ALFREDO A. AZUELO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. RAMON ARNALDO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Azuelo versus Arnaldo

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus brought by Alfredo Azuelo against the Municipality of Legaspi, Albay and its mayor, Ramon Arnaldo, to compel his reinstatement as patrolman and the payment of his back salary. Azuelo had been appointed without civil service eligibility, was suspended, and was later told that his temporary appointment would not be renewed. The case matters because it fixes the rule on the temporary appointment in the civil service: it is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, and no cause is needed to end it. It also teaches when the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not bar immediate recourse to the courts.

Procedural History

Azuelo first sought reinstatement and back salary from the municipal authorities of Legaspi, without success. He then elevated his case to the Office of the President, but without awaiting action from that office he filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance. After trial, the trial court rendered its decision holding that Azuelo had been legitimately removed as patrolman and could not be compelled to be reinstated, but that he was entitled to his salary for the period from March 7, 1956 to July 9, 1957, amounting to 1,129 pesos and 32 centavos, and awarded him 300 pesos in attorney's fees. From that decision the respondents appealed to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Alfredo Azuelo, who had no civil service eligibility, was appointed patrolman of the Municipality of Legaspi, Albay on July 1, 1954, with a salary of 840 pesos per annum. He served as patrolman until March 7, 1956, when Mayor Ramon Arnaldo suspended him in connection with certain administrative charges filed against him.

On May 24, 1956, the mayor withdrew the administrative charges but continued the suspension pending final decision in a criminal case for infidelity in the custody of prisoners, which the provincial fiscal had filed against Azuelo on March 14, 1956. On July 9, 1957, the mayor sent Azuelo a communication informing him that, because of the pendency of the criminal charge, his temporary appointment as patrolman had not been renewed as of the date of his suspension.

On July 18, 1957, Azuelo was acquitted in the criminal case, and the court ordered the municipal authorities of Legaspi to reinstate him and to pay his salary from the time of his suspension. Azuelo sought reinstatement and payment from the municipal authorities but to no avail. He brought the matter to the Office of the President, and without awaiting its action, filed the petition for mandamus.

Issues

• Whether or not a patrolman holding a temporary appointment may be removed at the pleasure of the appointing power, without need of cause, and despite his subsequent acquittal in the criminal case.
• Whether or not Azuelo is entitled to the payment of his salary corresponding to the period of his suspension.
• Whether or not the petition for mandamus is barred by his failure to await the action of the Office of the President under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the nature of a temporary appointment in the civil service, which the Court describes as terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power. The Court states the governing rule in these words:

We agree to the foregoing finding it appearing that the appointment of petitioner is merely temporary and as such is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power.

This rule bears directly on the first issue, because it means the mayor needed no cause at all to end Azuelo's employment.

On the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court states the exception in these words:

This is untenable, for while as a rule administrative remedies must first be resorted to before court action may be taken, that rule only applies when there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court.

This governs the third issue, because no such express legal provision was shown to exist.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that Azuelo's appointment was merely temporary and, as such, terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power. In such a case there is no need even of any cause for the termination, although the mayor had sufficient cause in the criminal charge for infidelity filed against Azuelo. The Court held that the acquittal was immaterial, for even without it his employment could be terminated at a moment's notice.

On the second issue, the Court held that since Azuelo was notified of the termination of his employment only on July 9, 1957, he is technically deemed to have ceased only from that date, and as such is entitled to his salary corresponding to the period of his suspension. The Court added that this is more so when he was acquitted with payment of his back salary.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that Azuelo had no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The rule requiring prior resort to administrative remedies applies only when there is an express legal provision making such a step a condition precedent to court action, and here there was none. The Court noted that Azuelo had in fact elevated his case to the Office of the President, and because of the apparent inaction of that office he was constrained to file the action, which the Court found justified.

Doctrine

A temporary appointment in the civil service is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power. No cause is required for its termination, and the subsequent acquittal of the appointee in a criminal case does not restore the appointment or compel reinstatement. The employee, however, is deemed to have ceased only from the date he is actually notified of the termination, and is therefore entitled to the salary corresponding to the period of suspension up to that date.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an absolute bar. It applies only where an express legal provision makes the administrative step a condition precedent to court action. Absent such a provision, and especially where the administrative office has remained inactive, immediate recourse to the courts is justified.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs, so Azuelo was denied reinstatement but awarded his back salary for the period of suspension, while the respondents lost on the appeal.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a temporary appointment is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, so that no cause and no acquittal can compel reinstatement. Examiners use this case to test the nature of temporary appointments and the limits of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.