HAIDE HO NEBRES DONGUINES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ALLAN ROY DONGUINES, GLORIA NINFA DONGUINES AND ABELARDO DONGUINES, RESPONDENTS- APPELLEES.

Donguines versus Donguines

The Case

This is the case of Donguines versus Donguines. Haide Ho Nebres Donguines, the wife, filed a petition against her husband Allan Roy Donguines for violation of Republic Act Number 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, and asked for a protection order. The spouses later signed a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved. The wife then tried to withdraw it, claiming she was forced and deceived. The case matters because it teaches the exact procedural route for attacking a compromise judgment, and it restates the burden of proving vitiated consent.

Procedural History

The wife filed her petition for violation of Republic Act Number 9262 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Bacolod City, and a temporary protection order was granted. The parties then filed a compromise agreement dated October 21, 2011. The wife moved to withdraw it, but the trial court denied the motion in its December 9, 2011 Order, finding no proof that her consent was vitiated. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on January 3, 2012. The trial court then approved the compromise agreement in its January 20, 2012 Decision. Two motions for reconsideration followed, and both were denied in the July 6, 2012 Order. The wife then brought this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On May 16, 2011, Haide Ho Nebres Donguines filed a petition against her husband Allan Roy Donguines for violation of Republic Act Number 9262, and a temporary protection order was issued on May 24, 2011. On November 2, 2011, the parties filed a compromise agreement dated October 21, 2011.

Two days later, the wife filed an urgent motion to withdraw the compromise agreement, claiming her husband forced her to sign it. The trial court denied the motion. It found that the wife and her own counsel had prepared the agreement without any participation from the husband or his counsel, so it was not convinced that she had been coerced by fraud or duress.

After reconsideration was denied, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. The wife again moved for reconsideration, insisting on withdrawal, but the trial court denied both motions. Hence, this appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the withdrawal of the October 21, 2011 Compromise Agreement.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in approving the said agreement.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as discussed in the decision, provides:

The Court of Appeals shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.

This provision bears on the case because it fixes the correct court and remedy for a party who alleges that a compromise judgment was tainted by vices of consent or forgery.

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as referred to in the decision, governs the remedy:

Annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts may be filed with the Court of Appeals.

This rule bears on the case because the Court held that the wife should have filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 instead of an ordinary appeal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal should have been dismissed outright. A judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory, and there is no appeal from such judgment. The Court explained that when both parties ask that a decision be rendered approving their agreement, they implicitly waive the right to appeal. If a party alleges mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity in the compromise, the remedy is an action to annul the judgment before the Court of Appeals under Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, or a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, not an ordinary appeal.

On the second issue, the Court, even setting aside the procedural defect, found no reason to annul the compromise agreement. The wife alleged fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and serious mistake, but offered only bare allegations. The Court applied the age-old rule that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and a mere allegation is not evidence. The records showed that the wife and her counsel personally prepared the document, and the husband merely affixed his signature. There could therefore be no serious mistake, and the husband could not have employed fraud since he had no hand in drafting it. The Court stressed:

The law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing.

The Court also rejected the claim that the husband filed criminal cases to pressure her. He had compelling evidence of her adulterous relation with a foreign national, and the criminal complaints were filed before this case and long before the compromise agreement.

Doctrine

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or end one already commenced. Once stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract; it has the force and effect of a judgment. A judgment based on a compromise is immediately executory and cannot be appealed, because the parties are presumed to have waived the right to appeal.

Vices of consent or forgery may disturb a compromise, but the remedy is not an appeal. The aggrieved party must bring an action to annul the judgment before the Court of Appeals under Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, or a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47.

He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it, and a mere allegation is not evidence. Courts will not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise or disastrous contract entered into with full awareness and all required formalities.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's Decision and Orders, with costs against the wife.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a compromise judgment is immediately executory and cannot be appealed; attack it only by annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Examiners use this case to test the proper remedy against a compromise judgment and the burden of proving vitiated consent.