G.R. No. L-19069. October 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA AND GERVA…
PER CURIAM:
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, subject of the present automatic
review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Parumog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio
Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants[1]
charged therein with multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced
to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the victims,
namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, in the sum of
P6,000, and each to pay his corresponding share of the costs.
The information recites
“That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the
municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bililbid Prisons by virtue of final judgments, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos
Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and
striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed
and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries
which directly caused their deaths;
“That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present
in the commission of the crime in that the crime was committed after the
accused have been convicted by final judgments and while they are serving the
said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
“Contrary to law with
the following aggravating circumstances:
“1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;
“2. That the crime was committed by a band;
“3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure
or afford impunity;
“4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to
weaken the defense;
“5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and
windows have been broken;
“6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act;
“7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were
engaged in the discharge of their duties.”
Upon motion of the
provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against
one of the accused[2] for lack of evidence. After the prosecution had rested its case,
the charges against six of the accused[3] were dismissed for failure of the prosecution
to establish a prima facie case against them. One of the defendants died[4] during the pendency
of the case. After trial, the court a
quo acquitted eight[5] of the remaining defendants.
As early as in 1956, a
great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves into two warring gangs, the
“Sigue-Sigue” and the “OXO,” the
former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the
latter comprised mainly of prisoners from the Visayas
and Mindanao.
Since then the prison compound has been rocked time and time again by
bloody riots resulting in the death of many of their members and suspected
sympathizers. In an effort to avert
violent clashes between the contending groups, prison officials segregated
known members of the “Sigue-Sigue” from
those of the “OXO.” Building 1 housed “Sigue-Sigue”
members, while a majority of the prisoners confined in Bldg. 4 belonged to the
“OXO.” Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of four brigades, namely,
4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao, from whom the “OXO” drew
most of its members, were confined in 4-A.
It was at about 7:00 a.
m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were preparing
to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of the “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” gangs occurred in the
plaza where the prisoners
were assembled, causing a big commotion.
The fight was, however, quelled, and those involved were led away for
investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their
respective quarters. Hardly had
conditions returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of
the “Sigue-Sigue.” The inmates thereof
tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and sympathizers of the
“OXO” gang were confined. The
timely arrival of the guards forced the invading inmates to retreat and return
to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot
erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of
their door and then rampaged from one
brigade to another. The invading
prisoners from 4-A mostly “OXO” members
and sympathizers, clubbed and
stabbed to death Jose Carriego an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of
4-C, and killed two more inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The three victims
sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death – before they could be
brought to the hospitals.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm.
in length and 3 cm. in depth; (b) contusion and hematoma
of the back of the neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured
wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs.
Cause of death: internal
hemorrhage from multiple fatal wounds in the chest.
Eugenio Barbosa: (a)
lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth;
(b) two penetrating wounds in the abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c)
lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in
length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at the right and left lower
extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary internal hemorrhage in the
abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the
head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on the upper
lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven punctured wounds
in the chest, two of which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds
on the left hand. Cause of death: fractured skull.
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified
that while he was taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego,
who was at the time the representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the
inmate carcel, he “suddenly heard
commotion” near the door of their brigade; that his fellow prisoners
started shouting “pinapasok na
tayo,” as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A
stampeded into 4-B; that he and Carriego took held of their clubs and stood at the end of
the passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his
club to Andres Factora, an
“OXO” member from 4-A; that as Carriego started
to walk away, Factora clubbed Carriego
on the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora
turned up the face of his fallen victim and struck him again in the face; that
while Carriego was in this prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal,
companions of Factora, repeatedly
stabbed him.
The testimony of Pineda
was corroborated in all its material
points by Juanito Marayoc
and Avelino Sauza, both
inmates of 4-B. These two prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as
the assailants of Carriego.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly
entered 4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners from 4-A
rushing toward their brigade; that among the invading inmates who forced open
the door of 4-C, with help from the inside provided by Visayan
prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita, Ernesto
Fernandez and Jose Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa,
while the rest of their companions instructed the Visayans
to leave their cell and ordered the “Manila boys” (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan,
another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa,
as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as
well added grim details. He declared
that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he
was beaten and stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita,
Pedro Cogol and Eilel Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp
instruments, in readiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog inmates.
Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared
that he saw Parumog, Peralta, Factora
and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.
The same witnesses for the prosecution testified that after
killing Barbosa, the invading “OXO” members
and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog
like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili testified
that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol
and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that
Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying, “Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;” that Luna and
Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared
that after the death of Barbosa, Santos Cruz was
brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his
cell only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he
was clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and Pabarlan with respect
to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both mentioned Larita
as one of the assailants of Cruz.
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution,
thus:
“. . . it clearly appears that the three
killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalry between the two organizations.
All those who were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs
and well known as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue
Sigue, while the
accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if not sympathizers of the Oxo
organization. These three killings were
sparked by the commotion that happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners were
preparing to go the mass. . . . It was evident that the clash that occurred in the plaza produced a
chain reaction among the members and followers
of the two organizations. The
inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the Sigue
Sigues, bolted the door of their cells and tried to
invade Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo
members and their sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced too by the timely arrival of the guards who sent them back to their
building. When the members of the Oxo in Building
No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who were
confined with them in the same building.
As the evidence of the
prosecution shows, the accused who were confined
in Brigade 4-A of Building No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories
and with the help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door of the
different brigades, and once they succeeded in bolting the doors of the
different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemies
they clubbed and stabbed them to death. . . .”
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta
nevertheless claims self-defense. He
testified that on the morning of the riot he as attacked by Carriego
and Juan Estrella near
the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the chapel with some
companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head;
that he was able to parry the second
blow of and then succeeded in squeezing Carriego’s a head with his bands; that forthwith
he whipped out an improvised ice pie and stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta) was already
dizzy due to the head wound he
sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then became unconscious, and when he regained
consciousness he found himself on a tarima, with his head bandaged.
Peralta’s declarations do
not inspire belief. The impressive
array of prosecution witnesses who saw him actively participate in the killing
of the three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and
Sauza positively identified him as one of the
assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego, an alleged “Sigue-Sigue”
member, would not have attacked him, knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was
an “OXO” lair where the “Sigue-Sigue”
members were outnumbered. Anent the
killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to
offer any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory
declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who
identified him as one of the murderers of Santos Cruz.
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated
that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defense in exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose Carriego, Juanito Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a
free-for-all forthwith ensued; that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the latter to go away as “I will be
the one to kill that person (Dosal);” that with
a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as Cruz
was about to hit him again, he got hold of
his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the latter fell.
Dosal’s avowal is clearly belied by the
positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili
and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of
Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense when the latter
together with his companions supposedly invaded Dosal’s
brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire
escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of
the first floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper
floor? Moreover, Dosal
failed to explain why he was seen in 4-C, which he does not deny, since he was
an inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he did not offer any evidence in
his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc
and Sauza identifying him as one of the killers of Carriego, and those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino implicating him
in the death of Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.
Andres Factora declared that he clubbed
Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his
co-accused who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed their order; that he did
not hit Barbosa anymore because the latter was
already dead; that it was his co-accused
who actually killed the three victims.
Again, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which were
accorded full credence by the trial court, exposes the
guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony
was corroborated by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the mass assault by crabbing Carriego treacherously.
Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one
of the killers of Barbosa, while at least three
prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active participation of Factora in the killing, which is a clear index of voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and
fear allegedly engendered by his
co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna
take refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi.
Parumog testified that he did not participate
in the killing of the three
inmates because he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office of the
trustees for investigation after the fight in the plaza; that he was
implicated in the killing by the prosecution witnesses because of his
refusal to accede to their request to testify against his co-accused;
that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that
he did not know about the killing until he was informed that three inmates had
died; that on the day in question he was brought to the police trustee brigade
for investigation after the incident in the plaza; that he was escorted
back to his brigade only in the afternoon.
Luna likewise disclaims any knowledge of the killing and asserts that
for the entire duration of the riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit
no credence when set against the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses
identifying them as participants in the killing of Barbosa
and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan,
Espino and Fontillas
declared that Larita was one of the killers of
Barbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita
kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili
and Espino testified that they saw Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa;
Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that Luna participated in the fatal assault
on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The alibis of the accused
are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. The defense of alibi is generally weak since
it is easy to concoct. For this reason,
courts view it with no small amount of caution and accept it only when proved
by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence.[6] In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were really
confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation on the day of the
incident, there should have been
a record of the alleged investigation.
But none was presented. The
testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in his cell is quite
unnatural. He claims that he did not
even help his cell-mates barricade their brigade with tarimas
in order
to delay if not prevent the entry of the invading inmates. According to him, he “just waited in one
corner.”
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
identification by prosecution witnesses
pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.[7]
Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which
depends almost entirely on the credibility of witnesses who seek to establish
it. In this respect the relative weight
which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless
patently inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted.[8]
In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing the alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna, said
that “their mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
witnesses who saw them participate directly in the execution of the conspiracy
to kill Barbosa, Carriego
and Santos Cruz.”
The killing of Carriego constitutes the
offense of murder because of the presence of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. Carriego
was clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay
prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed
him repeatedly on the chest. The blow on
the nape and the penetrating chest wounds were all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength qualified the
killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of
murder. The victims, who were attacked
individually, were completely overwhelmed by their assailant’s superiority in
number and weapons and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the
attack. All the attackers were armed
with clubs or sharp instruments while the victims were unarmed, as so found by
the trial court. In fact, Halili testified that Barbosa was
clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to hide under a cot, and
Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees pleading for his life.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy
attended the commission of the murders.
The resolution of this issue is
of marked importance because upon it depends the
quantity and quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the
appellants.
For this purpose, it is
not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular
emphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of the criminal liability of
the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandate of applicable law.
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.[9] Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor
as in treason,[10] rebellion[11] and sedition.[12] The crime of conspiracy known to the common
law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines.[13] An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the viewpoint of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent
design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of
the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of
a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability
of the perpetrators. In stressing the
significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto[14] opined that
“While it is true that the penalties cannot be
imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in
many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other
evidence of record, in establishing the existence of the consummated crime and
its commission by the conspirators.”
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one
is the act of all.[15]
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that “when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose, evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in
law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone.”[16] Although it is axiomatic that no one is
liable for acts other than his own,
“when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy.”[17] The imposition of collective liability upon
the conspirators is clearly explained in one case[18] where this Court held that
“. . . it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without
taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them
with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
agreement. . . The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act
and intent which existed between the .
. . accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
created by them, and they are all equally responsible. . .”
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors
conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the
crime. Of course, as to any conspirator
who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could
be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that
through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were
moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence
of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to
all of them the act of any one of them.
It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed, not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivising
criminal liability.
The ensharing
nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversation and rape committed in furtherance of a Common
design.
The crime of malversation is generally commited
by an accountable public officer who misappropriates
public funds or public property under his trust.[19]
However, in the classic case of People vs. Ponte[20]
this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal policemen, all
of whom were not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided a municipal
treasurer in the malversation of public funds under
the latter’s custody, were principally liable with the said municipal treasurer
for the crime of malversation. By reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of
the accountable public officer was imputable to his
co-conspirators, although the latter were not similarly situated with the
former in relation to the object of the crime committed. Furthermore, in the wards of Groizard, “the private party does not act
independently from the public officer: rather, he knows that the funds of which
he wishes to get possession are in the latter’s charge, and instead of trying
to abstract them by circumventing the other’s vigilance he resorts to
corruption, and in the officer’s unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most
reprehensible means of accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as
moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime.”[21]
In an earlier case[22]
a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who conspired
with his Superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation
of public funds as adjudged guilty as co-principal in the crime of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it
clearly appeared, that the funds misappropriated were not in his custody but
were under the trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.
In rape, a conspirator is
guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but also of the
separate and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only once but
his liability includes that pertaining to all the
rapes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,[23] this Court held that”
“. . . from the acts
performed by the defendants from the time they arrived at Consolacion’s
house to the consummation of the
offense of rape on her person by each
and everyone of them, it clearly appears that they conspired together to rape
their victim, and therefore each one is responsible not only for the rape
committed personally by him, but also that committed by the others, because each sexual intercourse had, through
force, by each one of the defendants with the offended party was consummated separately and independently from
that had by the others, for which each and every one is also responsible
because a the conspiracy.”
The rule enunciated in
People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain[24] where the appellant Teofilo
Anchita was convicted of forcible abduction with
double rape for having conspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the
aggrieved woman, although he himself did not actually rape the victim. This Court observed:
“We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo
Anchita took part in the sexual assault. . . the accused inserted his fingers in
the woman’s organ, and widened it.
Whether he acted out of lewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is immaterial:
it was both maybe. Yet, surely,
by his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.”
With respect to robbery
in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so much so that
“any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band,
unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.”[25] In this instance, conspiracy need not be
proved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the
assaults committed by his group is likewise anchored on the rule that the act
of one is the act of all.
Proof of conspiracy. While
conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence,[26] direct proof is not essential to show
conspiracy.[27] Since by its nature, conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence.[28] Consequently, competent and convincing
circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People vs. Cabrera,[29]
“conspiracies are generally
proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and
another part of the same, so as to complete
it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in
the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect,
the object.” Or as elucidated in People vs. Carbonel,[30]
the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy maybe
inferred from “proofs of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among to concert means is proved. . .” In two recent cases,[31]
this Court ruled that where the acts of
the accused, collectively and individually, clearly demonstrate the existence
of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident.
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or
agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, “it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient
that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.”[32] Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing, evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A
time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy
is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common
design are liable as co-principals.[33] This rule of collective criminal liability
emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be
held solidarily liable.
However, in order to hold
an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by
lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene
of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators
as to move them to executing the conspiracy.
The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the
three categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a
co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former’s
criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter’s
responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
In People vs. Izon, et al.,[34] this Court acquitted appellant Francisco
Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the trial court of robbery with homicide as a
conspirator, on the ground that although he may have been present when the
conspiracy to rob was proposed and made, “Robles uttered not a word either
of approval or disapproval. There are
authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy,
even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough
for purposes of conviction.” In a more recent case,[35] this Court, in exonerating one of the
appellants, said:
“There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant
Jose Guico was absent not only from the second
meeting but likewise from the robbery itself.
To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined
otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico’s participation in the first meeting sufficiently involved
him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the location of the house to be robbed in relation to the
surrounding, streets and the points thereof through which entrance and
exit should be effected), such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable
as a conspirator. Conspiracy
alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law,
except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do
not include robbery.”
Imposition of multiple penalties where
conspirators commit more than one offense. Since
in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of the
conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Consequently, if the
conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting
their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for
each offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,[36] this Court held:
“. . . it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneously indeed but
successively, inasmuch as there was, at least, solution of continuity between
each other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said
crimes. This court holds that the
crimes are murder . . . In view of all
these circumstances and of the frequently reiterated doctrine that once
conspiracy is proven each and every one of the conspirators must answer for
the acts of the others, provided said acts are the result of the common plan
or purpose . . . it would seem evident that the penalty that
should be imposed upon each of the appellants for each of their crimes should
be the same, and this is the
death penalty . . . “(underscoring supplied).
In the aforesaid case, however, the
projected imposition of three death penalties upon each of the conspirators for
the three murders committed was not carried out due to the lack of the then requisite
unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.
In another case,[37]
this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of eleven
murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:
“Some members of this
Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under the circumstances of the case, but they fall short of
the required
number for the imposition of this punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each appellant
is guilty of as many crimes of
murder as there were
deaths (eleven) and
should be sentenced to
life imprisonment for each crime, although this may be a useless
formality for in no case can imprisonment exceed forty years.”
(Underscoring supplied).
In
People vs. Masani,[38] the decision of the trial court imposing
only one life imprisonment for each of the accused was modified by this Court
on appeal on the ground that “inasmuch as their (the conspirators’) combined attack resulted in the killing of
three persons, they should be sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion
perpetua) for each of the three victims
(crimes).” (Underscoring supplied)
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressed
that once conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the conspirators is
not only solidary (all co-principals) but also
multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It can also be said that had
there been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases,
multiple death penalties would have been imposed upon all the conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An
accused who was charged with three distinct crimes of
murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties for two murders,[39] and another accused to thirteen (13)
separate death penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated.[40] Therefore there appears to be no legal
reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to multiple death penalties
corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they commit in furtherance of
a conspiracy. Since it is the settled
rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable
to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious
acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and
severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law.
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the
accused is found guilty of two or more separate and distinct crimes charged in
one information, the accused not having interposed any objection to the
multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading case of U.S. vs. Balaba,[41]
thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in the complaint or
information, the prescribed penalties for each and all of such offenses may be
imposed, to be executed in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the
Penal Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other words, all the penalties
corresponding to the several violations of law should be imposed. Conviction for multiple felonies demands the
imposition of multiple penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule are the
complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special complex
crime (like robbery with homicide).
Anent an ordinary complex crime falling under article 48, regardless of
the multiplicity of offenses committed, there is only one imposable penalty –
the penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period. Similarly, in special complex crimes, there
is but a single penalty prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of
separate felonies committed. For
instance, in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua
to death[42]
irrespective of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason or on occasion
of the robbery.
In Balaba, the information charged the accused with
triple murder. The accused went to trial
without objection to the said information which charged him with more than one
offense. The trial court found the
accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed only one death
penalty. In its review en conculta, this Court modified the judgment by
imposing separate penalties for each of the three offenses Committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to
the imposition of two death penalties), held:
“The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the
prescribed penalties for the offenses of which the accused was convicted
should be imposed in accord with the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is only applicable to cases
wherein a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a
necessary means for committing the other.
(U. S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)
“It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or
penalties should have been imposed upon the accused upon conviction of the
accused of three separate felonies charged in the information.
“There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
convict of two separate crimes of asesinato
(murder) marked with the generic aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
decision of the trial judge. . . It follows that death penalty must and
should be imposed for each of these offenses. . .
“Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of
one or both the asesinatos with which he is
charged in the information, it would seem
to be a useless formality to impose separate penalties for each of the offenses
of which he was convicted, in view of the nature of the principal penalty; but
having in mind the possibility that the Chief Executive may deem it proper to
grant a pardon for one or more of the offenses without taking action on the
others; and having in mind also the express provisions of the above cited
article 87 of the Penal Code, we deem it proper to modify the judgment entered
in the court below by substituting for the penalty imposed by the trial judge
under the provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death penalty prescribed
by law for each of the two
separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted,
and the penalty of 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
(for the separate crime of homicide). . . these
separate penalties to be executed in accord with the provisions of article 87
of the Penal Code.” (Underscoring supplied)
The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U. S. vs. Jamad[43] where a unanimous Court, speaking again thru
Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm concurring in the result in view
of the Balaba ruling), opined:
“For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in
the court below, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, that is to say the
penalty prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in its maximum
degree, and for this purpose made use of the provisions of article 89 of the
Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in the case of the United
States vs. Balaba, recently decided where in the
controlling facts were substantially similar to those in the case at bar, ‘all of the
penalties corresponding to the several violations of law’ should have been
imposed under the express provisions of
article 87 [now engrafted in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code] and under
the ruling in that case, the trial court erred in applying the provisions of
article 89 of the code.
“We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below
should be reversed, . . . and that the following separate penalties should be
imposed upon him [the accused Jamad], to be executed
in accordance with article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for the parricide of
his wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment
for the murder of Labonete; (3) the penalty of life
imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years and one day
of cadena temporal for the frustrated
murder of Taclind. . .”
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed
in People vs. Guzman[44], which applied the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, where this Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals
because they acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an
“information charges the defendants with the commission of several crimes
of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the multiplicity
of the charges made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and
sentenced accordingly for as many crimes the information charges them, provided that they are
duly established and proved by the evidence on record.” (Underscoring
supplied)
The legal and statutory
justification advanced by the majority in Balaba
for imposing all the penalties (two deaths and one life imprisonment)
corresponding to the offense charged and proved was article 87 of the old Penal
Code which provided:
“When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or
misdemeanors, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law
shall be imposed, the same to be simultaneously served, if possible, according
to the nature and effects of such penalties, “
in relation to
article 88 of the old Code which read:
“When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of the law, can not be simultaneously executed, the
following rules shall be observed with regard thereto:
“1. In the imposition
of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so
that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should
a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or
should they have been served out.”
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in
the words used by reason of style, of the abovecited
provisions have been preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which
is the product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code. Article 70 provides:
“When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit;
otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
“In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed
so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be
possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties
first imposed, or should they have been served out.”
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former
article 87 clearly did, that “all the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law shall be imposed,” it is unmistakable, however,
that article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple
penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be served either
simultaneously or successively. This presumption
of the existence of judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of
the offenses charged and proved is manifest in the opening sentence of
article 70: “When the culprit to serve or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit. . .” (Underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has to serve are those
legally imposed by the proper court.
Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is found in the
second paragraph of article 70 which provides that “in the imposition
of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be
followed. . .” Even without the authority provided by article 70, courts
can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty
is prescribed by law. Each single crime
is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of
justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions.
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there
is no statutory prohibition or jurisprudential injunction against it. On the contrary, article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code presumes that courts have the power to mete out multiple penalties
without distinction as to the nature and severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence supports the
imposition of multiple death penalties as initially advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar
where the accused was sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death
penalties. Significantly, the Court in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed
multiple penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as
a useless formality, an exercise in futility.
It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all
mortals, has only one life to forfeit.
And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it
is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and
futile because after the service of one
capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will
naturally be rendered impossible. The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers
from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to
consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously;
and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are
two distinct, though related, concepts.
The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined
by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas
service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty
or penalties imposed. In the imposition
of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual
service is a contingency subject to varied factors like successful escape of
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are
the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the
corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties
are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed
simultaneously. A cursory reading of
article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more
(multiple) penalties: simultaneously
or successively. The first rule
is that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of
the penalties will so permit. In the
case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not
only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of
multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several
capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which
may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence
irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of
the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive
clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of
pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter
delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would
exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his
behalf.
Granting, however, that the
Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of
the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute
the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical
effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of multiple
life sentences. If only one death
penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will
have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence.
Reverting now to the
case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial
court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the
murders. We quote with approval the
following incisive Observations of the court a quo in this
respect:
“Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the
Court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the
crime committed by the accused was planned.
The following circumstances show
beyond any doubt the acts of conspiracy:
First, all those who were killed, Barbosa,
Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many Tagalogs
like them confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and killed
thereby showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed
with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion; third, the accused accomplished the
killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost
the same people took part in the killing of Carriego,
Barbosa and Santos Cruz.”
It
is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A;
that all were from either the Visayas or Mindanao
except Peralta who is from Masbate and Parurnog who hails from Nueva Ecija;
that all were either “OXO” members or sympathizers; and that all the
victim were members of the “Sigue-Sigue” gang.
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused
acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up until the
time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog,
Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual
killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators
they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a
co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part
which the others have to perform.
Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation
in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony
previously planned are co-principals.[45] Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego,
Barbosa and Santos Cruz – each is guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder.
We cannot agree, however,
with the trial court that evident premeditation was also present. The facts on record and the established
jurisprudence on the matter do not support the conclusion of the court a
quo that evident premeditation “is always present and inherent in
every conspiracy.” Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as
the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the
latter.[46] Unlike in evident premeditation where a
sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on the
consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to commit it.[47] This view finds added support in People vs. Custodio,[48] wherein this Court stated:
“Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is
directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of
the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be taken for granted.
In the case before us, however, no such evidence exists; the conspiracy
is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the
crime. There is no proof how and when
the plan to kill Melanio Balancio
was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out; we are, therefore,
unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed ‘sufficient time between its
inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences.’ (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 91). In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity
for reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation (People vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to
No. 12] 166; People vs. Lesada, 70 Phil., 525.)”
Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in
favor of any of the six accused, as they did neither allege nor prove any.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of
the offenses were serving sentences[49]
in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa,
by virtue of convictions by final judgments, the penalty for each offense must
be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph
of article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada
observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist
is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.[50]
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby
modified as follows: Amadeo
Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Parunog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are
each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are
each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum
of P12,000;[51]
each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., on official leave.
[1]
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervacio Larita, Florencio Luna, Jose Tariman, Silverio Lumanog, Leonardo Hamora, Eilel Tugaya,
Gabriel Buclatin, Roberto Abada,
Ubaldo Peralta, Arsenio Cunanan, Pedro Cogol, Jesus Baldueza, Felicisimo Aguipo, Jose Loyola, Beltran Agrava,
Alfredo Paunil, Ambrosio Paunil and Ernesto Fernandez.
[2]
Roberto Abada.
[3]
Alfredo Paunil, Ambrosio Paunil, Ubaldo Peralta, Arsenio Cunananan, Jesus Baldueza and Beltran Agrava.
[4]
Gabriel Buclatin.
[5]
Pedro Cogol,
Ernesto Fernandez, Jose Tariman, Felicisimo
Aguipo, Eilel Tugaya, Silverio Lumanog, Leonardo Amora and Jose
Loyola.
[6]
People vs. Pasiona, L-18295, February
28, 1966; People vs. Bautista, L-17772, October 31, 1962, cited in People vs. Dayday, L-20806-07, August
14, 1965.
[7]
People vs. Tansiangco,
L-19448, February 28, 1964; People vs. Riveral,
L-14077, March 31, 1964; cited in People vs. Berdida, et al., L-20183, June 30, 1966.
[8]
People vs. Berdida, et al., supra, citing People vs.
Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964.
[9]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[10]
Article 115, Revised Penal Code.
[11]
Article 136, Revised Penal Code.
[12]
Article 141, Revised Penal Code.
[13]
U.S. vs. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 472; U.S. vs.
Remigio, 37 Phil. 599, 614; People vs. Assad, 55 Phil. 697.
[14]
36 Phil. 149.
[15]
U.S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil. 434; U.S. vs. Maza,
5 Phil. 346; U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; U.S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530 and the cases therein cited.
[16]
U.S. vs. Snyder, 3 McCrary, 377; See also
People vs. Bannaisan, 49 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Maza, supra.
[17]
U.S. vs. Ipil, supra; U.S. vs. Grant, supra.
[18]
U.S.
vs. Bundal, et al., 3 Phil. 89.
[19]
See Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
[20]
20 Phil. 379.
[21]
Quoted in People vs.
Ponte, supra.
[22]
U.S. vs.
Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4.
[23]
81 Phil. 193, 198.
[24]
99 Phil. 226.
[25]
See second paragraph of Article 296 of
the Revised Penal Code.
[26]
People vs. Ancheta, et al., 66 Phil. 638.
[27]
People vs. Carbonel, 48
Phil. 868.
[28]
People vs. Cadag, L-13830, May 31,
1961; People vs. Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148.
[29]
43 Phil. 64, citing 5 RCL 1088.
[30]
See note 27, p. 876.
[31]
People vs. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968; People vs. Fontillas, L-25298, April
16, 1968.
[32]
People vs. San Luis, 86 Phil. 485.
[33]
U.S. vs. Bundal, supra; U.S. vs.
Maza, supra; U.S. vs.
Matanug, 11 Phil. 188; U.S. vs. Ipil, supra; People vs. Go, 88 Phil.
203; People vs. Jaravata, L-22029, August 15, 1967; People vs. Fontillas,
supra.
[34]
104 Phil. 690.
[35]
People vs. Pelagio, L-16177, May 24, 1967.
[36]
64 Phil. 757.
[37]
People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil.
819.
[38]
L-3973, September 18, 1952.
[39]
United States vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260.
[40]
People vs. Salazar,
105 Phil. 1060.
[41]
See note 30.
[42]
See Article 294, subdivision 1, Revised Penal Code.
[43]
37 Phil. 305.
[44]
L-7530, August 30, 1958.
[45]
People vs. Valeriano, L-2859, September 19, 1951.
[46]
People vs. Datu Dima Binasing,
et al., 98 Phil. 902.
[47]
People vs. Monroy, et al., L-11177, October 30, 1958.
[48]
97 Phil. 698, 704-705.
[49]
Amadeo Peralta was serving sentences for robbery (two
counts), evasion of sentence (two counts) and murder; Andres Factora was serving sentences for illegal possession of
hand grenade and frustrated homicide (two counts); Leonardo Dosal
was serving sentence for frustrated homicide and murder; Angel Parumog was serving sentence for qualified theft; Gervasio Larita was serving
sentence for robbery in band with physical injuries and rape; and Florencio Luna was serving sentence for homicide, murder
and evasion of sentence.
[50]
1 Viada, 4th edition, p. 562, cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, vol. II, p. 930.
[51]
See People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, October 11, 1968.