FELISA ARON AND HEIRS OF MAURA ARON, REPRESENTED BY MARQUITA SANCHEZ, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. HEIRS OF PEDRO VILLANUEVA, NAMELY: NARCISO VILLANUEVA AND SANTOS VILLANUEVA, DEF…
ELBINIAS, M.P., J.:
Addressed here is an Appeal[1] filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The Appeal assails the Decision[2]
dated August 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires
City, Branch 23 (“trial court” for brevity) in Civil Case No. TM-594 for
“Recovery of Ownership with Damages.”[3] The Appeal[4] also questions the trial court’s Order[5] dated December 27, 2007, which denied plaintiffs-appellants’ eventual Motion for Reconsideration.[6]
The antecedent facts are:
On April 11, 1997, plaintiffs-appellants Felisa Aron, and
Heirs of Maura Aron, who were represented by Marquita Sanchez
(“plaintiffs-appellants” for brevity), filed a Complaint[7]
for “Recovery of Ownership with Damages” against defendants-appellees
Heirs of Pedro Villanueva, namely: Narciso Villanueva and Santos
Villanueva (“defendants-appellees” for brevity).
The rest of the facts are those as stated in the trial court’s assailed Decision[8] dated August 28, 2007, as follows:
“xxx Plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellants here)
alleged that their deceased parents Spouses Moises Aron and Valeriana
Santor died intestate, leaving a parcel of land at Gen. Trias, Cavite
with a total area of Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Nine (16, 809)
Square Meters known as Lot 2640 and covered by Patent No. 33071; that from the time of their parents’ death plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellants) never executed any deed regarding the sale, partition, waiver of right of said property.Sometime in year 1994, plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellants) were shocked to know that four-sixth (4/6) portion of said property is now registered under the name of the defendant (Pedro Villanueva here) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-22048) RT-19611 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. Since [plaintiffs] (plaintiffs-appellants) never signed any document regarding the four-sixth (4/6) share of the property, they alleged that defendant (Pedro Villanueva) committed fraud and falsification in the transfer of their four-sixth (4/6) share. Plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellants) demanded from the defendants (defendants-appellees) the return of the property but the latter refused hence, this litigation.
On the other hand, defendants (defendants-appellees)
tried to show that plaintiff Felisa Aron is not the legal heir of the
deceased Sps. Moises Aron and Valeriana Santor and therefore has no
right to file this case. However, the Baptismal Certificate presented
by this plaintiff is sufficient to show that she is the daughter of the
late Moises Aron and Valeriana Santor which resolves this issue.Another point raised by the defendant[s] was the sale executed by Valeriana Santor and Maria Aron. Defendants (defendants-appellees)
alleged that Santor and Aron sold the property (two-thirds [2/3]
portion) to Fortuno on April 19, 1932. Plaintiffs to this alleged that
this sale was obtained through fraud. Xxx Fortuno on the other hand[,]
sold the portion to Villanueva wherein a title was issued on November
26, 1941.”[9] (Emphasis supplied)
On August 28, 2007, the trial court rendered the Decision[10] appealed from, which dismissed plaintiffs-appellants’ Complaint[11]. The dispositive portion of the Decision[12] stated:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants DISMISSING the complaint filed by the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages and Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses.SO ORDERED.”[13]
After plaintiffs-appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration[14] was denied by the trial court in its assailed Order[15] dated December 27, 2007, plaintiffs-appellants filed the Appeal[16] at bench, praying that:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the Decision dated 28 August 2007 and rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires City in Civil Case No.
TM-594 be REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that another decision be rendered
granting the reliefs prayed for in plaintiff[s]-appellants’ Amended
Complaint.Plaintiff[s]-appellants also respectfully pray for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just or equitable.”[17]
The Appeal raised the following assignment of errors:
“1.1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT
PLAINTIFF[S]-APPELLANTS CLEARLY ADMITTED THE SALE OF THE FOUR-SIXTH
(4/6) PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY VALERIANA SANTOR AND MAURA ARON
TO A CERTAIN EMILIO FORTUNO;1.2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF[S]-APPELLANTS LOST THEIR INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WHEN
VALERIANA SANTOR and MAURA ARON SOLD THE SAME TO A CERTAIN EMILIO
FORTUNO;1.3 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLEES, WHICH ARE MERE PHOTOCOPIES, ARE
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION DISMISSING THE CASE;1.4 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF[S]-[APPELLANTS]
TO PAY DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLEES P50,000.00 AS DAMAGES AND P20,000.00 AS
LITIGATION EXPENSES.”[18]
Despite the failure of defendants-appellees to file their
Appellee’s Brief, it is nevertheless Our “primary duty to render or
dispense justice”[19] in this case in accordance with the facts and the law.
To begin with, even if plaintiffs-appellants properly argued in their assignment of error 1.1
that they had not admitted to the sale of the four-sixth (4/6) portion
of the subject property (“subject property” for brevity) by Valeriana
Santor and Maura Aron to Emilio Fortuno, still, contrary to
plaintiffs-appellants’ allegations in their assignment of error 1.3, the trial court properly dismissed the Complaint[20] filed by plaintiffs-appellants against defendants-appellees.
On these matters, plaintiffs-appellants had argued that:
“5.2. However, contrary to the erroneous finding and conclusion of the lower court, there was no
such admission on the part of [plaintiffs]-appellants to the effect
that the four-sixth (4/6) or two-thirds (2/3) portion of the subject
property had been sold to a certain (Emilio) Fortuno by (Valeriana)
Santor and (Maura) Aron;
xxx
5.6 Moreover, it is precisely because [plaintiffs]-appellants did not
also admit or acknowledge the validity of the alleged sale of the same
4/6 or 2/3 portion of the subject property from Emilio Fortuno to Pedro
Villanueva xxx
xxx
xxx [T]he lower court failed to state
specifically what ‘pieces of evidence’ did it consider and find
‘sufficient to justify a decision dismissing the case’, much less state
with particularity how and why such ‘pieces of evidence’ became
‘sufficient to justify a decision dismissing the case’;5.16. In the first place, the lower court should have not admitted the documentary evidence presented by defendant[s]-appellees, particularly Exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘5’, ‘5-A’, ‘5-B’, and ‘5-C’ for being written hearsay, unreliable, irrelevant, immaterial, misleading, and self-serving, as well as for being all mere photocopies;
5.17. Suffice it to say that defendant[s]-appellees’ Exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘5’, ‘5-A’, ‘5-B’, and ‘5-C’, being mere photocopies and not the original documents themselves, are inadmissible in evidence for having violated the best evidence rule, as provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence xxx;
5.18. Moreover, the lower court should have not also admitted the other documentary evidence of defendant[s]-appellees, specifically Exhibits ‘4’, ‘4-1’, ‘4-1-A’, ‘6’, and ‘7’ for being unreliable, without factual basis, irrelevant, immaterial, written hearsay, and self serving;”[21] (Emphasis and underlinings were made in the original)
Negating plaintiffs-appellants’ arguments however, is that
plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish by preponderance of evidence
that they had a better right over the subject property against
defendants-appellees. This is so, considering that plaintiffs-appellants
failed to present any proof that would have established their title
over the subject property. Plaintiffs-appellants merely attacked the
evidence presented by defendants-appellees.
In an action for
recovery of ownership, such as the case here, the party who claims a
better right over the property, such as plaintiffs-appellants, has the
burden to prove not only the identity of the property he was claiming,
but also his title to the property. Such party must not rely on the
weakness of the other party’s evidence but must rely on the strength of
his title to the property. This is in accordance with the declaration
made by the Supreme Court in Cornelio del Fierro, et al. vs. Rene Seguiran, G.R. No. 152141, August 8, 2011, to wit:
“The main issues are whether petitioners are entitled to
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, and whether the certificates of
title of respondent to the said lots should be cancelled.The requisites of reconveyance are provided for in Article 434 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title
thereto.In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the
person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first
fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location,
area and boundaries thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the
claimant’s title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can
claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the
object of the deed.” (Emphasis supplied)
Further showing that plaintiffs-appellants had no right over the
property is that, contrary to plaintiffs-appellants’ claim in their assignment of error 1.2,
the subject property was already sold by plaintiffs-appellants’
ascendants to a certain Emilio Fortuno (“Fortuno” for brevity), who in
turn, sold the property to defendants-appellees’ father, Pedro
Villanueva (“Pedro” for brevity). Defendants-appellees’ father had
subsequently registered the property under his name with the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite. As a result, he was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (T-22048) RT-19611 (“TCT No. (T-22048)
RT-19611” for brevity) on November 26, 1941.
Plaintiffs-appellants further argued that fraud was committed in the
transfer of the subject property from their ascendants to Fortuno, and
subsequently from Fortuno to defendants-appellees’ father, Pedro, as
follows:
“5.10. To reiterate, plaintiff[s]-appellants did not
admit or make any admission to the effect that the four-sixth or
two-third (2/3) portion of the subject property had been sold by
Valeriana Santor and Maura Aron to a certain Emilio Fortuno. In fact,
[plaintiffs]-appellants raised the very issue of fraud
insofar as both the alleged transfer of the 4/6 or 2/3 portion of the
subject property by way of assignment from Santor and Aron to Fortuno
and the alleged sale of the same 4/6 or 2/3 portion of said property
from Fortuno to Villanueva were concerned;5.11. It is precisely because plaintiffs-appellants questioned
or raised the question of validity of the alleged transfer of such
four-sixth (4/6) or two-thirds (2/3) portion of the subject property
from Santor and Aron to Fortuno that they (plaintiff-appellants) (sic)
had showed their interest in said property or that they had not lost their interest therein;5.12 Significantly, the foregoing finding of the lower court
that ‘the plaintiffs cannot question the transaction since they lost
their interest to the property when Santor and Aron sold the property to
Fortuno’ has no basis whatsoever in evidence and seems to have been based, if at all, merely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. The lower court simply failed
to cite any specific evidence on which it based its supposed finding
that they (plaintiffs) lost their interest to the property”[22] (Emphasis and underlinings were made in the original)
Defeating plaintiffs-appellants’ arguments however, is that
plaintiffs-appellants failed to overcome the burden of proving that
fraud attended the transfer of the property from plaintiffs-appellants’
ascendants to Fortuno, and then to defendants-appellees’ father.
Plaintiffs-appellants merely presented the following documents:
plaintiff-appellant Felisa Aron’s (“plaintiff-appellant Felisa” for
brevity) Certificate of Baptism[23]; the Certification[24] issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources in Trece Martires City, and; the TCT (T-22048) RT-19611[25]
issued by the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. These
documents however, did not support plaintiffs-appellants’ allegation
that fraud was committed by by Fortuno and by defendants-appellees’
father. This is because such documents were only offered to prove: the
filiation between plaintiff-appellant Felisa with Moises Aron and
Valeriana Santor; the subject property having been acquired by
plaintiffs-appellants’ ascendants on June 16, 1933, and; the subject
property having eventually been registered by defendants-appellees’
father in his name on November 26, 1941.[26]
That the party who alleges the commission of fraud in
obtaining titles, such as plaintiffs-appellants, should prove by
sufficient evidence such allegation, is as pursuant to the following
declaration of the Supreme Court in Delfin, et al. v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006:
“Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from
circumstances, and the circumstances proved may in some cases raise a
presumption of its existence. However, while fraud may be proved by
circumstances or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by mere
construction, but must be proven in all cases. Respondents indeed failed
to prove that fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported
allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity
of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.” (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, because of plaintiffs-appellants’ failure to prove
fraud, the title of defendants-appellees’ father over the subject
property under TCT No. (T-22048) RT-19611 prevails. That this is the
consequence is pursuant to the Supreme Court’s declaration in Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon and Gelima Abata Abobon, G.R. No. 155830, August 15, 2012, as follows:
“First of all, a fundamental principle in land
registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The
certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not
go beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate of title rests on
the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been
well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of
the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of
indefeasibility finds no application.” (Emphasis supplied)
Besides, defendants-appellees’ father is presumed to have acted in
good faith when he acquired the subject property from Fortuno, and when
he subsequently registered such property in his name.
Defendants-appellees’ father properly relied on a copy of the
“Assignment of Sale Certificate”[27] (“Sale Certificate” for brevity) executed between plaintiffs-appellants’ ascendants and Fortuno. The Sale Certificate[28] stated that plaintiffs-appellants’ ascendants sold, assigned, and transferred “all [their] right[s], title, and interest[s]”[29] over the subject property to Fortuno.
Good faith, being the opposite of fraud, is always presumed
unless convincing proof was presented to disprove such presumption. This
was not done so here because plaintiffs-appellants’ allegation of fraud
was unsubstantiated. That good faith is always presumed in the absence
of proof to the contrary is pursuant to the declaration made by the
Supreme Court in Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio, represented by its administratrix Buenconsejo Pineda vda. de Vivar vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[30], to wit:
“It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed
unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. It is incumbent
upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation.
Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails.
In the case under examination, the burden of proving bad faith
therefore lies with petitioners (plaintiffs below) but they failed to
discharge such onus probandi. Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of respondents stands.
xxx
Good faith is the opposite of fraud and consists of the
honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. xxx” (Emphasis supplied)
Given all these, no cogent reason was therefore shown to justify
any deviation from the following findings of the trial court, which were
in accordance with the facts and the law:
“From the pieces of evidence offered and admitted by the Court, the plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellants here)
failed to prove and establish the existence of fraud and substantiate
the same through convincing and credible proof and testimonies of
witnesses as regards the assignment of property made by
Valeriana Santor and Maura Aron in favor of Emilio Fortuno as well as
the contract of sale entered into by Emilio Fortuno and Pedro
Villanueva. From the moment of assignment, Fortuno acquires ownership
over the property. Hence, Plaintiffs cannot assail the contract of sale
by virtue of the said assignment. The contract such as sale takes effect
between the parties thereto. Furthermore, Pedro
Villanueva’s right over the property cannot be doubted as it is
evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22048 and an Order
issued by the Court in LRC No. 5964 dated October 08, 1992 as regards
Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of Original and Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of T.C.T. [N]o. T-22048 filed by Mariquita Sanchez who is
the same as the Plaintiff in this case. As stated in the order, ‘That
two (2) owner’s duplicate copies of said title was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cavite, one for Maura Aron and the other for Pedro
Villanueva, the other registered co-owner of said property.’ xxx ‘that
the owner’s copy of said title issued to Pedro Villanueva remains intact
in his possession.’ This Order of the Court is given much credence for
it is a public record. xxx”[31] (Emphasis supplied)
However, as correctly argued by plaintiffs-appellants in their assignment of error 1.4,
the trial court erred in awarding Php 50,000.00 as Damages, and Php
20,000.00 as Litigation Expenses in favor of defendants-appellees.
Defendants-appellees could not be awarded Damages in the
amount of Php 50,000.00 because the trial court failed to specify what
kind of Damages was awarded to defendants-appellees. The trial court
also failed to provide the actual, legal, and equitable justification
for such award of Damages, which award was only mentioned in the
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision.[32]
Defendants-appellees could not also be awarded Litigation
Expenses, given that the trial court failed to discuss in the body of
its Decision[33] the basis for such award to defendants-appellees.[34]
That Litigation Expenses could not be awarded if the trial court failed
to provide the factual and legal bases for such award in its Decision,[35] with the award being only mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Decision,[36] is pursuant to the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian M. Baking[37]:
“On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for the award
thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. Since the trial
court’s decision did not give the basis of the award, the same must be
deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, we held:Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-enshrined is that ‘an award for attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision and not in the dispositive portion only‘
(Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also true with the litigation expenses where the body of the decision discussed nothing for its basis.” (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and respect on appeal, and are in fact accorded finality when
supported by sufficient evidence on the record,[38] as in this case.
After careful consideration of all the facts, arguments, and
issues appearing on the records as well as of the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and, in accordance with what is best determined to be
proper under the circumstances, the following disposition is therefore
made on these matters.
BECAUSE OF ALL THESE, the trial court’s Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that the awards granted to defendants-appellees of Damages amounting to
P50,000.00, and Litigation Expenses amounting to P20,000.00, are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairperson) and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.54 – 70
[2] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[3] Records, pp. 1-4, 252 – 253
[4] Rollo, pp.54 – 70
[5] Records, pp. 262 – 263
[6] Records, pp. 254 – 258
[7] “Amended Complaint”, Records, pp. 25 – 28
[8] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[9] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[10] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[11] “Amended Complaint”, Records, pp. 25 – 28
[12] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[13] Records, p. 253.
[14] Records, pp. 254 – 258
[15] Records, pp. 262 – 263
[16] Rollo, pp. 54 – 70
[17] Rollo, p. 69
[18] Rollo, pp. 57 – 58
[19] Paz Reyes Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000.
[20] “Amended Complaint”, Records, pp. 25 – 28
[21] Rollo, pp. 63 – 67.
[22] Rollo, pp. 65 – 66.
[23] Records, p. 177
[24] Records, p. 178
[25] Records, pp. 183 – 184
[26] Records, pp. 174 – 175, 183
[27] Records, p. 236
[28] Records, p. 236
[29] Records, p. 236
[30] G.R. No. 117609 December 29, 1998
[31] Rollo, pp. 262 – 263.
[32] Records, p. 253
[33] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[34] Records, p. 253
[35] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[36] Records, pp. 252 – 253
[37] G.R. No. 156037, May 28, 2007
[38] Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15,
2010.