FERDINAND ANGELES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MARCELINO L. SAYO, JR. PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA AND FLORENCIO F. ALIASAS, RESPONDENTS.

Angeles versus Sayo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Ferdinand Angeles against Judge Marcelino Sayo, Jr., the presiding judge of a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and against the private respondent Florencio Aliasas. Angeles asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court that admitted Aliasas's memorandum of appeal in an ejectment case even though it was filed late. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a compact lesson on the procedural requirements of a petition for certiorari, namely personal filing and service with a written explanation, the attachment of relevant pleadings and documents, and the sixty-day period. Second, it teaches that the discretionary admission of a late memorandum of appeal is not grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

Procedural History

The case began as a complaint for ejectment filed by Aliasas against Angeles before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated 7 December 2009. Aliasas appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, but he failed to file his memorandum of appeal on time. He then filed a motion with leave of court to admit and give due course to his memorandum of appeal. Over Angeles's opposition, Judge Sayo issued an order dated 4 October 2010 granting the motion, admitting the memorandum, and giving Angeles fifteen days to file his own appeal memorandum. Angeles moved for reconsideration, and the motion was denied in an order dated 10 April 2014. Angeles then filed the present petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was filed on 8 October 2014.

Facts

Aliasas sued Angeles for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The trial court ruled against Aliasas and dismissed the complaint in a decision dated 7 December 2009. Aliasas elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, but he did not file his memorandum of appeal within the period allowed.

On 3 June 2010, Aliasas filed a motion with leave of court to admit and give due course to his memorandum of appeal. Angeles opposed the motion. On 4 October 2010, Judge Sayo granted the motion in the higher interest of justice, so that the case would be decided on the merits and not on mere technicalities. The court admitted the attached memorandum for appellant dated 5 March 2010 and gave Angeles fifteen days from receipt of the order to file his appeal memorandum.

Angeles moved for reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 10 April 2014. He received that denial on 6 August 2014. He then filed the present petition for certiorari on 8 October 2014, seeking to annul both orders.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement of a written explanation why filing and service were not done personally.
• Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition.
• Whether or not the petition was filed out of time under the sixty-day period.
• Whether or not the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in admitting the late memorandum of appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

This provision governs the first procedural defect, because the petition lacked the required written explanation.

Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. A person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

This provision supplies the documentary requirements whose violation is the second defect.

Section 4 of Rule 65 provides:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

This provision fixes the deadline that Angeles missed by one day.

Section 3 of Rule 46 provides:

Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition.

This provision expressly authorizes dismissal for non-compliance with the requirements, which the Court applies to all three defects.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition lacked the required explanation why its filing and service were not done personally. Under Section 11 of Rule 13, filing and service must whenever practicable be done personally, and a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation. Absent that explanation, the petition may be considered as not filed and as not served. The Court stressed that strict compliance is mandatory.

On the second issue, the Court held that Angeles failed to attach copies of the pleadings and documents filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, including the complaint and the decision dated 7 December 2009. The purpose of the requirement is to enable the Court to determine at the earliest possible time whether the petition has prima facie merit. A petition lacking these essential pleadings may be dismissed.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petition was filed out of time. Angeles received the denial of his motion for reconsideration on 6 August 2014, so the sixty-day period expired on 5 October 2014. Because that day was a Sunday and the following day was a holiday, the petition should have been filed on 7 October 2014, not on 8 October 2014. The Court reminded that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process, and that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ never demandable as a matter of right.

On the fourth issue, even setting aside the procedural defects, the Court held that the petition would still fail. Certiorari is narrow in scope and inflexible in character, and lies only for an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The second requisite was wanting, because Angeles did not show that the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the late memorandum of appeal. The Court declined to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion, following its earlier ruling that the word "shall" in the rule on the memorandum of appeal does not always denote an imperative duty and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. It added that Angeles was not deprived of due process, since the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.

Doctrine

A petition for certiorari must strictly comply with the Rules. Filing and service must whenever practicable be done personally, and any resort to another mode must be accompanied by a written explanation, failing which the paper may be considered as not filed. The petition must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the challenged order and copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and failure to comply is a sufficient ground for dismissal.

The sixty-day period under Section 4 of Rule 65 is counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and it is jurisdictional in the sense that a late petition must be dismissed. The right to appeal is a procedural remedy of statutory origin, not a natural right or part of due process.

Certiorari lies only for an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, meaning a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The discretionary admission of a late memorandum of appeal is not grave abuse of discretion, because the word "shall" in the rule requiring the memorandum does not always denote an imperative duty.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied due course to and dismissed outright the petition for certiorari, and declared the case closed and terminated. Angeles lost.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a petition for certiorari is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and it must be filed personally with a written explanation, complete with the relevant pleadings, strictly within sixty days. Examiners use this case to test the procedural requirements of Rule 65 and the rule that the discretionary admission of a late memorandum of appeal is not grave abuse of discretion.