JOSE L. TALENS, PETITIONER, VS. FELIPE GARCIA AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENTS.

In October, 1943, Felipe (1) to annul the deed of sale executed by
Laureano Estefanio in favor of his co-defendant Jose L. Talens
involving a parcel of land (a homestead) in Laur, Nueva Ecija, {2} to
compel Laureano Estefanio to convey the to him, and (3) to recover
damages. It appears that after selling the lot to Felipe Garcia in
1938, Estefanio sold it again to Jose L. Talens in 1943. Talens
contended in his answer that the first sale to Garcia was void because
it violated a prohibition in the Public Land Act. After hearing the
parties, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment
as follows:

“Bajo las consideraciones arriba expuestas, el
juzgado halla ajustado a derecho la contencion del demandante y decide
(1) declarar que el contrato de venta Exh. 1 asi corao el contrato de
“quitclaim” Exh. 2 sobre el terreno en cuestion y sus mejoras a favor
de Jose Talens, nulos y de ningun valor, reservando cualquier derecho
que tuviera dicha parte contra su co-demandado Estefanio; (2) ordenar
la cancelacion del Certificado de Titulo No. 19485 y (3) ordenar a
Laureano Estefanio a expedir el correspondiente documento a favor del
demandante Felipe Garcia, con las costas a los demandados.”

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (G. R. No. 3221-R) found for the defendant Jose L. Talens, and said:

“Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and defendant-appellant Jose Talens absolved from the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee, Felipe Garcia.”

This decision having become final, counsel for Talens filed on
November 23, 1949, in the court of first instance, a motion for an
order to the Provincial Sheriff “for the possession of the controverted
land by Jose L. Talens by evicting the plaintiff therefrom” and also
for the collection of the- costs awarded by the Court of Appeals. The
Court—Judge Nable—granted the petition as to costs; but denied the
petition as to possession, explaining that after having gone “over the
decision of the Court of Appeals we have found no disposition regarding
the return of the possession to defendant Jose L. Talens” most probably
because the defendant therein (Talens) had not asked for that
particular relief.

Denial of his motion for reconsideration prompted Garcia’s counsel
to institute this mandamus proceeding, the purpose of which is to
compel the respondent judge to order delivery of possession to
petitioner Jose L. Talens.

We have examined the record on appeal submitted to the Court of
Appeals in said case G..R. No. 3221-R because petitioner has made it a
part of his pleading. We find therein that defendant Jose L. Talens
never requested for restitution of possession. Therefore, it was
natural that the two courts did not deliberate upon such point. Anyway,
the undeniable fact is, none of them awarded such relief.

According to the Rules, “That only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment (of the Court of Appeals) which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.” (Rule 39, sec. 45)

It may be admitted that the judgment absolving defendant Talens was
in effect a declaration that the sale to him was valid. It may also be
admitted, though with some reluctance or reservation, that it was a
declaration of ownership of the lot. But it is doubtful whether it also
included a direction to surrender it to him. Al- though it is true that
the owner is generally entitled to possession, it is equally true that
there may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights which
must be respected or defined. A lessee is not the owner; yet a
declaration of ownership in another person does not necessarily mean
his ouster.

Touching the case at bar, if the possessor Garcia had made
necessary improvements for which he is entitled to compensation, an
order of possession would deprive him of such payment without having
had an opportunity to claim for them and prove their value. His Honor,
the trial judge, obviously foresaw this possibility among others, and
refused to decree the restitution, taking “into consideration that said
decision (of the Court of Appeals) seems not to close all the doors for
the parties to protect their respective interests, if they still have
any.”

Consequently, we hold that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
G. R. No. 3221-R absolving Talens from the complaint did not include an
order for delivery of possession of the land.

The petition is denied, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.