P. A. ALMIRA, P. M. AMURAO, J. R. ANGELES, R. N. BADIOLA, LILIA R. BAUTISTA, G. B. LAIZ, N. A. CANLAS, C. S. DE CASTRO, C. V. CELIS, JR., A. M. DIONISIO, V. S. ESPIRITU, E. S. G…

Almira versus B. F. Goodrich Philippines

The Case

This is a labor case that reached the Supreme Court by way of an appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations. The petitioners are a group of workers of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Incorporated, who were dismissed after the labor court declared their strike illegal. The private respondent is the company. The action began as a complaint by management to declare the strike illegal, and it matters to every Bar candidate because the Court here draws a firm line between the illegality of a strike and the drastic consequence of dismissal, holding that the two do not automatically follow one from the other. It is a case about the means employed in a strike, about violence during picketing, and about the constitutional command of security of tenure.

Procedural History

The company filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations to have the strike declared illegal. The case was heard by Judge Joaquin Salvador, who issued an order on the fourth of February, 1972, declaring the strike illegal and holding that the petitioners had lost their status as employees as of the nineteenth of April, 1971. That order was later affirmed by a resolution of the labor court en banc, with the Presiding Judge and one Associate Judge concurring in the result. The petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which decided the appeal on the twenty-fifth of July, 1974.

Facts

The relationship between labor and management in the company was marked by deep bitterness, each side believing the other guilty of the most reprehensible conduct. The union declared a strike while a certification election was pending, because management would not consider the union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative. The labor court itself described the picketing as far from peaceful: picketers physically blocked and prevented the entry of customers, supplies, and employees who were not on strike, and injuries were inflicted on certain employees of the company.

The company published notices in the Manila Times and the Daily Mirror, directing all employees not participating in the strike to report for work on or before the twenty-third of April, 1971, otherwise their failure would be considered participation in the strike. Some of the listed workers who failed to report were later seen picketing after the twenty-sixth of April. The picketing continued under the same pattern of coercive activity, with physical injuries inflicted on the company's personnel manager, mass picketing with intimidatory statements, and the roof of the Makati plant set on fire in January of 1972.

On these facts the labor court declared the strike illegal and, as a consequence, declared the petitioners to have lost their employment status. The Supreme Court noted that the labor court appeared to proceed from an outmoded view of a strike as coercive by its very nature, and that it did not pinpoint which particular petitioners committed which serious acts of violence.

Issues

• Whether or not the strike, though premature because a certification election was pending, was automatically illegal for that reason alone.
• Whether or not the acts of violence during the picketing automatically rendered the strike illegal and warranted the dismissal of all the petitioners.
• Whether or not the labor court erred in imposing the drastic penalty of termination of employment on all the petitioners without individual determination of responsibility.

Applicable Provisions

Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution provides:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.

This provision is the constitutional anchor of the ruling, because the Court holds that the security of tenure it guarantees forbids visiting every misstep of labor with the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the illegality of a strike for recognition is not absolute. The labor court itself admitted this, saying that the illegality of such a strike as a general proposition is not absolute, and that it declared the strike illegal on the basis of the attendant circumstances. The Court found that the labor court was unduly influenced by the outmoded view that a strike is by its very nature coercive, and that it failed to heed the ruling in Cebu Portland Cement against Philippine Match Factory, which had long been abandoned. At most, the strike was premature, but it could plausibly be viewed as inspired by good faith.

On the second issue, the Court held that violence does not automatically stamp a strike with illegality. It quoted its ruling in the Shell case:

A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed.

The Court stressed that responsibility for violence must be individual, not collective, and that the labor court failed to pinpoint which petitioners committed which serious acts.

On the third issue, the Court held that even assuming the strike was illegal, the automatic termination of the employment relationship was not warranted. It invoked the constitutional mandate of security of tenure, and held that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe, considering also the hardship unemployment brings to the worker's family.

Doctrine

A strike for recognition is not illegal per se; its illegality depends on the attendant circumstances, and a premature strike may still be viewed as inspired by good faith. Violence during a strike does not automatically render it illegal, because responsibility for such acts must be individual and not collective, unless the force is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. Even where a strike is illegal, the penalty of dismissal is not automatic; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure under Article II, Section 9 requires that where a less punitive penalty would suffice, it should be imposed instead.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the appealed order, ordering the reinstatement of the petitioners with backpay corresponding to eighteen months, subject to the condition that those against whom criminal charges are pending shall be reinstated only upon final dismissal or acquittal.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that the illegality of a strike does not automatically carry the penalty of dismissal, because responsibility for violence is individual and not collective, and security of tenure demands a less punitive penalty where one suffices. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the legality of a strike and the penalty imposed on strikers, and the application of the constitutional protection to labor.