WENCESLAO PLAZA, MANUEL SABERON, ARTURO BERNARDINO, RICARDO BERNARDINO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JUDGE EULOGIO MENCIAS AND FILIPINAS MOTOR SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENTS.

A petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the
annulment of a restraining order issued by the respondent Judge Eulogio
Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and of the proceedings
had before his court in Civil Case No. 6562, and enjoining respondents
from enforcing the said restraint order.

It appears from the record that petitioners, who are members of the
petitioning union (PAFLU), served on March 17, 1961 to the respondent
Filipinas Motor Services, Inc. (FILMOCO), a set of bargaining demands.
Within twenty-four hours after such receipt of the demands, the
respondent FILMOCO severed employment and stopped work of over twenty
members and officers of the PAFLU. As a result the petitioners on March
20, 1961, staged an unfair labor practice strike and picketing, filed
unfair labor charges with the Court of Industrial Relations against
respondent FILMOCO, and sent a written request to the Conciliation
Service of the Department of Labor to mediate and conciliate the labor
dispute.

On March 22, 1961, respondent FILMOCO filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against the petitioners. In said complaint, FILMOCO alleges that the
defendants, now petitioners, being independent contractors and not
employees of the plaintiff and there being no labor controversy or
dispute between them, staged a strike and illegally picketed the
premises of the plaintiff, exhibiting ugly, libelous and obnoxious
placards thereby preventing the free movement of the other independent
contractors, employees who are willing to work, officers, and customers
of the plaintiff entering the premises of the said plaintiff; that
defendants have harrasted, threatened intimidated and coerced and are
continuing to harras, threaten, intimidate and coerce other independent
contractors, employees, officials and customers of the plaintiff when
entering the said premises, and praying among other things, that a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the defendants from
continuing the acts complained of. This last prayer was granted in a
restraint order dated March 23, 1961.

In an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Immediate Lifting of
the Restraint Order”, filed on March 24, 1961, defendants (petitioners
herein) assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in
issuing the said order. They alleged that they being employees of the
plaintiff, and there being a labor dispute between them pending in the
Court of Industrial Relations, the latter has acquired jurisdiction
over all matters, including the case filed by plaintiffs, which are
mere incidents to the labor dispute case, to the exclusion of other
courts. They further pointed out that the Court in issuing the
restraint order without hearing violated the provisions of Sec. 9, R.A.
No. 875, which outlines the procedure in the issuance of a restraint
order.

On March 27, 1961, before the motion for reconsideration could be
resolved by the Court, the instant petition for certiorari was filed,
setting forth allegations contained in the motion for reconsideration
with the additional averment that the respondent judge refused
immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration.

In their answer to the petition, respondents allege that (1) the
petition was prematurely filed because the same was filed without
giving opportunity to the court to reconsider its restraining order as
prayed for in the motion for reconsideration; (2) the respondent judge
in issuing the restraining order was guided by Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court, because it was clear from the plaintiff’s complaint that it was
entitled to the relief demanded, because an illegal strike and
picketing was being staged by persons who are not employees of the
plaintiff, thereby causing irreparable injury and damages to
plaintiff’s business; (3) so the court below had no occasion to apply
the provisions of Sec. 9, of R.A. No. 875 because it appeared from
contracts duly signed by defendants and plaintiff and submitted to the
court, that the former are not employees of the latter, and because the
case is an action for damages, a case outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Hence, it is alleged, the lower court
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case and the parties. They
also allege that they are not aware of any unfair labor practice case
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations until they received a copy
of defendants’ motion for reconsideration.

We do not find in the record the alleged copies of contracts
executed between petitioners and the respondent company which,
according to respondent company in its answer, would show that the
petitioners are not employees but independent contractors. From the
allegations of the petition before us, it would seem that they are not
independent contractors, but are workers or laborers, although paid
according to amount and quality of work. The mere statement in the
contract that they are independent contractors would not change their
status as employees of the respondent company in the contemplation of
the labor laws.

Another allegation in the answer is that the respondent company
could not have known of the existence of the case for unfair labor
practice against it as the record shows that said case was filed on
March 20, 1961 and their complaint for damages was filed on March 22.

The record further discloses that upon being notified of the
restraining order issued by the respondent Judge Mencias, dated March
23, 1961, petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration dated
March 24, 1961. But before the motion for reconsideration could be
passed upon by the court below the petitioners filed the present
petition for certiorari in this Court on March 27, 1961.

One of the grounds raised by the respondents against the present
petition for certiorari is that it has been prematurely filed. We find
this objection to be well taken. The rule is that before a petition for
certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all
remedies available in that court must be exhausted. In the case at bar
the petitioners filed a petition without waiting for a resolution of
the court on the motion for reconsideration, which could have been
favorable to the petitioners, The rule also provides that actions for
certiorari may only be brought in case there is no adequate remedy
available to the petitioner in the court below and against which the
petition for certiorari is filed. In the case at bar the adequate
remedy was the motion for reconsideration and the resolution thereon,
which was expected to be more speedy remedy than the present petition
for certiorari.

The above objections are fatal to the present petition. Considering,
however, that if the present petition were dismissed and the case
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal to give it opportunity
to decide the motion for reconsideration, as the rules demand,
considerable time and expense will be wasted to no avail, on the part
of the petitioners and of the respondents, and of the courts, we have,
therefore, decided to grant the petition for certiorari and set aside
the preliminary injunction of the court below issued by the judge
thereof.

Writ granted; the preliminary injunction granted by Us is made permanent. No costs allowed.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.