ANTONIO ACOMPANIADO, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, ALBUERA LEYTE, BIENVENIDO VERANO JR., FRANCISCA MAINIT, TIRSO SABATE AND TONY SABATE, RESPONDENTS.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Acompaniado versus Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte
The Case
This is Antonio Acompaniado against the Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte, and against Bienvenido Verano Jr., Francisca Mainit, Tirso Sabate, and Tony Sabate. The petitioner sought review of a decision of the Municipal Trial Court through a special civil action, and the case reached the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. The decision is short, but it teaches a lesson every practitioner must learn: procedural rules on the filing of memoranda are not suggestions. The Court dismissed the appeal of the petitioner for one reason only, his failure to file the required memorandum within the period fixed by the Rules, despite notice and without just cause. The case matters because it shows how the Supreme Court treats a litigant who sleeps on his remedy, and it fixes in memory the exact rule that authorizes dismissal.
Procedural History
The petitioner, Antonio Acompaniado, brought a special civil action before the Court of Appeals, seeking relief against the Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte, and against the private respondents. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in that case. From that decision, the petitioner came to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari. On March 12, 2014, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty days from notice, pursuant to Section 10 of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the petitioner received the notice on April 24, 2014, as shown by the return registry receipt card. Counting thirty days from that receipt, the petitioner had until May 24, 2014 to file his memorandum. He did not file it. The Court then issued the resolution now before us, dismissing the appeal.
Facts
The material facts are few and entirely procedural. The petitioner had lost before the Court of Appeals in a special civil action against the Municipal Trial Court of Albuera, Leyte and the private respondents. He elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.
On March 12, 2014, the Court required the parties to file their memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty days from notice. The notice reached counsel for the petitioner on April 24, 2014, as evidenced by the return registry receipt card. The petitioner therefore had until May 24, 2014 within which to comply.
No memorandum was filed within that period, and no just cause was shown for the failure. Having received due notice and having let the period lapse, the petitioner left the Court with no choice under the Rules but to dismiss the appeal.
Issues
- Whether or not the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the non-extendible period fixed by the Rules is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
- Whether or not the appeal should be dismissed where the appellant failed to file the required memorandum without just cause despite due notice and within the period allowed by law.
Applicable Provisions
Section 10 of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda in special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.
This provision fixes the period the petitioner failed to meet, and it makes that period non-extendible, so no extension could have saved him.
The same Section 10 provides:
The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
This is the provision the Court applied, and it is the textual basis for the dismissal.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period allowed is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The Court quoted the second paragraph of Section 10 of Rule 44 and applied it directly to the petitioner.
On the second issue, the Court dismissed the appeal. Its reason was stated in a single, complete sentence: the petitioner failed to file the required memorandum without just cause, despite due notice, and within the period allowed by law. The Court noted that counsel for the petitioner received the notice on April 24, 2014, as evidenced by the return registry receipt card, and that the petitioner therefore had thirty days, or until May 24, 2014, within which to file his memorandum. No memorandum came. Because the period was non-extendible and no just cause was shown, the appeal was dismissed.
Doctrine
First, in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties file memoranda in lieu of briefs, within a non-extendible period of thirty days from receipt of the notice that all the evidence is already attached to the record. Second, the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within that period may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Third, where the appellant fails to file the required memorandum without just cause despite due notice and within the period allowed by law, the appeal is dismissed. The doctrine is strict: the period is non-extendible, and the consequence of lapse is dismissal. A Bar answer should anchor both rules in the exact language of Section 10 of Rule 44, quoting the non-extendible thirty-day period and the clause that failure to file the memorandum may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Disposition
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Antonio Acompaniado for his failure to file the required memorandum without just cause despite due notice and within the period allowed by law.
Remember This
Memorize the line: the failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Examiners use this case in remedial law to test the non-extendible thirty-day period for memoranda in special civil actions and the consequence of an appellant's failure to comply.