MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CECILIA MUNOZ-PALMA,,AS JUDGE OF THE RIZAL COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; ROSALINA S…

Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Munoz Palma,
presiding, dated October 25, 1961, which (1) granted the motion of
respondent executrix Rosalina Santos to set Civil Case No. 4395 of said
court, appealed to this Court as G.R. No. L-14070, for hearing to
determine certain factual issues before proceeding with the execution
of the judgment rendered therein by this Court, (2) admitted the
complaint in intervention of intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa
Avendano, and (3) denied the motion filed by plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, to enforce the judgment of this Court in the’ above-mentioned
case without the necessity of further hearing.

The events that led to the present petition may be summarized as
follows: On July 26, 1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a motion for the execution of the
decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-14070, dated March 29, 1961
(Civil Case No. 4395, Court of First Instance of Rizal), which motion
was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated August 16, 1961.
Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issued by the clerk of
the lower court on August 24, 1961, and notice thereof served upon
respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving the latter 10
days within which to comply with the same. Instead of complying with
the order, respondent executrix, on September 15, 1961, filed a motion
to set the case for hearing, alleging that it would be difficult to
comply with the court’s order unless the following questions were first
resolved: (1) what properties are to be conveyed by the executrix; (2)
to whom conveyance is to be made; and (3) in what proportions
conveyance should be effected. This motion was opposed by herein
petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the ground that the decision
of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and could be
complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence. A reply to
this opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder
thereto presented by petitioners.

On October 3, 1961, plaintiffs again filed a motion to enforce the
final judgment in the above-numbered case in accordance with section
10, Rule 39, to which motion defendant executrix filed an opposition
reiterating the necessity of a hearing before the judgment of this
Court could be executed.

In the meantime, or on August 29,1961, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa
Avendano presented a complaint in intervention, alleging that they are
legatees named in the last will and testament of the deceased Don
Simeon Bias as well as in that of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de
Bias, and that they are, therefore, entitled to participate in the
one-half share of Maxima Santos in her conjugal partnership with Simeon
Bias. Petitioners opposed the admission of the intervention complaint
on the ground that Pinpin and Avendano have absolutely no interest in
the case, not being the heirs and legatees contemplated in the document
Exhibit “A”, signed by the late Maxima Santos, nor in the will and
project of partition covering the estate of Simeon Bias nor in the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court sought to be executed; and that
the admission of the intervention complaint would violate the rule of
res judicata and the doctrine of “law of the case.” A reply to the
opposition was filed by claimants intervenors and a rejoinder thereto
presented by plaintiffs. After considering the allegations of the
parties in their respective pleadings, respondent judge issued an order
dated October 25, 1961, wherein the motion for intervention was
admitted, the motion for hearing granted, and the motion to enforce the
judgment of this Court was denied. A motion for reconsideration of this
order presented by petitioners on October 31, 1961 was denied by
respondent judge on December 7,1961. Hence, the present action was
brought before this Court.

The pertinent parts of the order against which the present petition
has been instituted is, for the sake of clarity, hereby quoted:

“In pages 27 to 46 of said Project of Partition an
enumeration was made of the properties constituting the entire share of
Maxima Santos on the basis of the above-quoted distribution. It is,
therefore, incorrect to state that all those properties listed in pages
27 to 46 of the Project of Partition constitute the one-half share of
Maxima Santos in the conjugal properties for as already indicated, said
enumeration includes: (a) the one-third1 portion devised to her by her
husband, Simeon Bias in his will; (b) the one-third portion
constituting the share of Lazaro Gervacio Bias; and (c) her one-half
share in the conjugal properties. In view of this, there is need of
‘segregating in that list of properties found in pages 27 to 46 of the
Project of Partition, those which constitute the one-half share of
Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias in the conjugal properties from those
portions which she inherited from her husband as well as those which
she bought from Lazaro Gervacio Bias.

“As regards the
allowance of the intervention of several parties in this proceeding,
this Court is simply guided by that portion of the decision of the
Supreme Court which states that considering that all heirs and legatees
designated in the will of Simeon Bias have not appeared in this Civil
Case, the said heirs and legatees may file adversary pleadings to
determine the participation of each and every one of them in the
properties to be conveyed.”

For a proper understanding of the case at bar, we hereby quote the
dispositive part of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-14070:

“x x x the defendant-appellee, administratrix x x x
is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated
to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said
Civil Case No. 6707, x x x to the heirs and the legatees of her husband
Simeon Blas.”

The objection to the execution of the above-quoted dispositive part
of the decision lies, as contended by counsel for respondent executrix
Rosalina Santos and as found by the trial court, in the supposed
impossibility of pointing out from among the properties adjudicated to
Maxima Santos in the project of partition of the estate of her deceased
husband, the properties that should be conveyed and delivered.

It must be borne in mind that it was not the intention of our
decision in the previous case (G. R. No. L-14070) which are ordered
executed, that of the very numerous properties adjudicated to Maxima
Santos in the project of partition, those that should be conveyed and
delivered to the petitioners herein, petitioners also in the previous
case, be specifically pointed out separately from the rest of the
properties that should remain as Maxima Santos’ share. It was not
expected, in view of the fact that the project of partition of the
estate of Simeon Bias does not indicate the properties adjudicated to
Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership separately from
those received by her from her husband as devisee of the free portion
of his estate, or those acquired by purchase, that the properties
constituting the one-half to be conveyed out of Maxima Santos share in
the conjugal partnership be expressly singled out from the others. What
was expected to be done by the court executing the judgment, in order
to carry out the decision of this Court, was to determine what
undivided portion or aliquot part of all the properties adjudicated to
her in various capacities should be conveyed by virtue of the judgment,
and then to have said undivided portion or aliquot part conveyed in an
appropriate deed and delivered to the petitioners, without need of
actually partitioning the bulk of the properties and pointing out which
of them belongs to petitioners and which belongs to the widow Maxima
Santos.

The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons
is to assign the whole of the properties left for distribution to the
heirs in a certain definite proportion, an aliquot part pertaining to
each of the heirs. This method or plan of distribution and partition of
estates is provided for in section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus:

“Section 1. When order for distribution. of residue
made. Testimony taken on controversy preserved—When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession.x x x”

It might be pertinent to recall, in order to show the propriety of
this method of partition by determination of the aliquot portion
pertaining to each heir, that,the original action, G. R. No. L-14070,
was instituted to obtain a judicial declaration that one-half of the
properties of Maxima Santos assigned to her as her share in the
conjugal properties of herself and her husband, be conveyed to the
petitioners, because of a document signed by Maxima Santos (Annex “H”
of complaint) in which she promised to convey to the heirs of her
deceased husband one-half of the properties that she would receive as
her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband. The
action was expressly based on said document, Annex “H” of complaint, in
which the promise to convey said one-half portion was made. There was
no demand that said one-half be expressly and actually segregated in
the action, or that the conjugal properties be actually divided or
partitioned. The defendants in that case contended that the document
Annex “H” was not executed by Maxima Santos and that if it was so
executed, the same was null and void as constituting a promise to
convey future inheritance. There was no intent to designate or point
out the properties to be conveyed. The properties appear in the
inventory filed in the proceedings t for the settlement of the estate
of Simeon Bias but no demand was made for their determination in the
case. In view of the nature of the claim, which was to compel
conveyance in accordance with the written contract or promise, and the
nature of the defense, which is the supposed invalidity of the promise,
the decision could not be other than a mere declaration of the validity
of the instrument, coupled with an order for the conveyance and j
delivery to the petitioners of the said one-half share as promised in
the document Annex “H”. All of the above circumstances would have been
ascertained had the court below taken pains to read even the decision
and the project of partition alone.

It is true that objection was also raised by the defendants in the
previous case to the action on the ground that the deceased Maxima
Santos had received in one single mass of properties, not only her
share in the conjugal estate but also a devise of one-third of the free
portion of the estate of her husband Simeon Bias, as well as the share
of one of the latter’s heirs. But such objection could not prevent
compliance with the promise made by the deceased Maxima Santos (to
convey to the heirs of her husband one-half of what she received of the
conjugal properties of her husband and herself). And the objection then
raised was opportunely denied.

The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our
decision sought to be enforced, which is the project of partition in
Civil Case No. 6707 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, contains
the following resume of the properties received by Maxima Santos in
various capacities in the settlement of the estate of her husband,
Simeon Blas:

1/2 of all properties left by the deceased, as her share
in the conjugal partnership property	P339,440.00
1/3 free disposition	113,146.66
1/3 of strict legitimate devised to Lazaro Bias and sold
by the latter to the widow	37,715.56
	—————-
Total	P490,302.22

The properties received by Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal partnership properties is expressly stated to be P339,440.00.
In accordance with the promise made in Annex “H”, to convey and deliver
to the heirs of the deceased husband one-half thereof, the value of the
properties that she was obliged to convey and deliver is one-half of
said properties, or P169,720. Following what we have stated above, that
the practice in the settlement of assets of deceased persons is to
assign to each heir or participant a certain aliquot portion, undivided
if division is difficult to carry out, the share to be assigned by
Maxima Santos is P169,720 divided by P490,302.22 or approximately
34.61%. In order to carry out the decision of this Court, therefore,
the administratrix should have been compelled or ordered to convey and
deliver the 34.61i/3% of the total amount of the properties that she
received in the project of partition.

The procedure to be followed is that outlined in section 8 of Rule 90 which reads as follows:

“See. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which
deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed.—Where the
deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed
real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of
the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the |
executor or administrator to convey such property according to M such
contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties
and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real
property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court
shall execute the deed. The deed executed by such executor,
administrator, the clerk of court shall be as effectual to convey the
property as if. executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such
conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that
purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested,
and such further notice . has been given, by publication or otherwise,
as the court deems proper; or if the assets in the hands of the
executor or administrator will thereby be reduce so as to prevent a
creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend.”

The above-quoted section is applicable because the deceased Maxima
Santos had agreed and promised to convey in her will one-half of her
share in the conjugal assets to such of the heirs of her husband as she
may designate. If the administratrix Rosalina Santos is reluctant to
execute the deed as ordered by the Court, the deed of conveyance and
delivery of the properties may be executed by the clerk of court, in
which case, as declared by the rule, the deed shall be as effectual to
convey the property as if executed by the deceased in her lifetime.

We note that the petitioners prepared a deed of conveyance to be
signed by the clerk of court, but the error in the said deed of
conveyance lies in that it includes all of the properties mentioned in
the project of partition, adjudicated to Maxima Santos which, as above
indicated, should not be the case, because what was actually
adjudicated to her in the project of partition included not only her
share in the conjugal partnership property, but also what she received
from her husband out of the free portion, and what she had purchased
from an heir of her husband.

It is to be noted further that in order to have the document
executed and approved by the court, the specific steps prior to the
execution of the deed of conveyance as pointed out in the last part of
the above-quoted section must be strictly followed.

With the above explanations, there should be no difficulty for the
court below to proceed with the execution of the decision in accordance
with its terms.

Our attention has been called to the fact that of the properties
included in the inventory of the estate left by the deceased Simeon
Bias, certain properties listed in Annex “2” of the petition in the
case at bar, are rjot included in the project of partition. We have
checked the said properties and have found that the same are actually
included in the inventory of the estate left by Simeon Bias but do not
appear among those adjudicated to any of the heirs in the project of
partition. Without making a final pronouncement as to the effect of
such conveyances, it is possible that such conveyances violated the
express promise made by Maxima Santos in Annex “H” that she would
convey one-half of her share in the conjugal properties to the heirs of
her deceased husband. On the other hand, the persons who may have
purchased the same may have acquired them in good faith, without
knowledge of the existence of the promise made by the deceased Maxima
Santos in Annex “H” The only just ruling regarding these properties
would be to reserve to the petitioners herein the right of action to
claim from the administratrix of Maxima Santos, or from the persons to
whom they have been transferred, or from both, their one-half share
therein as promised by Maxima Santos in Annex “H”

The above considerations dispose of the main issue submitted to this
Court in the case at bar. One minor matter remains to be considered,
and that is, the petition for intervention filed by Ludovico Pinpin and
Tomasa Avendaiio alleging that they have an interest in the action as
legatees of the deceased Simeon Bias. This petition was opposed by the
petitioners herein, but was finally admitted by the court a quo.

These intervenors appear to have received legacies in the will of
the deceased Simeon Bias. The portion of said will containing the
legacies to these intervenors are as follows:

IV

“Ang isang ikatlong bahagi, etc.

x x x x

“4. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay TOMASA AVENDAÑO, etc.

x x x x

“6. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay LUDOVICO PINPIN, etc.

(Pp. 254-255, Record on Appeal, G. R. No. L-14070, Maria Gervacio Bias, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos)

The question at issue, therefore, is whether these intervenors are
embraced within the term “herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng
aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON blas, sa kaniyang testamento,” to
which persons Maxima Santos had obligated herself to convey onehalf of
her share in the conjugal properties. A study of the testament of
Simeon Bias (Record on Appeal, pp. 249-257, G. R. No. L-14070) and the
promise or contract executed by Maxima Santos, Annex “H”, shows that
the two terms (herederos and legatarios) are used in the devises or
legacies to the various heirs and legatees. With respect to the
legitimate heirs of Simeon Bias, to whom he devised the strict legitime
and the mejora, he used the expression “ibinibigay ko at ipinamamana
sa aking apong Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta Gervacio Bias at Lazaro
Gervacio Bias” (Chapter II, paragraph 2 of the testament of Simeon
Bias). With respect to the mejora he uses the same term “ipinamamana”
and he says thus: “Para sa aking mga apong Luding at Leoncio Bias ay
ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana ang halagang SAMPUNG LlBONG Piso
(P10,000) sa bawa’t isa sa kanila.” In the last or fourth chapter where
the one-third subject to the free disposal are disposed of, he uses
only the term “ipinagkakaloob”. This term is used for Andres Pascual,
Leoncio Santos, Catalina Bias, Tomasa Avendano, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pinpin, and Fermin Santiago, all of whom are not relatives of the deceased.

Taking into account the fact that both the will of the deceased
Simeon Bias and the document Annex “H” executed by Maxima Santos were
prepared by the same persons and at about the same time, both bearing
date of December 26, 1936, and are attested by the same witnesses, and
the further fact that it was the deceased Simeon Bias that had asked
for the execution of the document Annex “H”, it stands to reason that
the word “ipinamamana” refers to devises made to legal heirs (heirs at
law) of the deceased Simeon Bias, whereas the term “ipinagkakaloob”
refers to persons who are not related to him, or his heirs at law.
Accordingly, in the document Annex “H” which reads as follows:

“MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABAgA:

“Na
akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang kasal kay SIMEON
BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag;

“Na aking nabasa
at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking
asawa, Simeon Blas, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at
sa harap ng aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at
bawa’t isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa
sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at
kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa
paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati
(1/2) sa mga herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit
na asawa, Simeon Blas, sa kaniyang testamento, na ako’y makapipili o
makahihirang sa kahi’t kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at
pamamanahan sang-ayon sa pag-galang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama na
gagawin sa akin.

“SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, ay nilagdaan
ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa
San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines.

“MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS”

the words “herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking
nabanggit na asawa” mean the heirs at law or relatives of the deceased
Simeon Bias and not other persons who are not heirs but had received
legacies in money or otherwise. Consequent to this conclusion,
intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendano cannot claim any right
by virtue of said document Annex “H” and their petition for
intervention should be as it hereby is, disallowed.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the order sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside
and the court below is ordered to proceed with the execution of the
judgment in G. R. No. L-14070 in accordance herewith. With costs
against the respondent Rosalina Santos.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., and De Leon, J., took no part.