G.R. No. L-21895. April 29, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. AGUEDA GO (SHIOK KING JO), PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
naturalization in the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte,
stating in the second paragraph thereof:
“Second.—My present place of residence is Rizal
Avenue street, Municipality of Malitbog, Province of Southern Leyte and
my former residence, none, continuously residing in Malitbog.”
On March 6, 1962 the Solicitor General opposed her petition on the
ground that she did not state all her previous places of residence as
required in Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473. Petitioner’s Immigration
Certificate of Registration dated April 29, 1953 stated that she
resided at No. 2l 4 Manalili St., Cebu City.
On May 11, 1962 the trial court granted the aforementioned petition.
The Solicitor General’s opposition was considered unwarranted on the
ground that petitioner’s stay in Baybay, Leyte and Cebu City during her
studies was merely temporary. The Republic thereupon appealed.
After filing eight (8) petitions for extension of time within which
to file appellant’s brief, all of which were granted by this Court, the
Solicitor General filed on May 8, 1964 a motion to withdraw appeal. On
May 18, 1964 we denied said motion and considered the same as
appellant’s brief.
Agueda Go was born on February 5, 1939 of Chinese parents in
Malitbog, Southern Leyte. At the age of 7 years she was sent to Baybay,
Leyte to study in first grade primary. The next year she entered the
Cebu Chinese High School at Cebu City where she finished her elementary
and secondary education. She then enrolled at the University of
Southern Philippines, Cebu City, for her first year collegiate course.
While in Cebu City she resided at No. 214 Manalili St., but went home
to Malitbog, Southern Leyte, during the summer vacation every year.
The point at issue is whether or not the omission of petitioner’s
places of residence in Baybay, Leyte and Cebu City from her petition is
fatal thereto.
This question is not new, for in a long line of cases we have held
that an applicant should state in his petition for naturalization all
his previous places of residence, temporary or permanent, as required
in Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473.[1]
Failure to do so will result in the denial of such a petition. The
purpose of the law is to give the public and the investigating agencies
of the government an opportunity to gather information and to express
objections relative to the petition.[2]
In Qua vs. Republic,[3] we said:
“* * * Precisely for this reason it is important
that petitioner’s actual, physical residence be likewise set forth and
published, since information regarding petitioner and objection to his
application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding.”
Hence, a residence though temporary—such as petitioner’s temporary
residence during her studies in Cebu City—ought to be stated in the
petition. Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473 speaks of “present and
former places of residence” without specifying actual or legal
residence.
We find no special circumstances or reason in the instant case to depart from our said previous rulings.
And lest it be overlooked, we express our disappointment over the
filing of the petition signed by Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza of the Office of the Solicitor
General to withdraw the appeal despite the repeated stand of said
office and our holdings sustaining it, that omission from the petition
for naturalization of the applicant’s previous places of residence is
fatal.
If said motion had been granted by this Court, the decision appealed
from would have become final resulting in the grant of Philippine
citizenship to an alien who may not be naturalized on the basis of her
own petition.
It bears stressing that the laxity of the legal arm of our
government in this case is liable to provide a fertile occasion for
graft and corruption and create an ideal ground upon which pressures,
political or otherwise, can be exerted. It may even tend to permit
non-observance of laws, such as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
would have resulted had the motion to withdraw appeal been granted in
this case.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Concepcion, this Court in a recent case[4] said:
“Thus, several parties had, through the action and
the omissions of the judicial branch of the government, succeeded, not
only in evading the law, but, also, in preventing the executive
department from executing and enforcing the same, for over two (2)
years. Surely, more caution should be exercised to avoid such
occurrence, if we hope to keep the faith of the people in the courts of
justice.”
A similar want of caution on the part of government lawyers can
indeed produce embarrassing and lamentable situations in which the
courts would have to deny a petition for naturalization against the
representations of the very office among whose important duties is to
guard against the granting of Filipino citizenship to those who do not
possess the qualifications required by law.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition for naturalization denied. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[1] Pidelo vs. Republic, L-7796, September 29, 1955; Keng Giok vs. Republic, L-13347, August 31, 1961; Koa Gui vs. Republic, L-13717, July 31, 1962; Ngo vs. Republic, L-18319, May 31, 1963; Gaw Ching vs. Republic, L-19419, September 30, 1964; Go Bon The vs. Republic, L-16813, December 27, 1963; Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964; Ong Tai vs. Republic, L-194l8, December 23, 1964; Ong Ping Seng vs. Republic, L-19575, February 26, 1965.
[2] Qua vs. Republic, supra.
[3] Supra, note 1.
[4] The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary vs. The Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-22308, 22343-44, March 31, 1966.