.  Section
28 of Rule 138 states:

“Sec. 28.  Suspension
of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after
such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises.”

Rule 138 likewise
prescribes the basic essentials that courts of first instance should follow in
suspension proceedings, namely,

“Sec. 30.  Attorney
to be heard before removal or suspension.– No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel.  But if upon reasonable notice
he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.”

The adoption of rules
specified in Rule 139 of the Rules of Court is merely optional on courts
of first instance as explicitly stated
therein, to wit:

“Sec. 9.  Procedure
in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. — As far as may be
applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and
investi­gation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in
Courts of First Instance.’ In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge
of first instance or Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit
to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of sus­pension and a full
statement of the facts upon which same is based.”

The fact that the court
below took cognizance of Atty. Bringas‘ motion
against Atty. Brillantes even if it was not verified
has no jurisdictional significance.  That
motion was filed as an off-shoot of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the court a quo on the basis of the sworn complaints file by
Atty. Bringas against the respondent for
falsification and introduction of falsified evi­dence in a judicial
proceeding.  Under the circums­tances,
this Court finds no substantive justifying purpose to be served by adhering to the prescription that a complaint against a lawyer be under
oath.  At all events, this Court has
already overruled a similar plea, in Tajam
vs. Cusi,
supra, with these words:

“It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of
members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff
and the respondent is a defendant. 
Disciplinary proceed­ings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance.  They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.  The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. 
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the out­come except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.  The court
may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the
proceedings; because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of
its own officers.  Indeed it is not
only the right but the duty of
the Court to institute upon its own motion proper proceedings for the
suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to
it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted
himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in
the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is
lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney.  This is
for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of
the administration of justice.”

2. The referral to Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court is misplaced and premature.  Neither in Rule 139-A which ordained, by
Court rule, the integration of the Philippine Bar nor in the By­laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which took effect on November 1, 1974 can any provision be found
withdrawing from the courts the authority to investigate and decide complaints
against erring members of the Bar.

3. It is irrelevant and immaterial to this proceeding that the
parties a quo in Civil Case 657 expressly accepted
the genuineness of the questioned deed of sale marked therein as Exhibit
“1.” That was purely a matter of personal judgment and affected
solely their private interests.  The case
at bar is of a different complex and nature. 
Here, a lawyer’s fealty to his oath and public duties is intimately and
inextricably involved, nay affected.  The
primary objective of the instant ac­tion is to determine whether the respondent
nota­rized a deed of sale of a parcel of land without be­ing duly appointed as
a notary public and introduced the same as evidence in court, thereby
flagrantly violating his duties as an officer of the court.

This Court is convinced,
after a thorough ­going examination of the evidence on which the judge below
anchored his findings and
conclusions, that the same are valid and correct.  Indeed, we ordered, of our own accord, a
re-check of the evidence below, and the result thereof showed positively that
the respondent’s pretenses are feigned.

At the hearing before
this Court, Atty. Brillantes claimed that he had in
his possession evidence which would prove that he was commissioned a notary in
1969.  What he presented to this Court, however, were carbon copies of an alleged notarial
appointment and an oath of office which did not even bear the signature of the
officials concerned, were not covered by the seal of the issuing court and,
although they had what appeared to be initials, did not least resemble any of
the first letters of the names or surnames of the alleged officials who issued
the same.  In fact, the appointment of
the respondent as a notary was denied here by the very person who supposedly
gave him the said commission.  The clerk
of court below, who was supposed to have issued the carbon copy of the slip of
paper filed in this Court by the respondent wherein receipt of the latter’s notarial books and monthly reports was acknowledged, also
denied that the respondent was appointed notary for Abra
during the 1968-1969 term.

The record shows and the
respondent asseverates ‘that he has been for a long time an active practitioner
in the courts of the province
of Abra.  It is, there­fore, quite
difficult to conceive that Judges Ofilada and Aquino and the clerk of court below would not know or
recall that the respondent was given a notarial
commission if such were really the case. 
As it is, a check of the records of the court below of the names of
persons who were given notarial commissions from 1966
to 1973 for the province
of Abra failed to show that he ever applied for a commission in any of those
years or was given one.  For a seasoned
practitioner like the respondent, it is quite remarkable and certainly unmitigating that instead of simply presenting satisfactory
evidence of his appointment as a notary which is required by law to be made in
official form, he should choose to avail himself vigorously of technical defenses,
such as that the trial judge below should inhibit himself from trying the
administrative complaint and the criminal cases filed against him; that the com­plaint
for his suspension from the practice of law should be tried by a grievance committee of the Integrated Bar;
that the final disposition of the appeal of Civil Case 657 should be awaited;
and that the case at bar “is a bickering of another member of the Bar who pretends to be a Super Citizen and guardian of Public Weal” which,
it is urged, should not be seriously entertained by this Court.  When the Court of Appeals ordered him in a
case therein where the respondent is counsel for the petitioner, to inform it
whether he was a duly commissioned notary public, the respondent instead of
giving either a “yes” or “no” answer, informed the Court of Appeals that his client is
already dead.  All such beating around an
otherwise sim­ple, uncomplicated matter which the respondent
could confront squarely if he were honestly and sincerely appointed notary,
does not avail him any good.  It, in
fact, reveals his desperate position. 
Hence, the necessity to encapsulate himself in a shell to forestall.  an inquiry
into the real merits of the case. 
Procedural norms, however, have their limits.  As this Court said in Alonzo vs. Villamor^[6] “Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.”

4. The contention that the criminal cases now pending against the
respondent pose prejudicial questions to the resolution of the primordial issue in the instant proceeding has no
merit.  First, the respondent has not
cited, and this Court does not find, any provision of the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Rules of Court which can justify the theory.  Second, in a criminal case it is the duty of
the prosecution to prove that the accused ‘is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, which is not so in
a suspension or dis­barment
proceeding where only clearly preponderant evidence is required.^[7]
Third, an accused in a criminal case may escape conviction not necessarily on
the ground that he did not commit the acts charged in the information.  Not infrequently, criminal cases pending in
trial courts are dis­missed on account of the failure of witnesses for the
prosecution to appear and testify or on account of a sworn desistance by the
complainant.  And fourth, in our opinion,
it is not sound judicial policy
‘to await the final resolution of a criminal case before we may act on a complaint or information against a lawyer
and impose the judgment appropriate to the facts.  Otherwise, this Court as well the courts
below will be effectively rendered helpless from vigorously applying the rules
on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the
whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.

5. The charge that the respondent’s right to an impartial trial
was violated cannot be sus­tained.  No
specific act of hostility or prejudice toward the respondent by the judge below
has been pointed out to this Court.  The
only reason cited is that Judge Gironella, who penned
the decision suspending the respondent, was the one who tried and rendered the
decision in Civil Case 657 and likewise the same magistrate who conducted the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints filed by Atty. Bringas against the respondent for falsification and
introduction of falsified evidence in a judicial proceeding.  These, by themselves, however, are not
sufficient indicia of lack of impartiality of the judge below.

The principal and basic
charge against the respondent is that he was not a duly commissioned notary
public in 1969 for Abra when he notarized the deed of
sale marked Exhibit “1” in Civil Case 657.  Since the appointments of notaries public are
a matter of public record and require formal documentation, all that the
respondent needed to do was to show to the court below his appointment
papers.  This he failed to do.  An inquiry was made by the judge a quo
from the Executive Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, Juan P. Aquino; whether the respondent was appointed a notary
public in the years 1967 to 1970; the answer, which was dated September 14,
1972, or before the court below transferred from the Capitol Building to its
present site on September 26, 1972, was in the negative.

At any rate, the entire
record of the case below was elevated to this Court and the respondent was accorded
ample opportunity to demonstrate that the findings below are erroneous.  We are satisfied from the evidence before us
that the respondent, with malice aforethought, falsely pretended that he was
appointed a notary public in 1969 when he notarized the deed of sale marked
Exhibit “1” in Civil Case 657.

What made the
respondent’s pretensions unpar­donable, however, was his act of presenting to
this Court spurious and falsified evidence of his alleged commission.  Instead of accepting his misdeeds and asking
for leniency, the respondent chose to sow even more falsehood.  The alacrity of the respondent in foisting deception on this
Court is, in the perspective of his long years in the Bar, a manifest sign that
as the respondent has gained in age, he has veered further away from life’s
virtues.  By his persistent disregard of
the lawyer’s credo “to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court,” the respondent has demonstrated beyond cavil that he is not fit
and worthy to con­tinue in the distinguished and exalted calling of the Bar.

In view of all the
foregoing, this Court does not consider it necessary to resolve the additional
issues raised in the supplemental complaints of Atty. Bringas.

ACCORDINGLY, Agripino A. Brillantes of Bangued, Abra is hereby disbarred. 
This decision shall be immediately executory.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 29, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: “Upon suspension
by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme
Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First
Instance shall forth­with transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based.  Upon receipt of such certified
copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or
removing the attorney from his office as such as the facts warrant.”

^[2]
Art. 171 provides: “The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: x x x“

^[3]
Art. 172 states: “The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: x x x Any person who shall
knowingly intro­duce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the
false docu­ments embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.”

^[4]
The Court of First Instance of Abra belongs to the
Second Judicial District and has two branches. 
(See Section 52, R.A. 296, as amended by R.A. 6092 on August 4, 1969).
Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella
and Judge Juan P. Aquino (of Branch I) inhibited them­selves
from trying the two criminal cases against Atty. Brillantes

^[5]
57 SCRA 154; G.R. No. L-28899, May 30,
1974.

^[6]
16 Phil 322.

^[7]
Lim vs. Antonio, Adm. Case No. 848, Sept.30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44.