VICTORIANO FAJOTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. CESAR BALONSO, ACTING MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF PAIAUIG, ZAMBALES, RESPONDENT.

Fajota versus Balonso

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Victoriano Fajota charges Acting Municipal Judge Cesar Balonso of Palauig, Zambales, with gross ignorance of the law. Fajota complains that the respondent judge accepted a criminal complaint for libel against him, ordered his arrest, and set him on the path of arraignment and preliminary investigation, when the law plainly lodged that power elsewhere. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's cleanest statement that a municipal judge who takes cognizance of a libel case outside the places allowed by the amended Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code acts without jurisdiction, and that ignorance of a plain and categorical provision is no excuse.

Procedural History

The case began as a verified complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court on February 21, 1978, charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. The respondent filed his answer, denying the charge on bail and explaining that he had relied on an older ruling. The matter was referred to the Deputy Court Administrator, who submitted a memorandum finding that the respondent had acted contrary to Republic Act 4363 and therefore without jurisdiction, and recommending suspension for six months without pay. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, agreed with those findings and resolved the case as an original administrative proceeding.

Facts

Jose J. Gutierrez filed a criminal complaint for libel against Victoriano Fajota before the respondent judge, acting as Municipal Judge of Palauig, Zambales. The libel suit rested on a letter Fajota had written in his capacity as Kagawad ng Sanggunian Bayan to the Board of Directors of the Zambales Electric Cooperative, Incorporated, concerning the employment in the cooperative of two active politicians who had pending criminal cases in court. The respondent judge accepted the complaint and ordered Fajota's arrest, and Fajota was deprived of his liberty for more than ten hours.

Fajota was released only after posting a real estate bond on June 27, 1977. The respondent judge then ordered his arraignment and the second stage of the preliminary investigation on August 5, 1977, after which the records were remanded to the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch II, in Iba.

In his defense, the respondent denied the matter of the bail, saying the bond had been prepared and passed upon by the Municipal Court of Castillejos, Zambales, and mailed to him. He claimed no second stage of preliminary investigation was conducted because Fajota waived it. He conceded he did not intend to evade responsibility, and explained that if he erred, it was because he had relied on the ruling in Mercader versus Valila, which held that Republic Act 1289 amending Article 360 did not deprive justices of the peace of their power to conduct preliminary investigation. That reliance, he said, made him overlook the later amendment by Republic Act 4363.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of a libel case filed before his municipal court, contrary to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 4363.
• Whether or not the respondent's claim that he overlooked the amendment is a valid excuse for ignorance of the law.
• Whether or not the respondent should be administratively sanctioned, and with what penalty.

Applicable Provisions

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4363, provides:

Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the Municipal Court of the City or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.

This provision fixes the only courts that may act on a libel complaint, and the respondent's court is neither a city court nor the court of the capital of the province.

The Department of Justice circularized all city and municipal judges on the amendment, stating:

It should be noted from these provisions that a complaint or information of libel may be filed only in the Court of First Instance. The preliminary investigation of the criminal case may, however, be conducted by the city court of the city or the municipal court of the capital of the province where the case is filed.

This circular removes any claim of good faith, since the respondent had been expressly reminded of the rule.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent violated Republic Act 4363 when he took cognizance of the libel case, because he is a municipal judge of neither a city nor the capital of the province. Quoting its earlier decision in Quizon versus Baltazar, the Court said:

The provisions of Act No. 4363 amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are so clear and unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even interpretation. In taking cognizance of the libel case, respondent was clearly without jurisdiction. The kindest thing we can say of him is that he is ignorant of the plain and categorical provisions of law.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the excuse of oversight. It held that the claim of having overlooked the amendment is not a valid excuse for ignorance of a plain and categorical provision, especially since the Department of Justice had circularized the rule and the Court had already spoken in Quizon versus Baltazar. The respondent, the Court said, exhibited a deplorable lack of assiduity in keeping abreast of the growth of the law and jurisprudence.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the Deputy Court Administrator and imposed suspension for six months without pay, with a warning that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.

Doctrine

A criminal complaint for libel may be filed only in the Court of First Instance, and the preliminary investigation may be conducted only by the city court of the city or the municipal court of the capital of the province where the case is filed, as Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4363, plainly provides. A municipal judge who takes cognizance of a libel case outside those places acts without jurisdiction. Ignorance of a plain and categorical provision of law is not a valid excuse, and reliance on a superseded ruling does not save a judge from administrative liability. Judges are expected to keep abreast of the growth of the law and jurisprudence, for the learning process in law does not stop upon admission to the bar.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable and suspended him from office for six months without pay, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely, and ordered that a copy of the resolution be attached to his personal record.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a libel complaint may be filed only in the Court of First Instance, and preliminary investigation conducted only by the city court of the city or the municipal court of the capital of the province, so any other municipal judge who acts does so without jurisdiction. Examiners use this case in legal ethics and judicial conduct, and in criminal procedure on the venue of libel, to test whether ignorance of a plain provision of law is a valid defense, and the answer is no.