ROSARIO DELOS REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, RESPONDENT.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on
the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint
that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of
said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her
Pathology subject if she would not submit to
respondent’s lustful desires. 
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent,
through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo
forced abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9,
1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant
as well as all the allegations
contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that
complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1)  she was a second year
medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of
which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2)  she however failed in her
Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the latter’s
house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15, 16, 26, 33,
tsn, June 6, 1975);

3)  despite
this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June
6, 1975);

4)  sometime
in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn,
June 6, 1975); xxx  xxx       xxx;

5)  on
February 12, 1973, both
respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh.
“A”) for Manila:  from the Manila
Domestic Airport,
they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed
for three days (Exhs. “K”, “K-1”
to “K-6”; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1975);

6)  after arriving at the
Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino,
Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp. 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7)  they
returned to the hotel at around twelve o’clock
midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8)  complainant
consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would
sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p. 61, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx         xxx       xxx;

9)  sometime
in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July
17, 1975); xxx xxx       xxx;

10)  later,
she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine)
that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p. 82, tsn, July 17, 1975);
xxx            xxx       xxx;

11)  thereafter, Ruben Cruz,
a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Mansanto fetched
her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);

12)  upon
reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas, she was given an
injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1975);

13)  as a result she lost
consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been performed upon
her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn,
July 17, 1975); xxx            xxx       xxx (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man
whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front
of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo,
p. 41).

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral
region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo,
p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor
General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban
testified that:

1.  In December, 1972,
respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel
with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December,
1972; (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2.  He usually slept with
respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila
(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo.
pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the
respondent stated that:

1.  In February, 1973, he
went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent: 
the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar:

2.  He usually slept with
respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together
with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn,
Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar
was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges
that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint.  As special defense, respondent further
alleged that the charge leveled against him is in furtherance of complainant’s vow to wreck
vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter’s approval of the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for
the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects.  It is likewise contended that the defense did
not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that
respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent’s averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:

“From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was
compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would
flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42,
50, tsn, June
6, 1975).  As respondent was
Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe him.

“It has been established also that complainant was brought by
respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had
carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his
lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs.
“A”, “K”, “K-1” to “K-6” pp. 51, 52,
55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975;).

xxx                                    xxx
                                          xxx

“On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during
the hearing.  It is true that he
presented Edilberto Caban
and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila,
but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. 
None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept
with respondent on February 12 to February
14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. 
xxx xxx xxx Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel
with his wife and children in December, 1972. 
The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive.  His (Caban’s)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case” (Rollo. pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of
immorality against respondent Aznar has been
substantiated by sufficient evidence, both testimonial and documentary; while
finding insufficent and uncorroborated the accusation
of intentional abortion.  The Solicitor
General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989,
the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
and motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on
the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with
the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo.
p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the
finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar,
under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the
case, is guilty of “grossly immoral conduct” and may therefore be
removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt
as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him.  With the exception of the self-serving
testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent’s behalf, the records are
bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less
contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the
Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not
present any evidence to show where he was at that date.  While this is not a criminal proceeding,
respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt
unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put
in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is
a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar.  He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the
high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]).  As once pronounced by the Court:

“When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93)
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him.  xxx In the case of United
States v. Tria, 17
Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

“An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
the State.  If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him.  It he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to himself, when to meet it
is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that
same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who
by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. 
This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but
actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist
him” (Quingwa v. Puno,
19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is
partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less
than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion
dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had
already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for
a three (3) year suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as
a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended
during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because
respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).  More
importantly, complainant’s knowledge of respondent’s marital status is not at
issue in the case at bar.  Complainant submitted to respondent’s solicitation for sexual intercourse
not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent’s
moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she
would flunk in her subjects.  As chairman
of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every
reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats.  Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it “worthwhile to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of
a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the court” (Rollo,
p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se,
would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. 
The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a
lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character.  Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto.  Good moral character is a continuing qualification
necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law.  The ancient and learned profession of law
exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule
138, “(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice.  x x x.” In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591,
[1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

“A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.  A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.

“It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is ‘grossly immoral conduct or to specify the
moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as
a member of the bar.  The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

“Immoral conduct has been defined as ‘that which is willful,
flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community’ (7 C.J.S. 959).

“Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant
by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (in re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896).”

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a
married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman
of the college of medicine in
asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., No part – did not take part
in the deliberations.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.