THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MORO MAMACOL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

PERFECTO, J.:


The attorney de oficio for appellant, who was sentenced by the lower
court to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P2,000.00 and to pay the costs, for the killing of Dagodob in the
early morning of October 16, 1946, in Ramitan, Malabang, Lanao, raises three
questions:

1. That at the last hearing at Iligan on July 16, 1947, according to the record,
   appellant was not present as he was still in Dansalan, and this is a reversible
   error as, according to Section 1 (a) of Rule 111, the accused is
   entitled to be present at every stage of the proceeding and when the crime
   charged is a capital one, such right cannot be waived.

2. That the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence
   after denying a motion for dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without
   Reserving the right to present said evidence in the event the motion is
   denied.

3. That the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict appellant.

The first question is based on the fact that whether the accused was present
or not at the hearing which took place at Iligan on July 16, 1947 the records
appear blank. The controversy centers on whether, that blankness must be
interpreted as that the accused was not present or it should be supplied by the
presumption that the official duty to have the accused present at the trial has
been complied with. It is not necessary, however, to decide this question in
view of the result we have arrived at in deciding the last two questions.

On the second question, due to the silence of the Rules on the matter, the
Solicitor General urges us to erase whatever doubts may exist regarding the
matter and to set a precedent for the future guidance of judges and lawyers
among whom the question has caused so much confusion.

The thesis of the Solicitor General is that whether the accused reserves or
fails to reserve his right to adduce evidence in making a motion to dismiss, if
the motion is denied, he can no longer do so, having elected to stand or fall on
the evidence submitted by the prosecution, and the court should decide the case
on the evidence submitted and the only question to be resolved on appeal is
whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction or not.

While maintaining this thesis, the Solicitor General has given an evidence of
fairness when he states honestly that the ordinary and common-day procedure
adopted by the trial courts in this regard runs counter to the thesis. That is,
with or without reservation made by the defense, said trial courts have been
and are allowing the defense to present evidence after a motion to dismiss has
been denied.

We are of opinion that the procedure which has been practiced and is
generally practiced in trial courts for a long number of years, is based on
sound reason. There are criminal cases in which because of the insufficiency of
the evidence for the prosecution, the presentation of defense’s evidence will
only entail waste of time. Where the motion to dismiss is denied, there is no
harm to the interest of the administration of justice to allow defendant to
present evidence, while to bar him to present said evidence, which might show
his innocence, may lead to a miscarriage of justice. We rule that the denial of
a motion to dismiss made by an accused, with or without reservation to present
his evidence, will not impair his right to present it. The substantial rights of
an accused should not be impaired because of his counsel’s anxiousness to have
him promptly acquitted. The need of applying the rule appears to be more
emphatic in a case like this where life or death or perpetual imprisonment of
the accused are at stake.

Upon the last question we hold, after going over the evidence presented by
the prosecution, that the testimonies of Apuntok Mamangcas and Payocan Moro, the
two witnesses for the prosecution, are enough to give the latter a prima
facie, case.

The appealed decision is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the
lover court to allow the accused to present evidence and for further
proceedings.

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
Feria, J., took no part.