G.R. No. L-24942. March 30, 1970
COTABATO LIGHT & POWER COMPANY, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE CITY OF COTABATO, THE HONORABLE MAYOR OF COTABATO CITY, THE HONORABLE BOARD MEMBERS OF COTABATO CITY A…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by the City of Cotabato, et al.,
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato
in its Civil Case No. 1971 (for declaratory relief), wherein the court a
quo declared null and void and ultra vires
the said city’s Ordinance No. 7 – imposing a tax (denominated as a license fee
in the Ordinance) on any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in
“the operation or manufacture or sale of electric light or electric heat
or electric power” within the limits of Cotabato
City – and enjoined the city officials concerned from enforcing the Ordinance
in question.
The background facts are not disputed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 487, dated June 18, 1939, the Cotabato Light & Power Company, Inc. was granted a
legislative franchise to construct, maintain and operate a plant for the
purpose of generating and distributing electric light, heat and power for sale
within the limits of the municipality (now city) of Cotabato
for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
The said grant provided, among others, as follows:
“Section 1. Subject to
the terms and conditions established in Act Numbered Thirty-six hundred and
thirty-six, as amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and thirty-two,
and to the provisions of the Constitution, there is granted to the Cotabato Light and Power Company, Incorporated, for a
period of twenty-five years from the approval of this Act, the right, privilege
and authority to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and
power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing electric light,
heat, or power for sale within the limits of the municipality of Cotabato, Province of Cotabato.
“Section 2. It is
expressly provided that in the event the Government should desire to maintain
and operate for itself the plant and the enterprise herein authorized, the
grantee shall surrender its franchise and will turn over to the Government all
serviceable equipments therein, at cost.
“Section 3. The municipal
franchise under which the grantee is now operating an electric light, heat,
and power plant in Cotabato, Cotabato,
is declared null and void.”
The provisions of Act 3636 (as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
132) referred to above, so far as pertinent to the present case, read:
“SEC. 10. The grantee
shall pay the same, taxes as are now or may hereafter be required by law from
other individuals, copartnerships, private, public or
quasi-public associations, corporations, or joint-stock companies, on his (its)
real estate, buildings, plants, machinery, and other personal property, except
property declared exempt in this section.
In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee
shall pay into the municipal treasury of the (of each) municipality in which
it is supplying electric current to the public under this franchise, a tax
equal to two per centum of the gross earnings from electric
current sold or supplied under this franchise in said (each said)
municipality. Said tax shall be due and
payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind,
nature or description levied, established, or collected by any authority
whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or insular, now or in the future, on its
poles, wires, insulators, switches, transformers and structures, installations,
conductors, and accessories, placed in and over and under all public property,
including public streets and highways, provincial roads, bridges and public
squares, and on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and
profits, from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.”
On June 19, 1959,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act, under whose provisions chartered cities, municipalities and municipal
districts were granted broader powers to levy taxes and fees in their
respective jurisdictions. Section 2 of
this law provides:
“SEC. 2. Taxation. – Any, provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts
shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business, or, exercising privileges in chartered
cities, municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to secure
licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the
municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district council of
the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for services rendered by
the city, municipality or municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable
fees for services rendered in connection with any business, profession or
occupation being conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district
and otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or
fees: Provided, That
municipalities and municipal districts shall in no case, impose any percentage
tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on
articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the
national internal revenue code: Provided,
however, That no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or
impose any of the following:
x x x x
(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks,
irrigation and other public utilities except electric light, heat and power;
x x x x
(j)
Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies,
and persons paying franchise tax; and
x x x x
Pursuant to the power and authority granted under Section 2(d) abovequoted, the Municipal Board of Cotabato
City, on October 3, 1962,
enacted the said city’s Ordinance No. 7 now called to question. Quoted hereunder are its provisions:
“ORDINANCE NO. 7
“AN ORDINANCE
IMPOSING LICENSE FEES ON THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ELECTRIC LIGHT, HEAT AND
POWER, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2(d) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2264.
“By authority of Section 15, Republic Act 2364, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Cotabato, be it
ordained by the Municipal Board in regular session assembled that:
“TITLE I – Municipal License Fees for Selling Electric Light,
Heat and Power.
“Section 1. – Permit
and License:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership,
or corporation to conduct or engage in the operation or manufacture or sale
of electric light or electric heat or electric power either generated by
machine or water power without first securing a permit therefor
from the City Mayor and paying the necessary license fees to the City
Treasurer, Provided, that application for permit shall be first approved by
both, the City Electrician or his authorized representative, and the City Engineer
or his authorized representative.
“Section 2. – Fees.
“For the business mentioned under Section 1, hereof, a license
fee, shall be paid monthly for electric light or electric heat or electric
power whether sold to the public or to any company, partnership or corporation
or individual with a franchise to sell same to the public, computed as follows:
“(a) For every kilowatt sold at the rate of from
P0.18 to P0.27, there shall be collected (one centavo) . . . . . P0.01
“(b) For every kilowatt sold at the rate less than
P0.18 (one-half centavo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P0.005
“(c) For every kilowatt sold at the rate more than
P0.27 (two centavos) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P0.02
“Section 3. – Time
for Payment.
“The license fees prescribed under Section 2, hereof, shall be
paid to the City Treasurer quarterly, and a surcharge of, twenty (20%) per
cent on the fees due shall be imposed for late payment.
“Section 4. – Mode
of Determining the Tax Due.
“In order to determine the amount of fees or tax due provided
herein, the proprietor or manager or president of the company or partnership or
corporation shall submit to the City Treasurer a sworn statement at the end of
every quarter stating the number of kilowatts sold at various rates during the
said period.
“Section 5. – Penal
Provision.
“Any person who is found violating any provision of this
Ordinance shall upon conviction thereof, be punished with a fine of not less
than P50.00 but not more than P200.00 or an imprisonment of not less than ten
(10) days nor more than one (1) month, and for each succeeding offense double
the penalty. In the case of a company,
partnership or corporation violating any provision of this Ordinance, it shall
be the manager or president or members of the board of directors who shall be
held liable therefor.
“Section 6. – Proceeds
from this Ordinance shall form the ‘City Light Fund’ and shall be exclusively
used for lighting public streets, plazas, alleys, and other public places and
public buildings.
“Section 7. – Effectivity.
“This Ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.”
The Cotabato Light & Power Company,
Inc., being engaged in the operation and sale of electric power, heat and
light in Cotabato
City under its franchise,[1]
was advised by the treasurer of the city of the enactment of Ordinance No. 7
and, at the same time, requested to cooperate in the implementation thereof.
The company hedged; in its letter dated February 6, 1963, it called the
attention of the City Treasurer to the term “kilowatt” used in the
ordinance, and informed the said official that the ordinance did not pertain to
it because the Cotabato Light & Power Company
sells electricity not by the “kilowatts” but by the
“kilowatt-hours”. Even after
the treasurer of the city had subsequently advised it that the
“kilowatt” referred to in the ordinance was intended to mean
“kilowatt-hour” as reflected in Resolution No. 61, Series of 1963 of
the Municipal Board of Cotabato City, however, the Cotabato Light & Power Company refused to pay and made
it plain in its letter of September 1, 1964 that it could not comply with the
ordinance because it believed the same to be ultra vires. It then filed the present action for
declaratory relief before the court a quo in view of the
insistence of the officials of Cotabato City
concerned to enforce the questioned ordinance against it; and, as stated in
the opening paragraph of this opinion, the trial court rendered judgment in
its favor and against the City of Cotabato and its
officials, with the following dispositive portions:
“In view of all the facts and the law aforecited,
it seems clear that Ordinance No. 7, series of 1962, of the defendant Cotabato City, is a tax ordinance, not a license fee; that
the defendant Cotabato City cannot enact Ordinance
No. 7 imposing a tax upon the plaintiff under Section 2(d) of the Local Autonomy
Act because said tax is expressly prohibited under Section 2(j) of the Local
Autonomy Act with respect to the plaintiff which is paying a franchise tax to
the government; that independent of Section 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act,
the Plaintiff is legally exempted from paying the tax imposed by Ordinance No.
7 by virtue of the express exemption in Section 10 of Act No. 3636, as amended
which is expressly incorporated in Republic Act No. 3217; that if the levy in
Ordinance No. 7 is considered as a license fee, the same would be null and
void for being clearly excessive, and therefore, unjust, pursuant to Section 2
of the Local Autonomy Law.
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff against the defendants:
“(a) Declaring Ordinance No. 7 a tax measure,
intended to raise revenue rather than merely a license for regulation
purposes;
“(b) Declaring said Ordinance No. 7, being a tax
measure, as null and void and ultra vires, by virtue
of Section 10 of Act No. 3636, as amended, expressly incorporated in Republic
Act No. 3217, the legislative franchise of the plaintiff;
“(c) Declaring said Ordinance No. 7, if considered
as a police regulation measure, null and void, for imposing a clearly
excessive, hence unjust, license fees, contrary to Section 2 of the Local
Autonomy Act.
“(d) Enjoining the defendants from enforcing
Ordinance No. 7 against the plaintiff.
“Without pronouncement as to costs.”
From this decision of the lower court, the City of Cotabato et al. has taken the present appeal, claiming
that:
“I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S CLAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF TAXES OTHER THAN
FRANCHISE TAX IS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 2 (j) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
2264.
“II. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS EXEMPTED FROM PAYMENT OF THE TAX
IMPOSED BY ORDINANCE NO. 7 OF THE CITY OF COTABATO
BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 10 OF ACT NO. 3636, AS AMENDED.
“III. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DECLARING ORDINANCE NO. 7 OF THE CITY OF COTABATO
NULL AND VOID AND ULTRA VIRES, AND IN ENJOINING DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FROM
ENFORCING THE SAID ORDINANCE.”
As correctly put by appellants, the real issues are (1) whether
or not Ordinance No. 7 of the City of Cotabato,
earlier quoted, is valid; and (2) if so, whether or not the said ordinance can
legally be enforced against the Cotabato Light &
Power Company, Incorporated.
It is pointed out by appellants that the City of Cotabato is legally possessed of
the necessary power and authority to enact the ordinance under
consideration. Reliance is placed upon
the provisions of Section 2(d) of the Local Autonomy Act We have previously
quoted, providing that “x x x
all chartered cities x x x
shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in chartered
cities x x x by requiring
them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council
of the city, x x x and
otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or
fees: x x x Provided, however, that no city x x
x may levy or impose x x x taxes on persons operating waterworks, irrigation and
other public utilities except electric light, heat and power”. Upon these, they argue that there should be
no doubt about the power of the City of Cotabato to levy taxes on persons
engaged in the business of electric light, heat and power; and since appellee Cotabato Light &
Power Company is engaged in such business within Cotabato City,
it has no reason to complain against Ordinance No. 7. Appellee, on the
other hand, contends that while the provisions of Section 2(d) of the Local
Autonomy Act relied upon by appellants so provide, Section 2(j) of the same
law ordains that “x x x
no city x x x may levy or
impose x x x x taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies, and
persons paying franchise tax”; and since it is already continuously and
regularly paying the 2% franchise tax provided for in thelaw
which granted its franchise, it maintains that appellant City of Cotabato is devoid of any authority to levy upon it the tax
imposed by its Ordinance No. 7. The
force of both arguments demands that We take a second look at the legal
provisions invoked by them, if only to get a clearer view of the
controversy. For emphasis, We again
quote the pertinent portions of the Local Autonomy Act involved:
“SEC. 2. Taxation. – Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts
shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business, of exercising privileges in chartered
cities, municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to secure
licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the
municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district council of
the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for services rendered by
the city, municipality or municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable
fees for services rendered in connection with any business, profession or
occupation being conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district
and otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or
fees: Provided, That
municipalities and municipal districts shall in no case, impose any percentage
tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on
articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the
national internal revenue code: Provided,
however, That no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or
impose any of the following:
x x x x
“(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks,
irrigation and other public utilities except electric light, heat and power;
x x x x
“(j) Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance
companies, and persons paying franchise tax; and
x x x x”
(Underscoring
Ours)
Appellants plead that these provisions should be taken to mean
that all persons already paying franchise taxes are exempt from local taxation,
except when they are engaged in the business of electric light, heat and
power. Thus, they argue in their brief:[2]
“It is difficult to understand how paragraph (d), with
specific reference to electric light, heat and power, which to all intent and
purposes is an exception to an exception, can be viewed as a general
provision, and corollarily, how paragraph (j) can be
considered as a special provision. There would be more sense and logic, we
submit, in treating paragraph (j) as a general provision insofar as persons
paying franchise tax are concerned, and paragraph (d), with respect to
operators of electric light, heat and power, as a special provision. Thus considering these two paragraphs, the
portions thereof which are pertinent to the present case would be understood to
mean – as the legislature intended them to mean – as follows: No city, municipality or municipal district
may levy or impose taxes on persons paying franchise tax except where such
persons are operators of electric light, heat and power. This construction would, we believe, give
full effect and meaning to the clear intention of Congress to isolate the business
of electric light, heat and power from other public utilities on which taxes
may not be imposed by cities, municipalities and municipal districts.
“The phrase ‘persons paying franchise tax’ in paragraph (j)
can only refer to persons or corporations, other than those engaged in electric
light, heat and power, paying franchise tax, like operators of ice plants,
radio broadcasting stations and television stations. The specific mention of ‘electric light, heat
and power’ in paragraph (d) would become idle if not meaningless if persons
engaged in that business and paying franchise tax would be deemed exempt from
the taxing power of local governments.
In enacting Section 2 of Republic Act No.2264, Congress must be presumed
to be cognizant of the fact that the business of electric light, heat and power
is operated under a legislative or municipal franchise, and, therefore,
inevitably subject to the payment of franchise tax. If, this notwithstanding,
persons operating this kind of business would be held as included in the term
‘persons paying franchise tax’ in paragraph (j), then the phrase ‘except electric
light, heat and power’ in paragraph (d) would be absolutely inoperative.”
The above argument of appellants suffers from a significant flaw
in its premise that the business of electric light, heat and power is
inevitably subject to the payment of franchise tax. There is no warrant for such contention in
any extant constitutional or statutory provision. In other words, it is perfectly possible for
the legislature or a municipality to grant a franchise without the requirement
to pay any franchise tax. Thus, the
exemption of franchise holders from any possible municipal tax under Section
2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act is not necessarily repugnant to the power given
to municipalities to tax the business of light, heat and power, under Section
2(d) of said law, assuming that the reference therein to such business
constitutes an exception to the exception.
Such business may be taxed so long as it does not pay a franchise tax,
but not in addition to or differently from the latter. Even the broadest view of the power of
taxation granted municipal corporations under the Local Autonomy Act cannot
justify appellants’ position in the absence of clearer indication of such
intent in its provisions. Withal, the
issue raised by appellants regarding the alleged repeal of the terms and
conditions of appellee’s franchise by Republic Act
2264 is not really new. Well reasoned
precedents[3]
practically on all fours with the present case, dispose of it entirely.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, supra, the
Collector of Internal Revenue, in pursuance of the provisions of Act No. 2432
and subsequent Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, assessed
against the Manila Railroad Company a tax on coal and oil imported into the
Philippines by the said company for its use, which tax, the Manila Railroad
paid under protest on the ground that it was not bound to pay it by reason of
its charter or franchise (Act No. 1510) which required it to pay a certain
percentage tax on its earnings with the proviso that “such payments, when
promptly and fully made, by the grantee shall be in lieu of all taxes of every
name and nature – municipal, provincial, or central – upon its capital, stock,
franchise, right of way, earnings, etc.” The problem thus presented was
whether or not said Acts had altered, repealed or amended the company’s
charter. This Court held
“x x x [T]he
question presented above may be stated more concretely: May a special law or charter be amended, altered
or repealed by a general law, by implication?
“That question has been answered in the negative so many times
that, except for the fact that it has not been raised here before, it would
scarcely be necessary to cite authorities.
“Repeals of laws by implication are not favored; and the mere
repugnance between two statutes should be very clear in order to warrant the
court in holding that the later in time repeals the other, when it does not in
terms purport to do so. (Cooley’s
Constitutional Limitations [6th Ed.], p. 182, and cases cited; Sutherland
Stat. Construction, Vol. 1, p. 465 [2d Ed.]; Kinney vs. Mallory, 3 Ala., 626;
Banks vs. Yolo County, 104 Cal., 258; People vs. Pacific Import Co., 130 Cal.,
442; Reese vs. Western Union etc. Co., 123 Ind.,
294; 7 L.R.A., 583; Cope vs. Cope, 137 U.S.,
682.)
“In the case of McKenna vs. Edmundstone
(91 N.Y., 231) the court said: ‘It is
well settled that a local and special statute, providing for a particular case
or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its
terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law.’ That
rule is but the application of the larger rule that a statute is not to be deemed
repealed, by implication, by a subsequent Act upon the same subject unless the
two are manifestly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other, or unless a
clear intention is disclosed on the face of the later statute to repeal the
former one.
“It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute,
general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute,
will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18 Wall. [U.S.],
478; Cass County
vs. Gillet, 100 U.S.
585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185
U.S., 373,
396.)
“Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the
later general – the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as
remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.],
425.)
“Said Act No. 1510 is a charter granted to the plaintiff
company by the Government of the Philippine Islands. It is in the nature of a private
contract. It is not a law constituting a
part of the machinery of the general government. It was adopted after careful consideration of
the private rights of the plaintiff in relation with the resultant benefits to
the State. It stands upon a different
footing from the general law. When a
charter is granted, it constitutes a certain property right. Charters or
special laws, such as Act No. 1510, stand upon a different footing from
general laws. Once granted, a charter becomes a private contract and cannot be
altered nor amended except by consent of all concerned, unless that right is
expressly reserved. (Darmouth College
vs. Woodword, 4 Wheat., 578.) The reason for the rule
is clear. The Legislature, in passing a
special charter, have their attention directed to the special facts and
circumstances which the Act or charter is intended to meet. The Legislature consider and make provision
for all the circumstances of the particular case. The Legislature having specially considered
all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special
charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general
law containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and
without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter,
intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special act. (Lewis vs. Cook
County, 74 Ill.
App., 151; Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting, 34
Phil. 401.)
“While the Acts of Congress referred to above contain a
provision that all laws inconsistent with their provisions are repealed, yet
they expressly provide that they shall not affect any accrued right. The plaintiff had enjoyed the rights granted
under Act No. 1510 for a number of years.
Such rights were accrued rights.
An examination of said Acts of Congress not only fails to disclose any
express intention to amend, alter, or repeal Act No. 1510, or any of its
provisions, but, upon the contrary, we find that the said Acts of Congress
expressly protect all rights theretofore accrued.”
There being obvious parity in the facts and legal provisions involved
in the above case and the present one, We hold that the clause “any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal
license taxes or fees” found in Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, did not
alter, amend, nor repeal the terms and conditions of the appellee
Cotabato Light & Power Company’s franchise under
which it was required to pay 2% of its gross earnings “in lieu of any and
all taxes of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or collected
by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or insular, now or in the
future, x x x on its
franchise, rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and profits, from which taxes
the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.” Consequently, said terms and
conditions exempt the Cotabato Light & Power
Company from the operation of Ordinance No. 7, enacted by the City of Cotabato pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264.
Indeed, the soundness of our conclusion on this point is strengthened
by the fact that even after the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 was already in
force, when Congress extended appellee’s franchise
for another twenty-five years under Republic Act No. 3217 on June 17, 1961, the
said franchise was again expressly made “subject to the terms and
conditions established in Act No. 3636, as amended by C. A. No. 132” which
conclusively shows that the exemption of appellee
from the imposition of taxes other than its franchise tax was not repealed,
altered, or modified by the provision of the Local Autonomy Act relied upon by
appellants. In any event, another way of
looking at the matter is that such exemption was revived, if at all it had
been repealed.
This is not to say that the legislature is without any
prerogative to alter or modify the terms of any previously granted franchise,
but the revision must, in the first place, conform with the express
reservations made in the grant and, moreover, the intent to amend must be
evident, if not specific.
On the other hand, there is no need to declare the ordinance in
question null and void and ultra vires
by reason of the exemption established in Act 3636 referred to in the
above-named company’s franchise. Neither is this the occasion to pass on the
question of whether the said ordinance is a police regulation measure or a pure
tax, although it is apparent from the terms of the ordinance that its purpose
is to raise revenue for the City Light Fund, and as such could be considered as
a tax.[4]
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that the portions thereof declaring Ordinance No. 7 null
and void and ultra vires are
eliminated. Thus modified, the same is
affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., in the result.
[1]
The company’s franchise granted under Commonwealth Act No. 487 was extended on its
expiry date under Republic Act No. 3217, dated June 17, 1961, which reads:
“SEC. 1. Subject to the terms and conditions
established in Act Numbered Thirty-Six Hundred Thirty-Six, as amended by
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Thirty-Two, and to the provisions of the
Constitution, the franchise granted by Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred
Eighty-Seven to the Cotabato Light and Power. Company, Incorporated, to construct, maintain
and operate an electric light, heat and power plant for the purpose of
generating and distributing electric light, heat and power for sale within the
limits of the City of Cotabato,
province of Cotabato, is hereby extended
for a period of twenty-five years from the date of its expiration.”
[2]
Pp. 7-9, Brief for Appellants.
[3]
See Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224 (1919). See, also, Philippine Railway Co. vs.
Collector of Int. Revenue (1952), 91 Phil. 35; Visayan
Electric Co., S.A. vs. David(1953), 92 Phil. 969.
[4] Cf. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, L-21183, September 27, 1968, 25 SCRA 192, 201.