BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS AND NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EX-LASEDECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations, ordering the petitioners to pay the cash
value of vacation and sick leaves of eighteen former employees of the
defunct Land Settlement and Development Co. (LASEDECO), corresponding
to the period of the Japanese occupation of this country.

It appears that on May 14, 1953, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order in Manlapit, et al. vs. Land Settlement and Development Corporation (Case No. 422-V) ^[1]
holding that former employees of the LASEDECO were entitled to the
payment of vacation and sick leaves corresponding to the period of the
enemy occupation. On December 3, 1956, the present case was filed by
the Ex-LASEDECO Employees’ Association in behalf of eighteen other
former employees of the LASEDECO, seeking application of the benefit of
that ruling to them, on the allegation that they were similarly
situated as the petitioners in the earlier case against the LASEDECO.
The action was brought against the Board of Liquidators (BOL), which
was created by Executive Order No. 372, Series of 1950, and designated
by Executive Order No. 60, Series of 1954, to liquidate the assets and
liabilities of the defunct LASEDECO pursuant to Republic Act No. 1160,
and against the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), which took over the assets of the LASEDECO.

The Court of Industrial Relations found that the respondents were
former government employees who had been recalled to the service of the
LASEDECO after the liberation of the Philippines and who had been given
back pay certificates. Upon the abolition of the LASEDECO, these
eighteen claimants were laid off. After hearing, the Court of
Industrial Relations held that, in line with its previous ruling,
claimants were entitled to the payment of vacation and sick leaves
during the period of the occupation.

Thereafter, petitioners Board of Liquidators and the National
Resettlement and Rehabiliation Administration filed a motion for
reconsideration which the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting en banc,
denied in a resolution dated August 29, 1958. Hence, this appeal. The
petitioners contend (1) that the C.I.R. has no jurisdiction over the
present case and (2) that the C. I. R. erred in ordering the payment of
vacation and sick leaves benefits to respondents for the period of the
enemy occupation.

In support of their contention that the C.I.R. has no jurisdiction
over this case, petitioners state that there exists no
employer-employee relationship either between the Board of Liquidators
and respondent or between NARRA and respondent. On the other hand,
respondent association contends that since this case is merely an
incident of another case before the C.I.R. over which the latter court
acquired jurisdiction, this case may properly be heard by that court in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits, pursuant to our ruling in Gomez vs.
North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc., 104 Phil., 294; 56 Off. (12) 2630.
Respondent association likewise argues that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the same because
some of its members were, at the time of the filing of the complaint,
employees of BOL and NARRA.

In Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 108 Phil., 134, We clarified our rulings on the jurisdiction of the C.I.R. thus—

“Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it
will be noted in all of them, though not stated in express terms, is
that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is
sought to be re-established because of its wrongful severance (as where
the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations
has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with
employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the
Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the relationship
and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims,
and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (Italics supplied.)

“We are aware that in 2 cases (Mindanao Bus Employees Labor Union [PLUM] vs. Mindanao Bus Co., et al., G. R. No. L-9795, Dec. 28, 1957; Gomez vs.
North Camarines Lumber Co., 104 Phil., 294; 56 Off. Gaz. [12] 2630)
some statements implying a different view have been made, but we now
hold and declare the principle set forth in the next preceding
paragraph as the one governing all cases of this nature.”

This ruling has been followed in a long line of cases and is now the settled doctrine on the matter^[2]

A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the C.I.R. is found in Campos, et al. vs.
Manila Railroad Co. et al., G. R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which
We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) there must exist between the
parties an employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his
reinstatement; atid (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified
by the President to the C.I.R. as one involving national interest, or
must have a bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or must arise
either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law.
In default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere
money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In this case, claimants do not pretend to be employees of the LASEDECO or of the BOL or the NARRA. In fact, paragraph 1 of their petition before the C.I.R. admits that
their association “is a legitimate labor organization of former
employees and workers of the defunct Land Settlement and Development
Corporation.” Nor do claimant-members of the association seek
reinstatement to their former jobs; indeed, they cannot, what with the
abolition of the LASEDECO. The first element—existence of
employer-employee relationship—necessary to confer jurisdiction on the
C.I.R. is therefore wanting.

Neither is this a case relating to a claim under the Minimum Wage
Law or the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or one involving an unfair labor
practice or one certified by the President to the Court of Industrial
Relations as in- volving an industry indispensable to the national
interest, in which case, the C.I.R., in the exercise of its broadpowers
under Commonwealth Act No. 103, may grant vacation and sick leave pay.
(See Isaac Peral Bowling Alley vs. Untied Employees Welfare Association, et al., 102 Phil., 219). The second element is also lacking.

We hold therefore that the C.I.R. had no jurisdiction over this
case. Indeed, in an earlier case between the same parties herein (Board
of Liquidators, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., 108 Phil. 162). We held that “considering that the members of
respondent (Ex-LASEDECO Employees) Association are former employees and
employees and workers of the defunct LASEDECO, who were laid off from
service therewith in November, 1953, and do not seek reinstatement
thereto, We find that respondent Court (of Industrial Relations) had no
jurisdiction over the present case.” We make a similar ruling here,
without prejudice to the right of the respondent union to bring such
action as it may deem necessary in the regular court of competent
jurisdiction.

The resolution of this question makes it unnecessary for Us to pass
upon the other point raised in this appeal. (New Angat-Manila
Transportation, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G. R. No. L-16283, Dec. 27, 1960; Board of Liquidators, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 108 Phil., 162.)

Wherefore, the decision dated April 29, 1958 and the resolution
dated August 29, 1958 are hereby set aside, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Appeals from this case were
taken to this Court in G.R. No. L-6252 and G.R. No. L-10227, but the
same were dismissed, the first for having been filed out of time and
for lack of merit and the second for being factual and for lack of
merit. (Res. dated Feb. 14, 1952 and Dec. 18, 1956, respectively.)

^[2] Cagalawan vs. Customs Canteen, et al., G. R. No. L-16031, Oct. 31, 1961; Sy Huan vs. Bautista, et al., 112 Phil., 914; Cuison vs. Gaite, G. R. No. L-16611, March 25, 1961; and several other previous cases.