CHIEF PROSECUTOR ZENON L. DE GUIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO, JR., RESPONDENT.

In a letter-complaint, dated 4 October 1993, filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator, Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia
impugns as arbitrary the act of respondent Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero^[1]
in citing for contempt Macario A. Agosila,^[2] and
ordering his arrest and detention for five (5) hours (later reduced to two (2)
hours) in the Calamba Police Station Jail. Complainant charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law,
and with acts constituting a direct affront to the dignity not only of Agosila,
but more importantly, to the dignity of the office of the Prosecutor which
Agosila represents.

The incident subject of the present complaint occurred during the
trial of Criminal Case No. 2689-­90-C^[3] in
the sala of respondent Judge. The
prosecution was trying to prove that the accused mortgaged to the complaining
witness a falsified and forged document – Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-164 – covering a non-existent property. Three (3) of the documents presented and marked by the prosecution
during the pre-trial were the affidavit of complaining witness Fe Ochoa-Baybay
(Exhibit “A”), TCT No. 164 (Exhibit ” C “), and TCT No.
RT-164 (2766) (Exhibit “E”).

At the trial scheduled on 20 September 1993, Agosila presented
TCT No. RT-164 (2766) and had it re-marked as Exhibit “A”. He then requested for a suspension of the
trial in order to have the original of TCT No. RT-164 (2766) photocopied. Instead of acting on Agosila’s request,
respondent Judge declared him in direct contempt of court allegedly in order to
“teach him (Agosila) a lesson” for unduly delaying the business of
the court on account of his failure to prepare ahead of time the photocopies of
the original of the documents to be presented and marked during the trial; and
for his failure to investigate the pertinent records in the office of the
Register of Deeds to ascertain his facts.

Respondent Judge thereupon ordered the arrest and detention of
Agosila for five (5) hours in the Calamba Police Station Jail. After being detained for two (2) hours,
however, respondent Judge ordered the release of Agosila.

In his Comment on the present complaint, respondent Judge
maintains that he committed no arbitrariness in declaring Agosila in direct
contempt, and in ordering the latter’s arrest and detention for five (5) hours,
later reduced to two (2) hours. Respondent Judge argues that the acts of Agosila merited a direct
contempt citation. And to substantiate
this conclusion, respondent Judge posits the following premises: Agosila’s request for a suspension of trial
in order to complete the photocopying of his documentary exhibits betrayed his
effort to delay the trial which could have proceeded continuously had Agosila
just been mere assiduous and prudent in his preparation for trial. Moreover, Agosila’s mismarking of
duplicitous and immaterial documentary exhibits supposedly demons­trated his
uncooperativeness with the continuous trial of the case. Furthermore, Agosila’s undue attention to
and reliance on what the court deemed as irrelevant documentary evidence – TCT
No. RT-164 (2766) – only proved that Agosila intended to confuse his evidence.

Finally, respondent Judge cites other instances of delaying
tactics in various criminal cases handled by Agosila wherein the latter
allegedly sought the resetting of hearings only because he was unprepared to
conduct the examination of witnesses, notwithstanding the constant warnings
from respondent Judge to Agosila and other lawyers for them to abide by the
continuous trial system. Respondent
Judge prays that the complaint against him be dismissed.

We find merit in the letter-complaint.

Apparently, what triggered the direct contempt citation of
Agosila was the evident impression of respondent Judge that Agosila was
unwilling to cooperate with the court’s continuous trial system, as allegedly
shown by a lack of preparation in the presentation of documentary exhibits,
thereby necessitating a request for a suspension of trial to complete the
photocopying of said documentary evidence. Respondent Judge, therefore, interpreted Agosila’s request for
suspension of trial as not merely constituting a delaying tactic but, worse, as
a subterfuge to cover for his unpreparedness (if not incompetence) in
prosecuting Criminal Case No. 2689-90-C.

In effect, respondent Judge defends his questioned acts as
nothing more than a legitimate and rightful exercise by a court of its contempt
powers in the face of what it perceives as not only an unjustified refusal by
an officer of the court to cooperate, but also his unpardonable display of
incompetence.

We are not persuaded by the ratiocinations of respondent Judge as
to the correctness of his action. On
the contrary, we question entirely the logic behind respondent Judge’s
immediate resort to a direct contempt citation in Agosila’s case.

First, we find a lack of impropriety in the conduct of Agosila to
merit a direct contempt citation in his prosecution of Criminal Case No.
2689-90-C. The right to ask the court
for adjournment or postponement, and much less, a mere continuance or
suspension of trial, is well within the prerogative of a counsel handling a
case. After all, the request is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In People vs. The
Honorable Bonifacio Sanz-Maceda, et al,^[4] this Court stated:

“Although the matter of adjournment and postponement of trials
is within the sound discretion of the court, such discretion should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should
be served thereby. After all,
postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of
dispensing justice.”

We further fail to see any contumacious attitude on the part of
Agosila to delay the proceedings of the court. On the contrary, Agosila accorded the court proper respect when he
requested for a suspension of the trial precisely to allow the court to decide
on its own whether to permit the delay in the trial by allowing said
request. Far from being a contemner,
Agosila dutifully submitted his request for suspension of trial to the
authority and discretion of the court.

Second, and more importantly, we seriously doubt the propriety of
respondent Judge’s choice of remedy in disposing of Agosila’s request for
suspension of trial. Although
concededly within its inherent powers, the exercise of the court’s power to
cite for contempt was not appropriately done under the given circumstances.

In treating of a court’s power to cite for contempt, the Rules of
Court, more specifically Section I, Rule 71 provides:

“Section I. Direct contempt punished summarily. –
A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, may
be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by fine not exceeding ten
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior
court.”

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the power to
declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an
inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect
and preserve the dignity, of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings
therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.

And as in all other powers of the court, the contempt power,
however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. In Noe Baja vs. Hon. Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandong, et al.,^[5] this Court explained the extent of the exercise of the contempt power
of courts:

“We have consistently held that the power to punish for
contempt should be used sparingly, so
much so that only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey
should the said power be exercised.

x x x                                                             x x x                                                                   x
x x

“More importantly, the power to punish for contempt
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle;
with the corrective rather than the retaliatory idea of punishment.

x x x                                                             x x x                                                                   x
x x

“It is propitious to remind our judges that they should not be
so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel personally hurt or affronted everytime
a complaining lawyer momentarily loses his ‘cool’ and writes in or utters less
than polite language, more so
when the lawyer is merely expressing an honest opinion about them which may not
altogether be flattering. ‘After all,
what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the
dictates of his conscience and the light
that God has given him. A judge
should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or
pettiness in the performance of his duties’.”

Clearly then, judges are
enjoined to exercise utmost restraint in the use of their contempt powers. They are expected to avail of the contempt
power only as a last resort when all other alternative courses of action are
exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect to the court and its processes. Thus, when a less harsh remedy presents
itself to the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt power,
and instead opt for the less harsh remedy.

In light of the
foregoing propositions, and after carefully examining the circumstances in this
case, it is quite clear that respondent Judge had an alternative to the
exercise of the court’s contempt power. We agree with the observations of the OCA in its recommendation, to wit:

“From the facts on record,
it is very evident that respondent acted rather arbitrarily in ordering the confinement of Fiscal
Agosila in jail for the latter’s unpreparedness and for unduly delaying the
trial and wasting the time of the court. The undersigned cannot entirely disagree with Chief State Prosecutor de
Guia’s assertion that the grounds relied upon by respondent in holding Fiscal
Agosila liable for direct contempt of court cannot in any way be considered as
constitutive of direct contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. If respondent really believes that the
purpose of Prosecutor Agosila in requesting for a continuance of the trial is
merely to delay the proceedings, the former could have easily denied the
request instead of ordering personally the arrest and confinement of the latter
in jail along with hardened criminals. Assuming, without admitting, that Prosecutor Agosila was indeed unprepared
on the day of the hearing, respondent should have taken into consideration the
fact that the former is also an officer of the court who does not have to be
treated the way he was treated and should have been accorded the appropriate
respect from the judge.”

WHEREFORE, for improperly citing Agosila for direct
contempt and ordering his detention without sufficient legal basis, a fine in
the amount of P2,500.00 is hereby IMPOSED upon respondent Judge Francisco Ma.
Guerrero, Jr. with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the records of
respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34 of Calamba, Laguna.

^[2]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna.

^[3]
Entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Amorino Sanchez and Tita Sales for Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents.

^[4]
G.R. Nos. 89591-96, 13 August 1990, 188 SCRA 530.

^[5]
No. L-60007, 29 February 1988, 158 SCRA 391.