PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOEY PUNZALAN @ “JOJO”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The facts of the case as culled from the records are:

Accused Joey Punzalan alias “Jojo” (hereafter appellant) stands charged for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in an Information which reads:

When arraigned, appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the offense charged.  Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Medel Cortez, Marivic Juan, Manuel Malubay, Dra. Talamayan and Julio Samson.  

For the defense, appellant, Nancy Punzalan, police officers Melchor Derada and Ulpiano Balmoja testified.

 The evidence for the prosecution established the following:

Medel Cortez (hereafter Medel) was the driver/classifier of Spouses Julio and Charito Samson at the latter’s rice-trading business.  

On May 14, 1996, at around 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock dawn, while Medel was in his quarters (bunkhouse) with his co-worker, George Dumlao (hereafter George), he heard Charito Samson (hereafter victim) shouting.  He slowly went near her and asked, “Manang anya di diay?” (“Manang, what is it”).  However, he heard no reply.  At a distance of about 1.5 meters, he saw appellant holding a fire extinguisher and pounded it three (3) times on the victim’s head who was then lying down face up.  Medel moved backward and hid.  Thereafter, he saw appellant came out through the back door with bloodstains on his hands and chest.  Appellant ran westward and while being chased by the victim’s dog, he opened the gate.  

Medel called on George and reported the incident to Abelardo Samson Sr. (hereafter Abelardo, Sr), the victim’s father-in-law.  They returned to the victim’s house together with Abelardo Samson, Jr. (hereafter Abelardo, Jr), victim’s brother-in-law.   Abelardo Jr. held the victim on his lap and ordered Medel to drive the Elf truck to bring the victim to the hospital.  The victim died before reaching the hospital.  

Dra. Virginia Talamayan (hereafter Dra. Talamayan) conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim and declared that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the frontal area and on the right facial area, and frontal skull fracture.

Marivic Juan (hereafter Marivic) testified that it was her habit to wake up early in the morning and drink coffee.  At about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of May 14, 1996, while she was at their terrace taking her early morning coffee, she  heard  the  barking  of  dogs.  Illuminated by streetlight and moonlight, she saw appellant standing at the corner of the latter’s house somewhat confused and bewildered.

Meanwhile, at about 3:00 o’clock dawn of May 14, 1996, Manuel Malubay (hereafter Manuel), appellant’s neighbor, was awakened by the barking of dogs. He heard appellant waking up Nancy Punzalan (hereafter Nancy) and afterwards drove off on a motorcycle.  

Julio Samson (hereafter Julio), the victim’s husband, was in Bulacan selling palay during the incident.  He declared that he spent approximately P150,000.00 as funeral expenses.

For the defense, the evidence established the following:

Appellant was the driver and trustee of her employer and aunt Nancy Punzalan (hereafter Nancy).  Appellant and Nancy testified on the following events:

After  due  proceedings, the  RTC  rendered  its  decision  in  the terms  earlier  set  forth.   Hence, this  appeal  raising  the  following  errors:

The appeal is meritorious.

The issue to be resolved in this case is the credibility of the witnesses.  The trial court found worthy of belief the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. Appellant however, claims that they are full of material inconsistencies which cast doubt on his culpability to the crime charged.

As a general rule, the trial court’s evaluation of testimonies of witnesses is accorded with highest degree of respect on appeal.  It is not to be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight or substance that could alter the result of the case (People vs Balacano, 336 SCRA 615).  

Medel’s account of the incident is unworthy of belief.   For one, his testimony failed to establish appellant’s presence inside the victim’s house prior to the commission of the crime.  It was clear in his testimony that there were  no  signs  of  appellant’s  presence  in  the  vicinity  before  the  killing incident. It was only him and his co-workers who were inside the compound of the victim’s house. Medel saw appellant only when he was inside the victim’s house and was hitting her with a fire extinguisher.  

While Medel admitted to have witnessed the killing, it took him four (4) days to pin down appellant as the wrongdoer (tsn dated August 21, 1996, p. 40). This cast serious doubts on the reliability and candor of Medel’s assertion that he saw appellant killed the victim. In fact, at the time the incident was reported to the police authorities, no suspect was ever identified by them (tsn dated September 17, 1997, p. 8-9; tsn dated November 27, 1997, p. 7).

The veracity of Medel’s claim, that when he saw appellant hitting the victim, he hid for fear, is doubtful.  Assuming his narration to be truthful, at the time of the incident, appellant was alone and, except for the fire extinguisher alleged to have been used in hitting the victim, appellant was unarmed.  There was no immediate danger to his person as appellant was unaware of his presence.  Medel could have immediately helped the victim or seek assistance from his co-worker, George, who was inside the compound of the victim’s house. Further, instead of checking on the condition of the victim after appellant left, he still managed to climb the fence to see appellant.  Thereafter, together with George, they went to the house of the victim’s father-in-law to report the incident.  Verily, evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People vs Calumpang, 454 SCRA 719).

We cannot likewise give credence to the testimonies of Marivic and Manuel.  Marivic’s narration that she saw appellant being chased by dogs and who appeared to be confused and bewildered is not persuasive as it was then dark and raining. She said that she was able to identify appellant through the aid of a streetlight and moonlight is not accurate.  Based on the evidence on record, from May 10 to 17, 1996, there could have been no moonlight as can be seen from the lunar calendar.  

Manuel’s testimony is also unreliable.  He admitted not having seen appellant before and after the incident but only to the fact that he heard him waking up Nancy, starting the engine of the motorcycle and left.

No convincing proof could show appellant’s reason or motive in killing the victim in cold blood.  No evidence of grudge between the victim or her family and appellant was presented and proved. Appellant testified that the victim and her husband are not his friends.  He had gone to their house only once during the lifetime of the victim.  His testimony on this matter is noteworthy, thus:

Prosecutor Paas:

 
Appellant’s defenses of alibi and denial were unarguably weak since they were corroborated merely by his aunt, a relative, and it was not shown that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Nevertheless, the same is inconsequential as the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his culpability (People vs Limpangog, 396 SCRA 603).  

An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence.  The presumption of innocence  dictates  that  it  is  for  the  people  to  demonstrate  guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence (People vs Arapok, 347 SCRA 479).  To sustain a conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.  The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction (People vs Comesario, 306 SCRA 400).  

In view of the foregoing, we find no further need to address the other issue raised by appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the RTC  dated September 10, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for  insufficiency  of  evidence.  Consequently,  appellant  is  ACQUITTED of  the  crime  charged on  reasonable doubt.  The  Director of the Bureau  of Corrections is hereby ordered to cause appellant’s IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM CUSTODY, unless he is lawfully held for another cause.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES, and VICENTE S. E. VELOSO, JJ., concur.