TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, DECEASED, ANDRES PASCUAL, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (in Sp. Proc. No. 3312) admitting
to probate the purported will of Catalina de la Cruz.

On 2 January 1960,
Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant,
died at the age of 89 in her resi­dence at San Roque,
Navotas, Rizal.  On 14
January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by
Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as
executor and sole heir of the decedent.^[1]

Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and
nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on
the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that
the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her pro­perties by will at
the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of
the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

After hearing, during which the parties presented their
respective evidences, the probate court rendered judgment upholding the due
execution of the will, and, as therein provided, appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of the
late Catalina de la Cruz without bond. 
The oppositors appealed directly to this
Court, the properties involved being valued at more than P300,000.00, raising
only the issue of the due execution of the will.

In this instance, oppositors-appellees
claim that the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed,
notwithstanding the exist­ence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
said testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will was not
signed by all the wit­nesses in the presence of one another, in violation of
the requirement of the law.

 On this point, the lower
court said:

“Regarding the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies in
the testimony of the three at­testing witnesses and of the Notary Public, some
of which have been enumerated in the Memorandum of Oppositors‘
counsel, this Court has taken pains in noting said inconsistencies but found
the same not substantial in nature sufficient to discredit their entire
testimony on the due execution of Ex­hibit ‘D’. 
It is to be ‘noted that Exhibit ‘D’ was signed in 1954 and that the
attesting witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after a lapse of eight years
from the date of the signing of the document. 
It is, therefore, understandable and reasonable to expect that said
witnesses will not retain a vivid picture of the details surrounding the execu­tion
and signing of the will of Catalina de la Cruz. 
What is important and essential is that there be unanimity and certainty
in their testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix,
the attesting witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact that they were all
present at the time those signatures were affixed on the document Exhibit ‘D’. .
.”

In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule that, where a will
is contested, the subscribing witnesses are generally regarded as the best
qualified to testify on its due execution. 
However, it is similarly recognized that for the testimony of such
witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it must be reasonable and unbiased,
and not overcome by competent evidence, direct or circumstantial.^[2] For it must be remembered that the law does not simply require the presence of
three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible.^[3]

In connection with the issue under consideration, we agree with
the trial judge that the contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the
testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out by the oppositors-­appellants (such as the weather condition at
the time the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses;
and the length of time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant
details or to impressions of the witnesses about certain details which could
have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and
which inconsisten­cies, by themselves would not alter the probative value of
their testimonies on the due execution of the will [cf. Peo.
vs. Sigue, 86 Phil. 139-140 (3 years interval)].

In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-13781, 30
January 1960, 106 Phil, 1076, this Court ruled:

“For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will,
it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give an ac­curate
and detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the
signing of the document by the said witnesses. 
It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the
moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they wanted to do
so.  In fact, in the instant case, at
least two witnesses, x x x
both testified that the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of
each and every one of them (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2817;
Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380).”

Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were
better known to proponent Andres Pascual than to the
testatrix suffices to render their testimony suspect.  Under the circumstances, considering the ad­mitted
fact that when the will was executed (1954) the testatrix was already 83 years old, suffering from
rheumatism to the extent that she had to wear thick socks and soft shoes, it is
not unlikely that she should have entrusted the task of requesting them to act
as witnesses to Andres Pascual himself, albeit the
said witnesses, testifying eight years later, should have stated that they were
asked by Catalina to witness her testament. 
The error of recall, considering the eight-year interval, is consonant
with the well known vagaries of human memory and recollection, particularly,
since the main detail that must have stuck in their minds is that they did
witness the signing of the will, upon which their attention must have
principally concentrated.  That they did
so is attested by their signatures and those of the deceased testatrix, which
are nowhere impugned; nor is there any claim by appellants that the latter was
incapable of reading and understanding the will that she signed.  In fact, the evidence is that she did read it
before signing.  The authorities are to
the effect that friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the
beneficiaries do not affect the credibility of the former,^[4]
so that the proven friendship between the proponent and the instrumental
witnesses would have no bearing on the latter’s qualification to testify on the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the will.

Appellants’ main reliance is the alleged tape recording of a
conver­sation between instrumental witness Manuel Jiongco
and oppositor Pedro B. Cruz at the latter’s house
sometime in 1960 (which recording was ad­mittedly taken without Jiongco’s knowledge) wherein said witness is supposed to
have stated that when he signed the will the other witnesses’ signatures were
already affixed, and were not then present, and that he (Jiongco)
signed the document in 1958 or 1959 (Exhibit 22; transcription, Exhibit 23 et.
seq.).

There are two circumstances that militate against giving credence
to this particular evidence.  The first
is that there is no adequate proof that the declarations tape recorded were in
fact made by Jiongco. 
The latter denied that the voice was his and in this respect the trial
Judge stated (Record on Appeal, pages 83-84):

“We do not doubt the fact that Manuel Jiongco was in the house of Pedro Cruz on the occasion that Exhibit
“23” was taken.  But it is
important to note that when said recording was replayed before Manuel Jiongco in Court he denied that the voice which uttered the
above-quoted portions in the conversation was his.  So that with that denial of Manuel Jiongco, the Court was
left with no other recourse than to make its own comparison between the
natural voice of the witness, Manuel Jiongco, while
testifying on the witness stand and his supposed recorded voice in Exhibit
“23”.  It is to be ad­mitted
that we noted some similarity between the two voices but it was not enough to
justify a categorical and definite conclusion that the recorded voice identified
by Pedro Cruz to be that of Manuel Jiongco is in
truth and in fact the voice of the latter. 
Between a testimony given in Court under oath which was subjected to and
stood a rigorous cross-examination and loose statements made out of Court which
even then are of doubtful source, this Court gives full faith and credence to
the former.  And this is true even if
this particular witness admits having a poor memory, and his trustworthiness is
assailed due to a previous record of an administrative case filed against him
wherein he was fined for a charge of fal­sification of public document (see Exh. “25”). 
This is so, because the veracity of his tes­timony in Court regarding
the due execution of Exhibit “D” is corroborated and confirmed by the
testimony of two other attesting witnesses to the document and the Notary
Public who no­tarized the same.”

Not having heard Jiongco testify, this
Court is not in a position to contradict the appreciation of the trial court
that the voice in the tape recording was not really that of Jiongco.  And considering that he denied that fact
under oath, that the tape recording was not supported by truly impartial
evidence, and was done without the knowledge of the witness, we can not see our
way clear to rule that Jiongco has been successfully impeached, and shown guilty
of false testimony.  It would be
dangerous to rule otherwise.

The second point that renders incredible the alleged assertion of
Jiongco in the tape recording, that he signed the
testament only in 1958 or 1959, is that in the Notarial
Register of the notary, Gatdula, the ratification of
the testament appears among the entries for 1954, as well as in the
corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed by him with Bonifacio
Sumulong, the employee in charge of the Notarial Section of the Clerk of Court’s office, who
produced them at the trial upon subpoena, and who testified to his having
searched for and found them in the
vaults of the Clerk of Court’s office. 
No evidence exists that these documents were not surrendered and filed
at the Clerk of Court’s office as required by law, and in the regular course of
official duty.  Certainly, the notary
could not have reported in 1954 what did not happen until 1958.

In view of the evidence, we do not feel justified in concluding
that the trial court erred in accepting the concordant testimony of the
instrumental witnesses as warranting the probate of the will in question,
taking into account the unexcelled opportunity of the court a quo
to observe the demeanor, and judge the credibility, of the witnesses
thereby.  Furthermore, it would not be
the first time in this juris­diction that a will has been admitted to probate
even if one instrumental witness testified contrary to the other two, provided
the court is sat­isfied, as in this case, that the will was executed and
attested in the manner provided by law (Fernandez vs. Tantoco,
49 Phil. 380; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs. Baron,
69 Phil. 639; Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil. 635).  There is greater reason to admit the will to
probate where only the testimony of one witness is subjected to serious, if
unsuccessful, attack.

Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground
that the execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted
by proponent on the testatrix, and affirm that it was error for the lower court
to have rejected their claim.  Said the
court in this regard (Record on Appeal, page 87):

“It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact
that a Will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the
same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have
numerous instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the
institution of heirs.  But in the case at
bar, Andres Pascual, although not re­lated by blood
to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the
latter for she considered him as her own son. 
As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and
cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held
him with affection so much so that Catalina’s sister, Florentina
Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her Will without any
objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.”

Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is
worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as
laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court: 
that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of
a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso
vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 596; Icasiano
vs. Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the
contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure can
not be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion , as it is not enough that
there was op­portunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it
may have been exercised (Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence
that it was actually exercised (Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, ante; Teotico
vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is on the person
challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution (Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that
mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante);
nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the
testator (Barretto vs. Reyes, L-5830-31, 31 January
1956), or omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence
(Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil.
163; Pecson vs. Coronel, 45
Phil. 416).

Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to establish
actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the
proponent.  Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in
the course of his testimony, that the deceased “did not like to sign
anything unless I knew it” (t.s.n., page 7, 27
January 1962), which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired.  On the contrary, the
evidence of con­testants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in
Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name
“Catalina de la Cruz” to be painted thereon in bold letters to
mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent’s influence was
not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix.  Because if the mind of the latter were really
subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had
no need to recourse to the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix, who
asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such
undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it
difficult for her to look for all the witnesses.  That she did not resort to relatives or
friends is, likewise, explainable:  it
would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in
her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to
unpleasant importunity and recriminations that an aged person would naturally
seek to avoid.  The natural desire to
keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to
probate the testament during her lifetime.

We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding
that ap­pellants’ evidence established at most grounds for suspicion but fell
far short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or
influence.  Considering that the
testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed
no objection to his being made the sole heir of her sister, Florentina
Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her
instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.  As stated by the Court in the Knutson case –

“The truth of the matter is that bequests and devises to those
in whom the testator has confidence and who have won his affection are more
likely to be free from undue influence than bequests or devises to
others.” (In re Knutson’s Will, 41 Pac. 2d 793).

Appellants invoke a presumption of undue influence held to exist
by American authorities where the beneficiary participates in the drafting or
execution of the will favoring him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although
a nephew of the proponent, we do not think the presumption applies; for in the
normal course of events, said attorney would follow the instructions of the
testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of
unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a testament, except
upon clear proof.

The charge of fraud, being premised on the existence of undue
influence, needs no separate discussion.

WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against contestants-appellants.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Although not related by blood, petitioner claims he was taken into, and grew up
with, the family of the deceased.

^[2] Junquera vs. Borromeo,
L-18498, 30 March 1967, 19 SCRA 656.

^[3]
Article 805, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[4]
95 C.J.S. 326-327;Yowell vs. Hunter, 85 NE 2d 674; In re Reid’s Estate, 138 So. 2d
342.