AMPARO D. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANGEL H. MOJICA, EMMA R. GENIZA, AURELIO GENIZA, CATALINA CARREON-RIVERA, ZACARIAS RIVERA, LORENZO RIVERA, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA AND THE S…

Santos versus Mojica

The Case

This is an original action for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by Amparo D. Santos against Judge Angel H. Mojica and the private respondents, the plaintiffs in the main case. Mrs. Santos asks the Supreme Court to annul the order of execution pending appeal issued by Judge Mojica in a civil case for damages arising from fraud, and to restrain the sheriffs of Manila and Quezon City from enforcing the writ of execution. The case matters because it is the classic statement of the rule that execution pending appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the failure of a losing party to file a supersedeas bond is a sufficient ground to deny certiorari against an order authorizing execution.

Procedural History

The private respondents filed a civil case for damages in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Roque M. Garcia, Miguel Moreno, and Amparo D. Santos. On April 30, 1964, the trial court rendered a decision sentencing the three defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs various amounts of damages, interest, attorney's fees, and costs. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeals of Garcia and Moreno were dismissed for failure to file their briefs on time, leaving Mrs. Santos as the only appellant.

Pending perfection of the appeal, the plaintiffs moved for immediate execution on the ground that the appeal was dilatory. Judge Mojica granted the motion, conditioned on the defendants' failure to file a supersedeas bond within ten days. No bond was filed, and a writ of execution was issued. The sheriffs levied on movables, on real property covered by a transfer certificate of title, and served notices of garnishment on the Pampanga Sugar Mills and on Pasumil Planters, Inc.

Mrs. Santos then filed this original action for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, impleading Judge Mojica and the sheriffs. The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond. The merits of the main decision were the subject of a separate appeal, and the Court confined itself to the question of whether Judge Mojica had exceeded his jurisdiction in authorizing execution.

Facts

The plaintiffs alleged, and the trial court found, that the defendants fraudulently induced them to believe that a barter license for sixteen million pesos in favor of the Southern Luzon Coconut Producers Association, Inc. had been approved and would be released within two weeks after payment of a one hundred thousand peso license fee, and that Emma R. Geniza would receive a commission of four hundred eighty thousand pesos if she found a buyer. The license had never been approved. The defendants persuaded the plaintiffs to mortgage several parcels of land to Henry Sy for fifty thousand pesos and another parcel to the Asia Mercantile Corporation for another fifty thousand pesos, both payable within forty days, and to deliver the aggregate sum of one hundred thousand pesos to the defendants in the house of Mrs. Santos and her second husband, Miguel Moreno, under a promise to pay it back within the same period. The promise was not fulfilled, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed, and title was consolidated in the mortgagees.

Mrs. Santos denied the acts imputed to her and denied the genuineness of the signature purporting to be hers on the promissory note. The trial court, after comparing the questioned signature with standard signatures and considering the testimony of a handwriting expert, found the evidence for the defendants unworthy of credence and concluded that their appeal had been taken for the purpose of delay.

On the question of execution, the record showed that the co-defendants of Mrs. Santos seemingly had no property upon which the judgment could be satisfied. Mrs. Santos had a house and lot in Quezon City with an assessed value of one hundred thirty-six thousand one hundred fifty pesos, but it was mortgaged to the Philippine Trust Company for one hundred fifty thousand pesos, and the debt had grown to one hundred ninety-one thousand eight hundred sixty-three pesos as of October 12, 1964. The movables levied upon were the subject of a third party claim by the heirs of Demetrio Santos, and the shares of stock were the subject of a similar claim by her children. She maintained that her salary and bonuses as treasurer of the Pampanga Sugar Mills were needed for her support and that of her children.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Mojica gravely abused his discretion in ordering the execution of the decision pending appeal.
• Whether or not the failure of Mrs. Santos to file a supersedeas bond bars the grant of certiorari against the order of execution.
• Whether or not the merits of the main decision, including the finding of fraud and the award of damages, may be passed upon in this action for certiorari.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, governs execution pending appeal:

If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed, although there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may arise which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should be granted only when these considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances demanding urgency, and the provision contained in Rule 39, section 2, requires a statement of those circumstances as a security for their existence.

This passage, quoted from the Court's earlier ruling in Aguilos versus Barrios, sets the standard: execution pending appeal requires superior circumstances demanding urgency, and the order must state those circumstances.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the question of whether a decision should be executed pending appeal is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and that Judge Mojica had properly exercised that discretion. The Court cited four circumstances. First, the co-defendants of Mrs. Santos seemingly had no property upon which the judgment could be satisfied, while Mrs. Santos was in imminent danger of insolvency because her mortgaged property was worth less than the debt secured by it. Second, no other property appeared available for the satisfaction of the judgment, since the movables and shares were under third party claims and her salary was claimed for support. Third, Mrs. Santos had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law: she could have filed a supersedeas bond, and the order complained of conditioned execution upon the absence of that bond, which she did not file. Fourth, the trial court found that the appeal had been taken for the purpose of delay, a finding supported by the evidence, including the testimony of a handwriting expert, and sufficient to justify execution pending appeal.

On the second issue, the Court held that the failure to avail of the remedy of a supersedeas bond is a sufficient ground to deny a writ of certiorari against an order authorizing execution pending appeal.

On the third issue, the Court held that the arguments of Mrs. Santos concerning the merits of the main decision, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of her motion for new trial, and the excessiveness of the damages, dealt with matters that were the subject of the separate appeal and could not be passed upon in this action for certiorari, where the only issue was whether Judge Mojica had exceeded his jurisdiction.

Doctrine

The question of whether a decision should be executed pending appeal is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Execution pending appeal may be granted where superior circumstances demanding urgency clearly outweigh the risk of reversal, and the order must state those circumstances. The failure of the losing party to file a supersedeas bond, when the order of execution is conditioned upon the absence of such a bond, is a sufficient ground to deny certiorari against the order of execution. The merits of the main decision may not be reviewed in a certiorari action directed only at the order of execution.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved, and costs were taxed against Mrs. Santos.

Remember This

Execution pending appeal rests on the sound discretion of the trial court, and the losing party who fails to file a supersedeas bond cannot later complain through certiorari. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of execution pending appeal and the rule that certiorari will not lie where a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, such as a supersedeas bond, was available and ignored.