DY PAC & COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND DY PAC PAKIAO WORKERS UNION, RESPONDENTS.

At the behest of Dy Pac Pakiao Workers’ Union—hereinafter referred to as the
Union—an acting prosecutor of the Court of Industrial Relations filed therewith
a complaint for unfair labor practice against Dy Pac & Co. Inc.,—hereinafter
referred to as the Company—and A. Santos Soriano. The latter and the Company,
although represented by the same counsel, filed separate answers denying the
material allegations of the complaint and setting up some special and
affirmative defenses. After due trial the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision in favor of the Union, the dispositive part of which reads:

“In view of all the foregoing considerations, the respondents are hereby
ordered to pay immediately, the backwages of the complainant workers, from the
date of the stoppage of work in the old carro up to the date when this
decision shall become final and executory, without
reinstatement.”

A motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied in an unanimous
resolution of said court sitting en banc. Hence, the present petition for
review by certiorari filed by the Company.

The latter is a private corporation engaged in the lumber business in the
City of Manila, where it operated two (2) —machines of a given type—referred to
in the record as “carros”—for the sawing of ilogs. One of these “carros”, which,
seemingly, was older than the other, was operated at nighttime, by about
nineteen (19) laborers under the supervision of A. Santos Soriano. Another group
of persons operated the other “carro” at daytime. Said A. Santos Soriano, was,
according to the Company, an independent contractor, but the lower court found
that he was merely a “dummy” of the Company. Indeed, it appears that on November
14, 1956, the laborers working under A. Santos Soriano organized the Union, and
then notified the Company about it. Subsequently, or in January, 1957, the Union
wrote to the Company a letter calling attention to the fact that the
compensation paid to said laborers was below that fixed in the Minimum Wage Law,
and requesting, among other things, an increase in their wages. Soon thereafter
the work under the old “carro” stopped. When the laborers inquired about the
reason therefor, the Company informed them that it had received a letter from
Santos Soriano terminating his contract with the Company and that Santos Soriano
was away. It was only then that the laborers learned of the alleged existence of
a contract between the Company and Santos Soriano. Sometime in November or
December, 1957, the old “carro” of the Company resumed. operation under Alfonso
Soriano, a son of Santos Soriano, with another set of laborers. The Union
members were not readmitted to the work—although they sought readmission—upon
the ground that they were troublesome. The record shows, also, that the Union
members were hired by Santos Soriano subject to the approval of the Company,
which paid their wages and that although, at first, the laborers signed no
payroll, they were later required to sign a payroll of the Company. Under the
foregoing facts, we find that lower court did not err in concluding that Santos
Soriano was not an independent contractor, but merely an agent of the Company
(Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-17495,
June 1962; Velez vs. PAV Watchmen’s Union, 107 Phil., 689; U. S. Lines vs.
Associated Watchmen & Security Union, L-12208-II, May 21, 1958; Asia Steel
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-7636, June 27, 1955), and that the
stoppage of the work of the members of the Union was due to their Union
activities, thus constituting an unfair labor practice on the part of the
Company.

It is next urged that the Court of Industrial Relations should have granted
the motion for new trial therein filed by the Company upon the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, because it could not introduce the
testimony of Santos Soriano owing to the failure of their common counsel to
locate him prior to the trial in the lower court. We find, however, no merit in
this pretense, for there is no showing that appellant had exercised reasonable
diligence to notify Santos Soriano of the date of the trial and assure itself of
his presence on that occasion. Besides, no affidavit of Santos Soriano showing
what he would testify to if a new trial were held and indicating that the result
then would probably be otherwise, was submitted in support of said motion.
Hence, the same was properly denied.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Dizon,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.