PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERIC PRONDA Y PALOMERO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
LAGURA-YAP, J.:
The dispositive portion[2] of the decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Eric Pronda y Palomero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11 (3), Article II of R.A. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), as charged. judgment is hereby rendered sentencing him to suffer and (sic) indeterminate prison term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) Years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos. He is to further suffer the accessory penalty provided by law. Costs against accused.
The one (1) sachet of shabu (Exh. “B-5-A” – 0.03 gram) subject matter of this case being a dangerous drug, the same is hereby ordered confiscated and/or forfeited in favor of the government and to be forthwith delivered/turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) provincial office for immediate destruction or disposition in accordance with law.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the bail bond for P120,000.00 put up by Plaridel Surety and Insurance Company under PSIC Bond No. 32680 for the provisional liberty of the accused is also hereby ordered canceled and rendered of no longer any force and effect.
Consequently, the immediate arrest of herein accused is likewise hereby further ordered for his commitment to the national penitentiary.
The Information[3] filed on May 19, 2004, against accused Eric Pronda y Palomero under Criminal Case No. 04- 26357, alleges:
That on or about the 16th day of May 2004, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drugs, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.03 gram, in violation of the aforementioned law.
Acts contrary to law.
The accused entered a “NOT GUILTY” plea during the arraignment[4] on June 9, 2004.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized as follows:
PO1 Jonas Leroy Redoblo, averred that there was a tip from an informant that there were many drug personalities roaming around Purok Sigay, Brgy. 2, Bacolod City. A group of PP-2 police officers headed by SPO2 Freddie Natividad, with members, PO1 Kenneth Ebron, PO1 Henry Gaburno, PO1 Jackson Genolos and PO1 Redoblo conducted a “stake out” operation in the area at around 3:45 P.M., on May 16, 2004. While at the foot-walk, PO1 Redoblo spied on a man standing in front of a sari-sari store holding a sachet of suspected shabu between his right thumb and index finger, with ¾ of an inch protruding. The person was apparently unaware of the presence of the camouflaged police officer. PO1 Redoblo immediately drew near the person but the man tried to enter the store. The officer grabbed the man’s hand to ascertain the sachet held by the person. PO1 Redoblo found out that the plastic sachet contained white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. PO1 Redoblo placed under arrest the person later identified as the accused Eric Pronda y Palomero. The latter was informed of the nature of his arrest and his right to remain silent and to counsel.
Evidence for the defense is summarized hereunder:
Accused Eric Pronda y Palomero is a resident of Patricia Home Subdivision and was tricycle driver. He testified that on May 16, 2004 at around 3:45 in the afternoon, he was at Purok Sigay to collect a debt due him from a certain Jerry Latoza, a co-laborer and merchandiser. Jerry was out of the house according to his wife. So the accused left a message and proceeded to Michelle’s Eatery. He traversed the foot-walk heading to the main road where a commotion was ensuing. When the accused reached the main road, he was held by two persons who inserted their hands in his pocket. They also got his key and P50.00. The accused complained about the search but he was told to just go with them. He was forced to board an owner-type jeepney. There were three of them inside the vehicle. The accused was brought to a house in front of the Brgy. Hall and when he complained again, he was told to wait. After the policemen arrived, the three were brought to BAC-Up 2. The accused was ordered to keep his peace when he was placed inside the cell. He denied possessing the one plastic sachet of shabu. He did not file a complaint against the police officer for his arrest.
After the trial, the RTC promulgated[5] its judgment of conviction against the accused. Aggrieved, he filed a Notice of Appeal[6] dated February 26, 2010. The accused-appellant filed a Motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal on February 28, 2010.[7] The Motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal was approved in the Order[8] dated March 12, 2010.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.
The accused-appellant argues that to constitute a valid in flagrante arrest two requisites must concur: 1. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting commit a crime; 2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. From the testimony of the arresting officer, there was nothing suspicious on the looks, or from the accused-appellant’s outward appearance, neither was there anything unusual from the actuations of the accused-appellant which could arouse a police officer’s attention. Mere holding of a plastic sachet in front of a sari-sari store would not in anyway be called an offense. Therefore, had it not due to the forcible taking of the sachet from the alleged possession of the accused-appellant, PO1 Redoblo would not know that it contained a white crystalline substance. Hence, the arrest of the accused-appellant is an infringement of his constitutional right.
The accused-appellant claims that the seizure of the plastic sachet of shabu does not fall within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. An object is in “plain view” if the object is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized is inside a closed package, the object is not in plain view and therefore, cannot be seized without a warrant. At first glance, PO1 Redoblo had no idea of the contents of the sachet allegedly held by accused-appellant. He (Redoblo) was not certain what was inside the small pack clipped between the thumb and index finger of the accused-appellant. He grabbed the plastic sachet from the accused-appellant to take a good look at the plastic sachet. PO1 Redoblo disclosed in his testimony during the cross-examination that he needed first to grab the thing which the latter held to be able to know what was inside of it.
The accused-appellant ratiocinates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function does not apply in this case. PO1 Redoblo admitted that he was staying in a safe house located at Purok Sigay, Barangay 2 of Bacolod City for almost a month. Yet, PO1 Redoblo does not know the name of the owner of the sari-sari store where the team found the accused-appellant. Neither could he (Redoblo) recall the surrounding area and the people present during the arrest. He could not read the letters he affixed on the plastic sachet he seized from the accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant also posits the view that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody rule. From the testimony of the PO1 Redoblo, there was no showing of who was in possession of the plastic sachet from the sari-sari store to the Police Precinct 2. The identity of the station commander to whom the custody of the seized plastic sachet was turned over was not duly established. The specimen was kept the whole night of May 16, 2004 at the Police Precinct 2. No evidence was presented to show who had access to the evidence cabinet where the specimen was kept overnight. There was also no disclosure as to the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized specimen, after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court.
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced as its evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime charged.
The Solicitor General in his Appellee’s Brief counter argues that on the contrary the prosecution was able to establish the elements of illegal possession of drugs. PO1 Redoblo positively identified the person he saw holding a small transparent plastic sachet. He narrated how during the surveillance, he inadvertently saw accused-appellant holding a plastic sachet that he suspected to be containing prohibited drugs. The plastic sachet recovered from the accused-appellant tested positive for shabu.
According to the Solicitor General, courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which the accused can concoct it to suit his defense. Thus, the accused-appellant’s denial must fail in the light of the positive identification and declarations made by the prosecution witness. PO1 Redoblo testified in a straightforward and categorical manner regarding the identity of the accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General avers that the records do not show any objection interposed by the accused-appellant as to the irregularity of his arrest. In People v. Alunday,[9] the Supreme Court ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before the arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In this case, the accused-appellant was duly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and actively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case.
Nevertheless, the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was effected under Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Redoblo and the other policemen were in the area because of reports that illegal drugs were being sold there. While doing so, Redoblo saw accused-appellant holding a piece of plastic sachet. On suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, Redoblo approached the accused-appellant but the latter immediately tried to enter the store. Redoblo grabbed the hands of the accused-appellant to ascertain the sachet held by the accused-appellant. Then and there, the accused-appellant was apprehended and brought to the police station. Under these circumstances there is no doubt that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime within the view of the arresting team, in violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The Solicitor General says that there is no merit to the contention that the seizure of the plastic sachet does not fall within the purview of the plain view doctrine. All the requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this case. The police officers had prior justification to be at accused-appellant’s location, as they were engaged in a stake-out operation. In the course of Redoblo’s operation he inadvertently saw a small plastic sachet allegedly containing a prohibited drug in the hands of the accused-appellant.
Finally, the Solicitor General contends that the prosecution was able to establish the corpus delicti of the case. The station commander to whom the custody of the plastic sachet was turned over, was positively identified by PO1 Redoblo. The records would also show that Guinanao had the actual custody of the specimen after it was subjected to laboratory examination. Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. In this case, the accused-appellant bears the burden to show that the evidence has been tampered with. Failing to discharge such burden, there can be no doubt that the drugs seized from the accused-appellant were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court shall resolve contemporaneously the assigned errors because they are interrelated to each other.
After a careful examination of the records and evidence on hand, the Court finds and that a reversal of the judgment under review is in order.
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. In the instant case, We have scoured the records of the case and We find that the warrantless arrest conducted upon accused-appellant was not in accordance with law. Hence, the illegal drugs confiscated from accused-appellant cannot be admitted in evidence against accused-appellant because it was seized during a warrantless arrest which was not lawful.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court is the basic repository of valid warrantless arrests.
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
“(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxxxxxx
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings.[10] Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
“Probable cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in accused-appellant’s case.[11]
Probable cause in the instant case was more imaginary than real. There was no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search because of the lack of an overt physical act of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime or was committing a crime or was attempting to commit a crime. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of the accused-appellant that would reasonably invite the attention of PO1 Redoblo. The latter testified that he approached accused-appellant because he was holding a small plastic packet between his right thumb and point finger.[12] When he (Redoblo) approached accused-appellant the latter attempted to enter the store but PO1 Redoblo grabbed him. Clearly, accused-appellant was merely arrested because he was holding a plastic packet. Undeniably, there was no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by accused-appellant. PO1 Redoblo’s testimony is most telling:
I hurriedly went to him and he tried to enter the store but I was able to grab his hand to see what he was holding.
In the recent case of People of the Philippines, vs. Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati,[13] where the circumstances surrounding the arrest are more or less similar to the instant case, the Supreme Court held that:
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 DE Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 DE Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the warrantless arrest, in the instant case was illegal. The warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The search conducted against accused-appellant cannot be justified under “plain view doctrine”. Under this doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the case of Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines [14]:
“The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis Supplied)”
Even assuming, that PO1 Redoblo inadvertently came across accused-appellant who was holding a small plastic packet because it was within his “plain view,” what may be said to be the object in his “plain view” was just the plastic pack and not the shabu. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic packet was not immediately apparent from the “plain view” of the object. Indubitably, the seized shabu was not apparent to justify the application of the “plain view doctrine”. As stated in the testimony of PO1 Redoblo, he only saw accused-appellant holding a plastic packet. It was never mentioned, whether or not he saw the contents thereof.
Moreover, granting arguendo that the evidence submitted is admissible in evidence, still the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the evidence confiscated from the accused-appellant, as required in Section 21 of R.A 9165. Per testimony[15] of the lone prosecution witness PO1 Redoblo, he said that after he confiscated the plastic sachet of shabu[16] weighing 0.03 gram, he marked the plastic sachet at the place of incident. Thereafter he brought the plastic packet together with the accused-appellant to Police Precinct 2. PO1 Redoblo turned over the plastic sachet to their Station Commander Police Senior Inspector Jimmy M. Fortaleza for safekeeping. He (Redoblo) brought the specimen to the crime laboratory the following morning, together with the letter request[17]. Per Chemistry Report No. D-190-2004[18] prepared by Police Inspector Alexis Abinion Guinanao, the plastic sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram yielded positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The testimony of PO1 Redoblo failed to sufficiently demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody of the plastic sachet of shabu. The prosecution should have presented the station commander (police chief) and/or the custodian of the specimen, to testify as to how the the plastic sachet of shabu was kept, more so that the specimen was in their custody overnight. The testimony of the Station Commander is necessary to determine whether the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized substance had not been compromised in any way. His testimony is one of the essential points that would connect the chain of custody of the confiscated item. The prosecution thus failed to prove the corpus delicti of the case. Said the Supreme Court in People v. Habana,[19] since the failure in this case to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs compromised the identity and integrity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against Habana, his acquittal is in order.
Although, We find that the defense of denial is weak and uncorroborated, nevertheless, this cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[20] Apparently, there were four other police officers who were with PO1 Redoblo when he (Redoblo) arrested accused-appellant and yet the prosecution opted to present only PO1 Redoblo. Not even one of the other four policemen was presented in court to corroborate the testimony of Redoblo or at least rebut the testimony of the accused-appellant. Without doubt, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must draw strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes his innocence until the contrary is shown. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.[21]
WHEREFORE, the Decision[22] dated February 24, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 04- 26357 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-Appellant Eric Pronda y Palomero is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Ingles, (Chairperson) and [*]Quijano-Padilla, JJ., conur.
[*] Acting Junior Member per Office Order No. 472-13-ABR dated December 12, 2013.
[1] Records, pp.180-187.
[2] Records, p. 154-155.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Records, p. 38, “Certificate of Arraignment”.
[5] Records, p. 95.
[6] Records, p. 191.
[7] Records, p. 193.
[8] Records, p. 230.
[9] G.R. No. 181546, September 3, 2008.
[10] People vs. Binad Sy Chua G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 04, 2003 citing People v. Aruta (1998).
[11] People of the Philippines, vs. Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013
[12] TSN, February 22, 2006, p. 14.
[13] G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013 citingValdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, citing People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862 (1999); State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649 (Tenn. 2006).
[14] G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011.
[15] TSN, February 22, 2006, pp. 9-10.
[16] Records, p. 153, Exhibit “B”, Chemistry Report No. D-190-2004.
[17] Records, p. 152, Exhibit “A”.
[18] Records, p. 153, Exhibit “B”.
[19] G.R. No. 188900, March 5, 2010.
[20] Valdez vs. People, G.R. No. 170180, Nov. 23, 2007.
[21] People vs. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, Dec. 16, 2008.
[22] Rollo, pp. 34-41.