FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. L-24827, April 27, 1982 ]

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION , PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

D E C
I S I O N

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner seeks a review of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders and the July 31,
1965 en banc resolution of the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations in CIR
Case No. 51-IPA (2), captioned “Free Telephone Workers Union, petitioner, versus
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, respondent.”

Pertinent to the resolution of the instant petition are the following facts
on record.

On November 1, 1964, petitioner declared a strike against respondent company
to break an impasse over negotiations on a 20-point economic demand, among which
was a demand for wage increase covering a period of three years — 1964 to 1967.

On November 3, 1964, the President of the Philippines, upon authority of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), certified the labor
dispute as one clearly affecting an industry indispensable to the national
interests, to the Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as
respondent CIR.  The case was docketed as CIR Case No. 51-IPA, entitled “Free
Telephone Workers Union, petitioner, versus Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, respondent.”

On November 9, 1964, the respondent CIR, after hearing, issued a partial
decision (Annex L, Petition, pp. 105-114, rec.), the pertinent dispositive
portion of which runs as follows:

“A.     The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered to
pay each of its rank and file employees, numbering 1,345 persons, the amount of
Sixteen Centavos (P0.16) wage increase per hour from November 9, 1964, the date
of this decision, and to run for a period of one (1) year thereafter;

“B.     xx                     xx                     xx.

“C.     Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19, Commonwealth Act 103, as
amended, the members of the Free Telephone Workers Union are hereby ordered to
return to work immediately, and the Company is, in turn, ordered to accept them
under the same terms and conditions of employment, in addition to the award
herein above indicated while the other unresolved demands of the Union are under
consideration.  It shall be understood that during the pendency of this case,
the Union, its members and/or agents shall not strike or walk out of their
employment; and the Company shall not lockout its employees as public interest
demands, considering that the Court, in its opinion, can not promptly settle or
decide the dispute.  xxxxx”

From the above November 9, 1964 partial decision, petitioner interposed an
appeal with the Supreme Court mainly on the sufficiency of the amount granted as
increase.  The appeal was docketed as G.R. No. L-24593, entitled “Free Telephone
Workers Union, petitioner, versus Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
respondent.” The Supreme Court affirmed on July 31, 1970 the November 9, 1964
decision of the respondent CIR and held that the sixteen centavo (P0.16)
increase per hour per employee effective for a period of one (1) year from
November 9, 1964 was supported by substantial evidence (34 SCRA 44).

On March 3, 1965, petitioner and respondent company entered into an agreement
which partly provides:

“In order to insure harmonious labor management relations in the COMPANY
while CIR Case No. 51-IPA, or any incident thereof, is still pending final
resolution by the courts, the parties hereto have agreed as follows:

” xx                      xx                     xx.

“4 .  Hereafter disputes or misunderstandings that may arise by and between
the COMPANY, on the one hand, and the UNION and/or any employee belonging to the
bargaining unit it represents, on the other hand, shall be referred to the
President of the UNION and the Controller of the COMPANY for possible
settlement.  A sincere attempt will be made to settle the dispute or
misunderstanding amicably.  If the dispute or misunderstanding is not settled
amicably, the dispute or misunderstanding shall be submitted to the courts for
final disposition as incidents of CIR Case No. 51-IPA” (underscoring supplied).

Meanwhile, or on April 21, 1965, Republic Act No. 4180 was enacted, raising
the minimum wage to P6.00 a day.  Accordingly, respondent company increased the
wages of its workers who were receiving below P6.00 a day, in addition to the
P0.16 per hour previously awarded by the respondent CIR in its partial decision
of November 9, 1964.

On April 27, 1965, petitioner asked for wage readjustment negotiations with
the respondent company, claiming that when the respondent company automatically
raised the minimum wages of its employees receiving less than P6.00 a day in
compliance with R.A. 4180, a proportionate increase with respect to those
employees already receiving P6.00 a day at the effectivity of R.A. 4180 should
be subject of negotiations.  Respondent company countered that it could not
negotiate with petitioner on the matter because such wage readjustment would in
effect be a wage increase which was connected with the wage increase demand of
petitioner in the pending case certified on November 3, 1964 by the President of
the Philippines.

Consequently, petitioner presented on May 6, 1965 to respondent company a
demand for an automatic P0.25 per hour wage increase for all rank-and-file
employees receiving above P0.75 per hour on account of the implementation of the
new statutory minimum wage of P6.00 a day.

On May 17, 1965, when Case No. 51-IPA, was still pending decision, petitioner
again filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor for refusal of
respondent company to negotiate on its demand for wage adjustment under Republic
Act No. 4180, which allegedly constitutes unfair labor practice.

On June 2, 1965, respondent company, sensing that petitioner would really go
on strike, filed with respondent CIR a petition for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction as an incident of pending Case No. 51-IPA and was thus
docketed as Case No. 51-IPA(2) (pp. 25-28, rec.).  Respondent company prayed
therein of the respondent CIR to enjoin petitioner from striking as petitioner
and respondent company had previously agreed on March 3, 1965 to submit all
further disputes to the respondent CIR and that a strike under the situation
would violate respondent CIR’s November 9, 1964 order (pp. 25-29, rec.).

On June 3, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the aforesaid petition
of June 2, 1965 on the ground that respondent CIR has no jurisdiction to
consider it.

On July 6, 1965, the respondent CIR acting in Case No. 51-IPA (2) confirmed
the action of the Hearing Examiner therein and issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining petitioner from declaring a strike or any specie thereof during
the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction (p. 32, rec.).

On July 7, 1965, petitioner filed with the respondent CIR a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order, alleging substantially the same grounds
contained in its June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss (pp. 33-34, rec.).  On the same
day, petitioner, declared a strike.  According to petitioner, the strike was
precipitated by the [1] summary dismissal of two of its members without a prior
investigation at which it should be represented, and (2) respondent company’s
continued refusal to negotiate on its demand for wage readjustment (p. 4, rec.).

On July 8, 1965, respondent company filed with the respondent CIR an urgent
motion to declare the July 7, 1965 strike of petitioner illegal, the same being
violative of the no-strike order of July 6, 1965 and the court’s partial
decision of November 9, 1964, and praying that the strikers be ordered to return
to work or else forfeit their jobs (pp. 36-40, rec.).  Respondent company
further prayed therein that petitioner and its officers and agents and/or
sympathizers be directed to lift and remove the pickets posted in the different
premises of the company and that the strike of the petitioner be declared
illegal and the officers of the petitioner be held in contempt of court and,
therefore, to have lost their status as employees effective July 7, 1965, the
date of the strike.

On July 9, 1965, petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid respondent
company’s urgent motion (pp. 41-43, rec.).

On July 16, 1965, after due hearing, the trial judge of respondent CIR issued
an order denying petitioner’s June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss respondent
company’s June 2, 1965 petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction, the pertinent dispositive portion of which runs as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss, dated June 3, 1965, and filed on the same
date, is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.  Pursuant to the Partial Decision in
relation to Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended, the petitioner union, its
officers, agents and/or assigns and sympathizers are hereby directed to call off
the strike declared on July 7, 1965, and to lift the picket lines established in
and around premises of respondent company’s various offices and installations in
Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Caloocan City, Dagupan City, Baguio City, San
Pablo City, Iloilo City, Bacolod City, Cebu City, Zamboanga City, Makati, Rizal,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, San Juan, Rizal, San Fernando, Pampanga, Mabalacat,
Pampanga, Lucena, Quezon and Baler, Quezon.  The persons manning the picket
lines in these places are hereby enjoined from impeding and interfering with the
implementation of this Order as well as from interfering in any manner with the
operations of respondent.  The striking employees are hereby directed to return
to work within three (3) days from receipt of a copy of Order by petitioner;
otherwise, if they or any of them fail to do so, considering that as has been
found by the President of the Philippines the business of respondent is coupled
With national interest, the management of respondent is hereby authorize to
replace any and all of them in virtue of Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended,
provided however, that the employees who shall have been replaced may be
reinstated by the Court after due hearing and after establishing good and valid
grounds for their failure to return to work as herein directed” (pp. 54-55,
rec., underscoring supplied).

On July 17, 1965, petitioner, without first returning to work as above
directed, filed with the respondent CIR its motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid July 16, 1965 order.

With the above motion for reconsideration still unacted upon by the
respondent CIR, petitioner on July 19 ,1965 filed with this Court its urgent
petition for certiorari and prohibitory and mandatory injunction
docketed as G.R. No. L-24755, questioning the power and jurisdiction of
respondent CIR.

On July 20, 1965, this Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for “being
premature and for lack of merit” (p. 69, rollo of G.R. No. L-24755).

Back to the respondent Court.  On July 31, 1965 respondent CIR denied
petitioner’s July 17, 1965 motion for reconsideration of the July 6 and 16, 1965
orders of the trial judge, Ansberto Paredes, thus:

“These are two separate motions both filed by petitioner FREE TELEPHONE
WORKERS UNION, thru counsel, seeking reconsideration of two separate orders of
the Trial Court dated July 6 and 16, 1965, respectively.  The Court en banc is
sufficiently guided by the written arguments therein presented and hence, there
is no necessity for an oral argument.

“After a careful perusal of the records as well as the arguments of both
parties, the Court en banc fails to find sufficient justification for altering
or modifying the aforesaid orders.

“BOTH MOTIONS DENIED.  x x x ” (Annex J, Petition, p. 79, rec.).

Hence, this recourse of petitioner, questioning the validity of the aforesaid
July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the CIR and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution
of respondent CIR.  The order of July 6, 1965 enjoined petitioner union from
declaring a strike or any specie thereof during the pendency of the issue raised
in its motion to dismiss.

On the other hand, the order of July 16, 1965

a.  directed petitioner union, its officers, agents and/or assigns and
sympathizers:

(1) to call off the strike declared on July 7, 1965; and
(2) to lift the
picket lines established in and around the premises of respondent company’s
various offices and installations.

b.  enjoined the persons manning the picket lines in these places from
impeding and interfering with the implementation of said order as well as from
interfering in any manner with the operations of respondent;

c.  directed the striking employees to return to work within three (3) days
from receipt of a copy of the order by petitioner; and

d.  authorized respondent company to replace any and all of such striking
employees, who fail to return to work within the said period of three (3) days,
provided that employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated by the
Court after due hearing and after establishing good and valid grounds for their
failure to return to work as directed in the order.

WE have meticulously and painstakingly analyzed the arguments pro and con of
counsel for the contending parties, as well as the issues raised and discussed
by counsel for petitioner under the errors allegedly committed by the court a
quo.  WE find, however, that the real and principal issue in the case at bar is
whether or not the orders of July 6 and July 16, 1965, which were both affirmed
by the respondent court en banc, were validly issued.  In other words, the issue
is one of jurisdiction.

I

Petitioner contends in its third assignment of error that inasmuch as its
second demand for wage increase was prompted by the passage on April 21, 1965 of
Republic Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, said demand
could not have been envisioned by the President of the Philippines when he
certified the labor dispute, subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA, to the CIR on
November 3, 1964.  Hence, said demand was different from and outside the scope
of certified Case No. 51-IPA, since the strike of July 7, 1965, which petitioner
declared and staged arose due to the refusal of respondent company to grant the
second demand for wage increase long after the certification of the President of
the Philippines of November 3, 1964.  Therefore, according to the petitioner,
the dispute, subject matter of 51-IPA (2), is outside the jurisdiction of
respondent court.

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.  One of the principal issues in the
labor dispute between petitioner and respondent company which was certified by
the President of the Philippines on November 3, 1964 and docketed as CIR Case
No. 51-IPA is the issue of wage increases.  During the conciliation stage of
this case it was made clear that the wage increase demanded by petitioner are on
a staggered 3-year basis (Partial Decision on November 9, 1964).  The 3-year
period covered by the wage issue in the main case runs from November 9, 1964,
the date the partial decision was promulgated, as the starting point for the
3-year staggered increases, and to last until November 8, 1967.  The partial
decision of November 9, 1964 in certified case No. 51-IPA, which resolved
petitioner’s first strike declared on November 1, 1964, had settled the matter
of wage increase for the first year of the 3-year period, i.e., from November 9,
1964 to November 8, 1965.  This is precisely why on March 3, 1965, petitioner
and respondent company entered into an agreement whereby, “in order to insure
harmonious labor management relations in the company while CIR Case No. 51-IPA,
or any incident thereof, is still pending final resolution by the courts, x x x
disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between the company, on the one
hand, and the union and/or any employee belonging to the bargaining unit it
represents, on the other hand, shall be referred to the President of the Union
and the Controller of the company for possible settlement.”

It, therefore, clearly appears that the second union demand for wage increase
in May, 1965, which gave rise to the instant case was made within the same
period covered by respondent court’s partial decision of November 9, 1964
granting petitioner a wage increase of P0.16 per hour.  The same demand is
likewise covered by the provision of the March 3, 1965 agreement.

Besides, CIR Case 51-IPA (2) is but an incidental case or an ancillary
proceeding to CIR Case No. 51-IPA, the main case.  When the main case was thrown
to the CIR’s lap by Presidential directive, the CIR assumed jurisdiction over
it, together with all its incidents.  Hence, no independent jurisdiction is
needed to enable the CIR to take cognizance of the ancillary action, much less
any incident thereof ( Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union, 45 SCRA
337, 342; Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CIR, 18 SCRA 894, 898 [1966], and
Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Rural Transit Shop Employees Association,
20 SCRA 779, 785 [1967]).  In the Talisay-Silay case, WE stated that “x x it has
been held that where a Federal court has jurisdiction of a claim and the parties
in the principal action, it generally has jurisdiction also of a suit or
proceeding which is a continuation of or incidental and ancillary to the
principal action, even though it might not have jurisdiction of the ancillary
proceeding if it were an independent and original action or proceeding.  The
jurisdiction of the ancillary suit or proceeding is referrable to or dependent
upon the jurisdiction of the court over the principal suit or proceeding (United
States v. Accord, 209 2d 709 [1954]; Accord, Morrel v. United Airline Transport
Corp., 29 F Supp. 757 [1939]).” And in the Cebu Portland Cement Co. case, WE
declared that “the labor dispute between the employer and the striking employees
had been certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of
Industrial Relations, and the certification confers upon the said court
exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the controversy (Sec. 10, R.A. 875; PAFLU
vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854; Talisay-Silay Milling Co. vs. CIR, L-21582, 29 November
1966, 18 SCRA 894, and others) and other matters connected therewith.” There is
therefore no justification for petitioner’s contention that for the CIR to
assume jurisdiction over CIR Case 51-IPA (2), another presidential directive is
necessary.  In this connection, the pertinent portions of the questioned July
16, 1965 order as affirmed by the July 31, 1965 resolution of the respondent
court en banc is worth quoting as it demonstrated the lack of merit of
petitioners’ stand, thus:

” xx                 xx                     xx.

“But petitioner contends that the ‘x x x present dispute x x x’, being based
on R.A. 4180 which became law only on April 22, 1965, is outside the
Presidential Certification of November 3, 1964 and, therefore, should not be
considered with the certified labor dispute (page 8, t.s.n., of July 9, 1965). 
For this reason, the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged.  However, the
facts obtaining in the main case negate petitioner’s contention.  As clarified
in the conciliation stage of the proceedings, the wage increase issue is on the
staggered three year basis.  ‘There being an impasse x x x’ on this issue ‘x x x
the Court proceeded to receive evidence of the parties on the appropriateness of
granting a reasonable increase of wages’ (Page 7, Partial Decision of November
9, 1964).  In other words, the Court had begun to exercise its compulsory
arbitration powers, as outlined in Section 10 R.A. 875, by ‘x x x fixing the
terms and conditions of employment particularly on the wage increase issue.  In
the Partial Decision, the Court did not only fix the amount of wage increase per
hour for the first year but also fixed the period to be covered by it, which is
x x x from November 9, 1964, the date of the decision, and to run for a period
of one (1) year thereafter; x x x.’ The time aspect of the Partial Decision was
not appealed by the petitioner to the Court En Banc nor to the Supreme Court. 
Since the wage increase issue, submitted to the Court for decision comprises a
period of three (3) years from November 9, 1964, any demand for another wage
increase made within the same period is covered by the certified labor dispute,
and since the Court has already began to exercise its powers of compulsory
arbitration, such a demand should be brought to it in the manner provided by
C.A. Act 103, as amended.  Clearly such is the ‘x x present dispute x x’, so
called by the petitioner, generated by the demand and strike notice of
petitioner based on wage adjustment on account of the passage of R.A. 4180
fixing a new statutory minimum wage of P6.00.  Petitioner’s counsel tried to
differentiate wage increase from wage adjustment, but considering the admission
of counsel that the adjustment involves employees already receiving P6.00, the
adjustments above P6.00 are in fact wage increases themselves.  If Republic Act
No. 4180 has any bearing at all on the issue of wage increases, it is only
insofar as it may be used as a justification of the increase or a factor in
deciding the said issue.  This was precisely what petitioner itself did when it
made mention of the passage of the Act in its Memorandum of May 3, 1965, filed
in support of its stand on the wage increase for the second and third years.

“It may then be asked — how may petitioner now avail of R.A. 4180 as factor
in deciding the wage increase for the first year in its favor when that issue
has already been decided by the Court?  The ruling laid down by the Supreme
Court in ‘ Compania Maritima, et al. vs. Phil. Marine Radio Officers’ Ass’n’
G.R. No. L-10115, has been relied upon by petitioner itself in the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. L-24593).  It has been ruled in that case that in providing for
Section 10 in R.A. No. 875, ‘xx.  The evident intention of the law is to empower
the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner
prescribed under Commonwealth Act No. 103, but with the same broad powers and
jurisdiction granted by that Act. x x.’ In other words, the effect of a
Presidential certification of a labor dispute to the Court under Section 10 of
R.A. 875 is the revival of the compulsory powers of the Court under C.A. 103. 
Section 17 of C.A. 103 provides a clear remedy to petitioner in order that it
could avail itself of the effect of the passage of R.A. 4180.  Pursuant to this
legal provision, it could seek the modification, alteration or setting aside or
the reopening of the Partial Decision.

” xx                 xx                     xx” (pp. 48-51, rec.).

Parenthetically, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s appeal from the
November 9, 1964 Partial Decision on the question of the amount of increase
granted therein has been decided by this Court on July 31, 1970 (Free Telephone
Workers Union vs. PLDT, G.R. No. L-24593) wherein WE affirmed the said November
9, 1964 Partial Decision of respondent court.  There are supervening facts and
circumstances revealed in that decision of OURS which WE feel render moot
petitioner’s stand on the aforesaid issue of jurisdiction as said facts and
circumstances disclose petitioner’s implied recognition of the authority of
respondent court to issue the questioned July 16, 1965 order and July 31, 1965
resolution.  WE quote:

“Not to be overlooked in viewing the Union’s demand in a balanced perspective
is the fact that on November 26, 1965, after the instant petition for review was
filed, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a ‘Third Partial Decision’,
wherein the rank and file employees represented by the union were granted a wage
increase of P0.16 per hour for the second year, effective November 9, 1965, and
another increase of P0.18 per hour for the third year, effective November 9,
1966.  With the previous increase of P0.16 for the first year, effective
November 9, 1964, the total gained at the start of the third year as a result of
the initial demands which gave rise to this case, was P0.50 per hour.

“Although the third partial decision aforesaid is not the subject of review
herein, We note nevertheless that the lower court has made therein a detailed
analysis of the respondent company’s financial situation and found that in 1964
it made a net return of 6.25% on its investment.  The projection made by the
same court, if a yearly increase of P0.16 per hour was granted for the next two
years, was that the company would realize a net return of 7.55% in 1965, 4.9% in
1966, and 1.84% in 1967.  In fact, however, the increase actually granted for
the third year effective November 9, 1966, was two centavos per hour more than
that which was made the basis of the projection.

“These observations, of course, in no way constitute an affirmance of the
lower court’s third partial decision, which is not under review herein, but are
made only to underscore the fact that the increase now challenged by the union
as insufficient is supported by substantial evidence.  Indeed, it has been
pointed out in its brief by the respondent company, without any denial on the
part of the petitioner-appellant, that the latter appears to consider the
additional wage increases as reasonable and did not even move for their
reconsideration” (pp. 50-51).

With the above finding that the Court of Industrial Relations had
jurisdiction over the subject incident (CIR Case No. 51-IPA [2]) the first,
second, fourth, and fifth assigned errors must perforce fall as they are
principally anchored on the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations over the said incident.

1.  However, with respect to the first error assigned, petitioner injects a
constitutional issue in that the respondent CIR’s order of July 16, 1965
violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech because it called for
the lifting of peaceful picket lines.  Indeed, it is now well-settled that
peaceful picketing cannot be restrained because the same is part of the freedom
of speech (PCIB v. PNBEA, 105 SCRA 314, 318 [1981]; Associated Labor Union vs.
Gomez 96 SCRA 551 [1980]; Mortera v. CIR, 79 Phil. 345 [1947]; PAFLU vs. Barot,
99 Phil. 1008 [1956]; De Leon vs. NLU, 100 Phil. 789 [1957]).  But petitioner
fails to realize that the questioned July 16, 1965 order of the Court of
Industrial Relations did not refer to peaceful picketing.  For the order partly
reads, thus:

“x x x Pursuant to the Partial Decision in relation to Section 19 of C.A.
103, as amended, the petitioner union, its officers, agents and/or assigns and
sympathizers are hereby directed to call off the strike declared on July 7,
1965, and to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of
respondent company’s various offices and installations in Manila, Quezon City,
Pasay City, Caloocan City, Dagupan City, Baguio City, San Pablo City, Iloilo
City, Bacolod City, Cebu City, Zamboanga City, Makati, Rizal, Mandaluyong,
Rizal, San Juan, Rizal, San Fernando, Pampanga, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Lucena,
Quezon and Baler, Quezon.  The persons manning the picket lines in these places
are hereby enjoined from impeding and interfering with the implementation of
this Order as well as from interfering in any manner with the operations of
respondent.  x x x” (underscoring supplied).

In Mortera, supra, where the therein questioned order partly declared that “x
x x picketing under any guise and form is hereby prohibited x x x”, this Court
ruled that the “order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing
must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing
through the use of illegal means.  Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited.  It
is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.  Therefore, the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations must be understood to refer only to
illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means” (p.
351).

In this case, the questioned order should also be taken as limited to the
lifting of the picket lines which constituted illegal picketing especially so
because it expressly stated that the petitioner union and its officers, agents
or sympathizers “are hereby directed to call off the strike declared on July 7,
1965, and to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of
respondent company’s various offices and installations x x x.  The persons
manning the picket lines in these places are hereby enjoined from impeding and
interfering with implementation of this Order as well as from interfering in any
manner with the operations of respondent.”

2.  Under its second assignment of error, petitioner contends that respondent
could not validly authorize respondent company to replace those striking
employees who failed to return to work within the time specified in the July 16,
1965 order as no hearing on the issue of termination of employee status had yet
been conducted by the respondent court.  The questioned order in part reads:

“x x x .  The striking employees are hereby directed to return to work within
three (3) days from receipt of a copy of this Order by petitioner; otherwise, if
they or any of them fail to do so, considering that as has been found by the
President of the Philippines the business of respondent is coupled with national
interest, the management of respondent is hereby authorized to replace any and
all of them in virtue of Section 19, of C.A. 103, as amended, provided however,
that employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated by the Court after
due hearing and after establishing good and valid grounds for their failure to
return to work as herein directed.”

And aforesaid Section 19 of C.A. 103, as amended, provides:

“Implied condition in every contract of employment.  In every contract of
employment or tenancy, whether verbal or written, it is an implied condition
that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant
or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or
walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court, after hearing and when
public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only
after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in
its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the employees, tenants or
laborers fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer or
landlord to accept other employees, tenants or laborers.  x x x .”

It is thus clear that this provision vests respondent court under the
obtaining circumstances of this case with full authority to direct the striking
employees to forthwith return to their work and to allow the respondent company
to replace those workers who would choose to defy the court’s directive.  It
must be stressed that the aforesaid authority of the respondent company to
replace arises only from the failure of the workers to return to work.  In other
words, the workers are not being terminated by reason of the strike but because
of their failure to return to work despite the order of the respondent court. 
It is a sanction to enforce petitioner’s obedience to the court’s order.  While
termination by reason of an illegal strike requires hearing, replacement by
reason of violation of a return-to-work order does not.  For such sanction is
merely provisional and an expedient to enable the respondent company to comply
with its duties and functions which are very closely related to the interests of
the public, it being involved in an industry affecting national interest. 
Moreover, such provisional remedy is calculated to minimize the injurious
effects of the strike on the respondent company and its clients as well as on
the public.  After all, by the very terms of the questioned order, “the
employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated by the Court after due
hearing and after establishing good and valid grounds for their failure to
return to work as herein directed.”

As a matter of fact, the employees replaced by the respondent company
pursuant to the herein questioned orders were subsequently ordered reinstated by
the respondent CIR in its order of November 4, 1965 and affirmed by the CIR en
banc on November 29, 1965 which order of reinstatement was upheld on appeal by
this Court in the related case of Philippine Long Distance Co. vs. Free
Telephone Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25420 (22 SCRA 1013 [1968]).  However, all
the subject employees except three (3) union officers were sternly warned for
having disobeyed the partial decision of November 9, 1964 and the orders of July
6 and 16, 1965.  The aforesaid union officers were ordered suspended for three
(3) months for having defied the aforestated orders.

WE held among others in that case that:

“As to the reliance by Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company on the
Court of Industrial Relations’ authorization to hire replacements, said
authorization order dated July 16, 1965 expressly provided that replacements be
temporary, that is, subject to the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to
subsequently order reinstatement of replaced employees.  And thus, Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company’s contention that it can no longer reinstate the
26 employees in question because it had hired permanent replacements in their
positions by virtue of the Court of Industrial Relations’ authorization order,
is plainly untenable.  Said order precluded the hiring of permanent
replacements.

“Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company finally contends that at any rate
it has the power to dismiss the 26 employees in question for serious misconduct
on their part constituting in their having induced strikers not to return to
work in the face of the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations to the
contrary.  Such contention deserves no consideration because Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company had admitted that its dismissal of said employees was
pursuant to and under the authority granted by the Court of Industrial Relations
to replace strikers who failed to return to work.  And consequently said
dismissal must be subject to the conditions provided for in said authority
regarding the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to order their
reinstatement.”

3.  WE go to the last two errors imputed to the respondent court.  It is
claimed that the respondent court erred in giving the company injunctive relief
without the company exhausting all remedies to negotiate with the petitioner
(4th assigned error) and in issuing the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders without
regard to the procedural requirements of due process (5th assigned error).

Both assigned errors are without merit.

WE have already established and ruled that the subsequent demand for wage
increase which precipitated the second strike by petitioner was merely an
incident of the main case, CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore the conceded
jurisdiction of the respondent court over the main case.  (CIR Case No. 51-IPA)
carried with it authority to take cognizance of the aforesaid incident subject
of CIR Case No. 51- IPA(2).  Consequently, as the subject incident is part of
the main case, which was then already subject to compulsory arbitration,
negotiation was no longer necessary.  Precisely, the decision of November 9,
1964, was just a PARTIAL DECISION covering only the first year phase of the
three-year wage increase demand involved in said main case and the last 2-year
phase still remains to be resolved.

With respect to the claim that procedural requirements of due process were
disregarded in the issuance of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the respondent
court, it must be stressed that the said orders were issued by the respondent
court on the premise that the incident subject of CIR Case No. 51-IPA (2) was
part of CIR Case No. 51-IPA and therefore as already emphasized, the
jurisdiction of the respondent court over CIR Case No. 51-IPA necessarily
includes its authority over CIR Case No. 51-IPA (2).  Under its November 9, 1964
Partial Order in CIR Case No. 51-IPA, it was ordered, among others, that “x x x
during the pendency of this case, the Union, its members and/or its agents shall
not strike or walk out of their employment; and the Company shall not lock out
its employees as public interests demand, considering that the Court, in its
option, cannot promptly settle or decide the dispute.” Hence, when respondent
court issued the questioned July 6 and 16, 1965 orders it was merely enforcing
the said November 9, 1964 Partial Decision by requiring the striking workers to
return to work under pain of being replaced.  And as WE have already pointed out
in our resolution of the second issue, this did not constitute a resolution on
the merits of the issue of termination of employee status but only as a
provisional sanction to secure obedience from the recalcitrant and defiant
strikers which does not require prior hearing.

Besides, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition of respondent
company and thereafter a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
same; hence, whatever deficiency could be imputed to the assailed orders was
considered cured by the aforesaid motions.  Thus, they were not only given an
opportunity to be heard, but actually were heard ( Beng vs. City Sheriff of
Manila, 83 SCRA 229, 233 [1978], citing several cases).  Moreover, the
questioned orders were based on sufficient facts contained in the record and
disclosed to both parties ( Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]).  It cannot
therefore be properly asserted that the aforesaid orders of respondent CIR were
issued without due regard to procedural due process.

There is therefore no justification for the reversal of the questioned orders
of the respondent CIR.

WHEREFORE, THE JULY 6 AND 16, 1965 ORDERS AND THE JULY 31,
1965 EN BANC RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ARE
HEREBY AFFIRMED.  NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, Plana, and Escolin,
JJ.,concur.
Aquino, J., no
part.
Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ.,on
leave.