PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. POCHOLO MIRANDA Y BUMANLAG A.K.A. POCHIE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DICDICAN, J.:
For adjudication by this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] rendered by Presiding Judge Joselito dj. Vibandor of Branch 199 of the Regional Trial Court in Las Piñas City, National Capital Judicial Region, (“trial court”) on December 6, 2013 in Criminal Case No. 11-0247 convicting herein accused-appellant Pocholo Miranda y Bumanlag a.k.a. Pochie (“accused-appellant”) for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act in the following Information[2] which reads as follows:
“That on or about 15th day of January, 2011, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of abuse against “AAA”, a 16-year old minor, by then and there presenting himself to her, thru text messages, as “Macky,” complainant’s friend, and thereafter sending text messages inviting her to go somewhere and asking for a kiss from her, which acts caused her annoyance, irritation, vexation and distress, which are prejudicial to said child’s development and which debase, degrade or demean her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On June 13, 2011, upon being arraigned of the charge against him, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty[3] thereto. Subsequently, a pre-trial was conducted on October 5, 2011[4]. A trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution adduced in evidence the testimonies of the following: (1) “AAA”, the minor complainant herself; (3) Fernan Kalaw (“Kalaw”); (4) Mark Jason Cortez (“Cortez”); and (4) Barangay Tanod Gerardo Caballes (“Caballes”) .
On the other hand, the accused-appellant adduced in evidence his own testimony as well as that of Sharmaine Someya (“Someya”).
The prosecution’s recital of established facts is summarized as follows:
On January 15, 2011, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, herein private complainant “AAA”, who was then sixteen (16) years old, received a text message from a number unknown to her. Upon inquiry, the sender of the text message introduced himself as “Macky”.
Since “AAA” had a best friend whose nickname is “Macky” and considering that their manner of texting was the same, she was led to believe that the “Macky” that she knew had only changed his cellular phone number.
Subsequently thereafter, “AAA” received a voice call from “Macky”. At that instance, “AAA” inquired as to why “Macky’s” voice sounded different. “Macky” then told her that he had just woke up and was suffering from colds.
Feeling skeptical, “AAA” went to the house of her best friend, Mark Jason Cortez or Macky, and told the latter that someone was sending her text messages and pretending to be him. “AAA”, Cortez and his friends then came up with a plan and decided to meet up with the person pretending to be “Macky”.
At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, “AAA”, accompanied by Cortez and his friends, all went to the clubhouse in Teresa Park Subdivision, Pillar Village, Las Piñas City to meet with “Macky”.
At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, “AAA” received a text message from the accused-appellant which stated that he was already in their meeting place and that he was the guy on board the motorcycle. Upon the advice of her friends, “AAA” remained where she was.
The guy with the motorcycle then approached “AAA” and told her that he was instructed by “Macky” to come and pick her up. “AAA” also claimed that the accused-appellant approached their group and told them, “Ako ito, ate.”
Suddenly, Kalaw, Aguila and Cortez, came out and started to maul accused-appellant. The accused-appellant was then brought to the barangay hall after the barangay tanods, who received a call for help from “AAA”, responded to the commotion.
With respect to the testimony of Kalaw, he claimed that, on January 15, 2011, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he was in the house of his friend, Jeremy Aguila, when he received a text message from Cortez telling him that someone was misrepresenting himself as “Macky” to “AAA” through text messages.
Kalaw, “AAA” and Cortez then proceeded to the house of Aguila where they came up with a plan to entrap “Macky”.
It was in the clubhouse at Teresa Park Subdivision where “AAA” and “Macky” decided to meet. Kalaw, Cortez and Aguila accompanied “AAA” to the said meeting place.
Kalaw claimed that he was hiding at the back of the clubhouse, together with Cortez and Aguila, while “AAA” waited for “Macky” to arrive.
Kalaw likewise claimed that, upon seeing that the accused-appellant was already forcing “AAA” to ride his motorcycle, Cortez emerged from their hiding place and confronted the accused-appellant. Kalaw and Aguila then followed behind.
When accosted by Cortez about his misrepresentations, the accused-appellant merely answered, “Wala lang.”. Kalaw and his group then instructed “AAA” to run back to her house and ask for assistance from her mother and the barangay officials.
Kalaw and his group then started to run after the accused-appellant who was then trying to escape in his motorcycle. When Kalaw got hold of the accused-appellant, the latter hit him on his shoulder with his helmet. Kalaw then retaliated and chased the accused-appellant who was trying to flee. Soon thereafter, the barangay officials arrived and they boarded herein accused-appellant in the barangay patrol.
To corroborate the testimony of “AAA”, Cortez narrated that “AAA” told her that someone was pretending to be him and was sending her some text messages. Allegedly, the sender of the text message was inviting her to go out and have a drink. Subsequently, at around 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of January 15, 2011, he went to the house of “AAA” wherein the latter showed to her all the text messages which a certain “Macky” had sent to her.
It was at that moment when he decided to seek for the assistance of his friends, Kalaw and Aguila. At around 9:45 p.m. on the same day, Cortez, together with “AAA”, Kalaw and Aguila waited for “Macky” at the clubhouse in Teresa Park, Pillar Village, Las Pinas City.
Herein accused-appellant arrived at the clubhouse in a motorcycle while Cortez, Kalaw and Aguila stayed at the back of the clubhouse. Cortez asserted that he saw the accused-appellant forcing “AAA” to ride on the motorcycle. According to Cortez, he heard that the accused-appellant claimed that “Macky”, who was already drinking somewhere else, told him to fetch “AAA”.
Upon witnessing the incident, Cortez, together with Kalaw and Aguila, came out and confronted the accused-appellant. When asked as to why he was misrepresenting himself as “Macky”, the accused-appellant answered “Wala lang.”. The accused-appellant’s response then prompted Kalaw and Aguila to attack him.
Meanwhile, Cortez escorted “AAA” to her house and then proceeded to run after the accused-appellant. After their group was able to catch the accused-appellant, they brought him to “AAA’s” house. At that point, Cortez claimed that the accused-appellant said sorry and was pleading for them to set him free.
Caballes, on the other hand, testified on the basis of the Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aresto which he executed and wherein he claimed that he was one of the barangay tanods who apprehended the accused-appellant during the incident which transpired on January 15, 2011.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant denied the accusation hurled against him and raised the defense of denial.
The accused-appellant admitted that he had seen “AAA” at the Teresa Park for several weeks before he asked Someya, “AAA’s” childhood friend, to introduce him to her. It was also through Someya that the accused-appellant obtained the cellular phone number of “AAA” on January 13, 2011.
While the accused-appellant explained that he invited “AAA” to have a drink in the eve of January 15, 2011, he however claimed that he withdrew his invitation since Someya was not available.
The accused-appellant denied that it was his intention to abduct “AAA” as it was “AAA” who was persistent to meet up with him and even insisted to have a drinking spree at his house.
Because “AAA” insisted on meeting up with him, the accused-appellant conceded. Upon reaching their meeting place, the companions of “AAA”, including Kalaw who was purportedly the latter’s suitor, started to utter invectives against him and were furious as they started to maul him. According to the accused-appellant, “AAA” and her group even wanted to take his motorcycle from him during the incident.
When questioned as to the possible motive of the complainant in filing a case against him, the accused-appellant claimed that all the accusations against him were mere fabrications since “AAA’s” parents and suitor were furious at him.
Someya corroborated the testimony of the accused-appellant.
According to Someya, the accused-appellant was also well known as “Macky” and that she was the one who introduced the accused-appellant to “AAA”, who was her childhood friend. She testified that she got “AAA’s” cellular phone number from Jake Cortez, the brother of Mark Jason Cortez.
Someya further testified that the accused-appellant indeed invited her to have a drinking spree on January 15, 2011 together with “AAA” but, on account of the fact that she was still in Laguna, she was not able to join them. She corroborated the testimony of the accused-appellant that it was “AAA” who was persistent in having a drinking session with them.
Someya, likewise, revealed that “AAA’s” mother talked to her mother and told her that she (Someya) would be implicated as an accomplice in this case if she would testify in favor of the accused-appellant. She described the accused-appellant as a kind-hearted and loving son whose only intention in sending text messages to “AAA” was to be his friend. On the contrary, Someya described “AAA” as a bully.
Finding the testimony of the private complainant more credible, the court a quo rendered a Decision on December 6, 2013, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court finds accused Pocholo Miranda y Bumanlag @ ‘Pochie’ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 10(a) Other Acts of Child Abuse, of R.A. 7610 and absent any modifying circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
“The accused is likewise ordered to pay the minor complainant the amount of Php20,000.00 as moral damages.
“SO ORDERED.”
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the accused-appellant pretended to be “AAA’s” friend “Macky”, telling her to bring her gadgets with her and meet with him. For the trial court, such incident had caused fright upon the minor which affected her focus on her studies and threatened her normal development.
The trial court likewise ruled that, given the prevailing facts of this case as established by the prosecution, it can be said that the minor complainant “AAA” was annoyed, irritated, vexed and distressed during the time that the accused-appellant was sending text messages to her and pretending to be her friend “Macky”.
Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, herein accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal raising as errors the following acts that were committed by the trial court, to wit:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(A) OF ARTICLE VI OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS THE SAME WAS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS WHATSOEVER.
The primordial issue brought before this Court for resolution is whether the court a quo erred in convicting herein accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 reads:
“Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development.—
“(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
Child abuse is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
“Section 3. Definition of terms. –
x x x x
(b) ‘Child Abuse’ refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
3. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.”
The accused-appellant asseverated that the facts of the case as established herein did not constitute a violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160 and definitely did not prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Preliminarily, it is worthy to note that the Constitution itself provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved[5]. An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt[6]. It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion with moral certainty[7].
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Berroya[8] as follows:
“[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.”
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC to the effect that the accused-appellant was sending text messages to “AAA” under the pretext that he was “Macky”, we disagree with the court a quo’s holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the afore-quoted provisions.
As can be gleaned from the record of this case, it was not established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant’s act of sending text messages to “AAA” and representing himself as “Macky” had been intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of “AAA” as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass “AAA”. The record of the case would show that the accused-appellant only wanted to befriend “AAA” which friendship could safely be assumed to have been welcomed by the latter on account of the fact that she even graciously accepted the gadgets that the latter had given to her. The pertinent testimony of “AAA” is cited herein as follows:
“Fiscal Azares
“Q: Tell us.
“A: Because he kept on sending me gadgets so, maybe, he has this plan of taking the gadgets and at the same time taking me.
“Q: What are those gadgets?
“A: MP3, charger of Samsung, Sony Ericson and iPod.[9]”
To the mind of this Court, the admission made by “AAA” that the accused-appellant was giving him gifts belied her claim that she did not know the accused-appellant and that she was skeptical about his real identity.
Aside from the foregoing, there were also several inconsistencies in the testimonies of “AAA”, Cortez and Kalaw which cast doubt on the veracity of their testimonies with respect to what had really transpired on January 15, 2011.
According to “AAA”, she surmised that the accused-appellant would abduct her during their rendezvous because the accused-appellant came with company. However, Cortez and Kalaw testified that it was only the accused-appellant who came and approached “AAA”.
“AAA” likewise claimed that Cortez, Kalaw and Aguila immediately assaulted the accused-appellant after the latter introduced himself to her, while both Cortez and Kalaw averred that they confronted the accused-appellant after the latter approached “AAA”.
With respect to the mauling incident, both “AAA” and Cortez admitted that Kalaw and Aguila attacked the accused-appellant first, contrary to Kalaw’s testimony that it was the accused-appellant who hit him first and that he only retaliated.
Details as to what had transpired immediately after “AAA” realized that the sender of the text messages was not her friend “Macky” likewise presented different set of facts which are hard not to ignore. According to “AAA”, she went to the house of Cortez to verify that it was the latter who was the sender of the text messages. Meanwhile, Cortez claimed that he went to “AAA’s” house immediately after the latter told her that someone was sending her text messages under the pretext that it was him.
Such inconsistencies could not be overlooked as the same seemed to be contrary to common human experience. While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the trial court on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or misapprehended, we cannot elude or shirk from our duty to sift fact from fiction.
We note further that the text messages that were allegedly sent by the accused-appellant to “AAA” and presented before the trial court only quoted those conversations which were sent by the accused-appellant at 5:15 p.m. until 9:30 p.m.[10]. The date as to when the exchanges of text messages were made was not even indicated therein[11]. Although “AAA” claimed that the text messages were sent from the accused-appellant’s cellular phone number, no other evidence showing their integrity and reliability was presented before the court a quo.
Contrary to the plaintiff-appellee’s argument that the authenticity of the said text messages had been sufficiently satisfied before the trial court, it is important to note that the admissibility of evidence must be distinguished from its probative value[12]. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute[13]. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue[14]. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence[15].
While the subject text messages’ admissibility had not been timely raised by the accused-appellant during the trial before the court a quo, it does not ipso facto render the facts, as set forth therein, duly proven. It is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the facts as contained therein.
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant pretended to be Macky Cortez as it was never established that he used such surname in his communication with “AAA”. Otherwise stated, it was not the intention of the accused-appellant to misrepresent himself as Macky Cortez as he never mentioned to “AAA” that his surname was Cortez. Furthermore, it was also not proven that the act of the accused-appellant in sending text messages to “AAA” as “Macky” had, in any manner, debased, degraded or demeaned the intrinsic worth of the latter, considering that she was still replying to the said text messages and even admitted to receiving gadgets from the accused-appellant.
All told, we find that the application of the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule is proper in this case. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused[16]. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction[17].
As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Amanquiton v. People[18]:
“However, this noble statute ( Republic Act No. 7610) should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to be brandished against an accused even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The right of an accused to liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to be subjected to any form of abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.
“There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any and all forms of abuse. While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills, care has to be likewise taken that wayward youths should not be cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be applied only and strictly to actual abusers.”
Thus, under the foregoing circumstances, the accused-appellant lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of “AAA” as a child and as a human being that is so essential in the crime of child abuse as defined under Section 3(b) (2) of Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. It was also not shown beyond reasonable doubt that the communications between “AAA” and the accused-appellant had, in any manner, endangered or become prejudicial to “AAA’s” normal development.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 rendered by Branch 199 of the Regional Trial Court in Las Piñas City in Criminal Case No. 11-0247 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Pocholo Miranda y Bumanlag a.k.a. Pochie is hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a) of Article VI of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law.
SO ORDERED.
Ybañez, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Record, Criminal Case No. 11-0247, pp. 206-218 .
[2] Ibid, p. 1.
[3] Ibid, Order, p. 82.
[4] Ibid, Order, p. 95.
[5] CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14 (2).
[6] RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 2.
[7] People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil. 435, 445 (2002).
[8] 347 Phil. 410, 423 (1997).
[9] TSN, January 16, 2012, pp. 13-14.
[10] Record, pp. 16-17.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Heirs of Sabanpan et al. v. Comorpoa, et al., G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003.
[13] Ibid.
[14] PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, October 8, 1998.
[15] Ibid.
[16] People v. Abarquez, G.R. No. 150762, 20 January 2006, 479 SCRA 225, 239.
[17] People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 633 (1999).
[18] G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009.