INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, UNITED STATES LINES COMPANY AND/OR LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, DE…

Plaintiff Insurance Co. of North America filed, on October 14, 1965, in the Court of First
Instance of Ma­nila,
an action for the recovery of P86,081.30, the in­sured value of a
shipment of eighty-two (82) cartons of goods, allegedly lost in the custody of
the carrier, de­fendant United States Lines, Co., or of the lighter operator,
defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, or of the arrastre operator, defendant
Bureau of Customs, an agency of defendant
Republic of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs,
on their part, moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming State immunity from suit. 
These defendants also
filed an answer, raising the same point as a special defense.  Plaintiff opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss.

Defendant United States Lines Co., filed an answer with a cross-claim against the Republic of the Philippines
and the Bureau of Customs.  Said
defendants filed answers to the cross-claim.

Defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation filed an answer and later
an amended answer with a counterclaim.  And plaintiff
answered the counterclaim.

On
December 18, 1965, the
court denied the Repu­blic’s and Bureau of Customs’ motion to dismiss.  Sub­sequently, however, on February
1, 1967, said court,
taking notice of Our decision in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.  vs. Bureau of
Customs and Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-13139, December 17, 1966, dismissed
the case with respect to the Republic of the Philippines
and the Bureau of Customs.

Plaintiff appealed from the order of dismissal.  We affirm.

The first question
regarding the suability of defendants Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs has been
squarely passed upon and resolved in the Mobil case, supra.  As We held therein, the Bureau of Customs, in operating the arrastre service itself,
does so in the performance of a necessary incident to the prime governmental function of taxation,
and, as
such, is not suable for alleged losses resulting therefrom.  A fortiori neither is the Republic suable for said activity of the Bureau of Customs.

Appellant would however next take issue with the
statement in the Mobil case that plaintiff therein should have filed its
claim thru the Auditor General, it being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327. 
It is now urged that the claims for that may be filed with the Auditor
General under said law, in relation to Act No. 3083, are only those accounts
subject to liquidation by an arithmetical computation and only where the
liability of the Government is not
In issue.  Appellant cites Compañia
General de Tabacos v. French, 39
Phil. 34.

The principle recognized in the Compañia General de Tabacos
case, supra, was that a money claim for damages the amount of which cannot be
readily determined from vouchers, reports or other means within reach of
accounting officers, but calls for the application of judgment and discretion
upon the measure of damages, is not within the competence of the Auditor General to decide.  In
the present case, the amount of the claim is already fixed and is readily determinable from the bills of lading and other shipping papers.  Accordingly, such a claim should be addressed to the
Auditor General.

Neither did said case, Compañia General de Tabacos hold that where the liability of the Government is in issue, the claim
cannot be filed with the Auditor General. 
It is precisely for the Auditor General to determine whether the claim
is tenable or not, and if not to deny the same.

The real issue in said Tabacalera case was whether the
Auditor General (then Insular Auditor) may offset against a specific,
liquidated and undisputed debt of the Government, an unliquidated claim for
damages in favor of the Government against the creditor; and the ruling stated
that he not.  Such ruling does not apply
to bar a case, like the present, where no question of offset is involved, but
simply that, of allowing or disallowing a specific and liquidated claim against
the Go­vernment.  Rather, it in effect
sustains the power of the Auditor General to take cognizance of such a claim,
for if the same
be found in order and allowable, the amount recoverable is fixed
and liquidated, as determined or readily determinable from papers and invoices
available to him, instead of being subject to his dis­cretion, as would be the
case in an unliquidated claim for damages.

Stated otherwise, where
the existence of a specific and fixed debt is the issue,
the Auditor General has po­wer to act on the claim; but when not only the existence
but also the, amount of an unfixed and undetermined debt is involved,
said official has no competence to consider such a claim.  The present case is of the first kind, the
assertion of the existence of a specific and fixed indebtedness on the part of
the Government.  It should therefore be
lodged with the Auditor General.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is here­by
affirmed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.