ERMIDIA A. MARIANO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. THE ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES (KONINKIJKE JAVA-CHINA-FAKITVAART LIJNEN N. V. AMSTERDAM) AND J. V. KAMERLING, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. R E S…

Mariano versus Royal Interocean Lines

The Case

This is a labor and civil law case between Ermidia A. Mariano, the plaintiff who was dismissed from her employment, and The Royal Interocean Lines, her former employer, together with J. V. Kamerling. Mariano sought to recover from the company the benefits she claimed were due her upon her separation from service. The case matters because it fixes the state of the law on dismissal of employees without a fixed period of employment during a gap in our statutes, and because it illustrates how a judgment that has become final binds a party even when she later tries to reopen it through a motion for reconsideration.

Procedural History

The case began in the trial court, which rendered judgment and expressly held that it could not grant the plaintiff's claim for retirement and old age allowance because she had not complied with one of its conditions, namely, that she had not completed ten successive years in permanent service from the first of March 1948 up to her retirement on the twenty-first of August 1955. From that finding the plaintiff attempted to appeal, but she failed, because her record on appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Twice she came to the Supreme Court, on the eighteenth of July 1957 and on the twenty-second of November 1957, seeking to compel the trial court to allow her record on appeal, and both petitions for mandamus were dismissed for lack of merit. The Supreme Court had earlier rendered judgment in the case on the twenty-seventh of February 1961. The plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration of that judgment, and it is this motion that the Court resolves in the decision before us.

Facts

Ermidia A. Mariano was employed by The Royal Interocean Lines, but not for a definite or fixed period of time. On the twenty-third of October 1953, the company dismissed her from its service.

At that time, the new Civil Code, which took effect on the thirtieth of August 1950, had already repealed article 302 of the Code of Commerce. That old provision had authorized the dismissal of an employee, with or without cause, whose service had been engaged not for a definite or fixed period of time, upon thirty days notice or payment of one month salary, known as the mesada. The employee's right was revived only on the twelfth of June 1954, when Republic Act Number 1052 was enacted into law, later amended by Republic Act Number 1787 on the twenty-first of June 1957.

In her motion for reconsideration, Mariano contended that the regulations regarding allowance to the Local Staff of the company, which had been made known to all its employees including her, formed part of their contract, and that she was entitled to the benefits thereof. The trial court, however, had found that she had not completed ten successive years in permanent service from the first of March 1948 up to her retirement on the twenty-first of August 1955, and her attempt to appeal that finding failed because her record on appeal was filed late.

Issues

• Whether or not the appellee, who had been employed not for a definite or fixed period of time and who was dismissed on the twenty-third of October 1953, was entitled to thirty days previous notice or payment of one month salary upon her dismissal.
• Whether or not the provisions of the regulations on Local Staff Allowances formed part of the contract of employment and entitled the appellee to the benefits thereof.
• Whether or not the appellee may still raise, through a motion for reconsideration, that part of the judgment from which she attempted to appeal but failed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, which the Court discusses as the repealed source of the right to notice or mesada, provided for the dismissal of an employee whose service was engaged not for a definite or fixed period of time upon thirty days notice or payment of one month salary. The Court holds that this article had already been repealed by the new Civil Code when the appellee was dismissed, so the right it granted was not available to her on the date of her dismissal.

Republic Act Number 1052, enacted on the twelfth of June 1954, revived the employee's right to notice or mesada. The Court notes that this statute came into force only after the appellee's dismissal, so it could not govern her separation from service.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that on the twenty-third of October 1953, the date of the appellee's dismissal, the new Civil Code, which took effect on the thirtieth of August 1950, had repealed article 302 of the Code of Commerce. It was only on the twelfth of June 1954, when Republic Act Number 1052 was enacted, that this right of the employee was revived. Hence, on the twenty-third of October 1953, the appellee, who had been employed by the appellant company not for a definite or fixed period of time, could be dismissed even without cause and would not be entitled to thirty days previous notice or payment of one month salary.

On the second issue, the Court declined to adopt the appellee's view that the Local Staff Allowances amounted to, constituted, or converted her employment into one of fixed period of time, or that she could not be deprived of the benefit granted by the appellant and earned by her. The Court could not take such a view because the trial court had found and held that it could not grant the plaintiff's claim for retirement and old age allowance, for the reason that she had not complied with one of the conditions thereof, namely, that she had not completed ten successive years in permanent service from the first of March 1948 up to her retirement on the twenty-first of August 1955.

On the third issue, the Court held that since the appellee attempted to appeal that part of the judgment but failed, because her record on appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, and since her two petitions for mandamus were dismissed for lack of merit, that part of the judgment is final insofar as it concerns her. She cannot be allowed to raise it again, for it is res judicata, that is, a matter already finally adjudged.

Doctrine

First, the right of an employee engaged without a fixed period of employment to thirty days notice or one month salary upon dismissal rests on article 302 of the Code of Commerce, and that article was repealed by the new Civil Code effective on the thirtieth of August 1950. Between that repeal and the enactment of Republic Act Number 1052 on the twelfth of June 1954, an employee so engaged could be dismissed even without cause and was not entitled to notice or mesada.

Second, a statute reviving a right does not reach back to govern a dismissal that took place before its enactment. The law in force on the date of dismissal controls.

Third, a judgment, or a part of it, from which an appeal was attempted but not perfected within the reglementary period becomes final, and the party concerned may not later raise the same matter again, for it is res judicata.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was denied, so the defendants prevailed and the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court stood.

Remember This

The one line worth memorizing is that between the repeal of article 302 of the Code of Commerce by the new Civil Code and the revival of the right by Republic Act Number 1052, an employee without a fixed period of employment could be dismissed even without cause and without notice or mesada. Examiners use this case to test the rule on the retroactive reach of reviving statutes and the finality of judgments, including the bar of res judicata against a party who failed to perfect an appeal.