Adm. Case No. 175-J. June 10, 1971
MODESTO KALALANG, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaints filed by the Mayor of Bacolod City, Hon. Romeo G. Guanzon
(Case No. 176-J) and one Modesto Kalalang (Case No.
175-J) against the Hon. Jose F. Fernandez, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, Branch V, the first, for
alleged inefficiency, incompetency, physical
incapacity, impunctuality, intemperance, abuse of
authority, gross partiality, ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and
maladministration of justice and the second, for alleged oppression.
The said charges and the
respective answers thereto of respondent are adequately summarized in the report,
dated May 7, 1971,
of the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, Justice of the Court of Appeals, who was
designated by this Court to conduct the necessary investigation as follows:
“Re: Adm.
Case No. 175-J, for OPPRESSION
“Modesto Kalalang alleges in his
complaint that on May 7, 1970, at about 8:30 A.M., he was ordered arrested by
the respondent Judge for having taken his picture while he was entering his sala; that he was detained at respondent’s chamber for some
30 minutes after which he begged of respondent to allow him to go to the
comfort room; that emerging from the comfort room, he went out to confer with
his lawyer but when he returned, respondent’s sala was
already closed; that four days later he was subpoenaed to appear and explain
why he should not be punished for contempt; that when he appeared he was
admonished and reprimanded.
“In answer, respondent admits the allegations of the complaint
as substantially correct except the averment on detention, alleging that
petitioner was called to the chamber to explain his actuation and was advised
to telephone the mayor who ordered him to take his pictures and to call his
counsel to assist him in giving his
explanation in open court, and that he
was reprimanded after pleading guilty and begging for forgiveness.
“Re: Adm.
Case No. 176-J, for INEFFICIENCY, INCOMPETENCY, PHYSICAL INCAPACITY, IMPUNCTUALITY,
INTEMPERANCE, ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, GROSS PARTIALITY, IGNORANCE OF THE LAW,
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND MALADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
“Romeo G. Guanzon, Mayor of Bacolod City, charges respondent Judge under three
specifications: (1) physical incapacity
to discharge the functions of his office; (2) partiality and intemperance in
Civil Case No. 9059; and (3) abuse of
authority, partiality, ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and
maladministration of justice in connection with Civil Case No. 6689.
“Under Specification No. 1, petitioner alleges that the
respondent judge starts morning session
late and ends it early; that he seldom hold
sessions in the afternoon; that he renders less than five hours of duty a day;
and that he is physically unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge.
“Under Specification No. 2, petitioner alleges that during
the hearing of Civil Case No. 9059, the respondent Judge failed to protect
Atty. Jules Rabago from scurrilous and insulting
language of a Chinese witness; and that he even held said attorney in contempt
of court.
“Under Specification No. 3, petitioner alleges that the
respondent Judge heard a petition for preliminary attachment before the amended
complaint could be served upon the defendants in Civil Case No. 6689; that he
ordered the garnishment of the property of a third-party; that he issued an order different from
what he verbally assured defendant’s counsel; that he issued an order of execution
pending appeal which might be stayed upon the filing of a P50,000.00 supersedeas
bond, knowing fully that provincial branches
of surety companies for such sum needed prior approval of the Manila offices;
that he personally instructed the office of the clerk of court to expedite
issuance of the writ of execution;
that he ordered the manager of
a surety company to execute a certificate
of solvency to be attached to the bond; that he issued a supplemental order
without resolving defendant’s motion for reconsideration; and that he allows
his employees to offer for sale his personal effects.
“In answer to
Specification No. 1, respondent Judge denies the imputation of late
start and early termination of morning sessions, admitting but attributing to some lawyers some
instances though; admits few sessions in the afternoon due to reluctance of some
lawyers to attend; admits some instances of daily service of less than five hours when physically
indisposed but ready at a nearby residence for any and all exigencies; and
admits physical weakness but asserts mental alertness. Respondent alleges that the affidavits
attached to the complaint for support are unreliable, because the affiant Romeo
Gonzaga is a relative of complainant Romeo Guanzon and the first was the counsel of the latter in
eight cases which were dismissed for lack of evidence, and that affiant Jules Rabago is a poor loser and apparently sick mentally.
“In answer to Specification No. 2, respondent alleges that Atty. Rabago was found guilty of contempt in Civil Case No. 9059
which he served for six hours,
while the mandamus petition arising from Civil Case No. 9064 was dismissed
by this Honorable Court and it would be a waste of time to discuss a closed
case.
“In answer to Specification No. 3, respondent refrains from
discussing the subject thereof because the same is on appeal in the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. No. 36005-R, and
therefore is sub judice, but he
observes the appalling ignorance of the lawyer therein. He denies the imputation that he ever offered
for sale his personal effects to litigants.
He adds an alleged incident with complainant City Mayor of Bacolod City, insinuating that these cases are the
offshoots of his refusal to yield to pressure in several cases the Mayor was
interested in.”
In the same report, Justice Enriquez analyzed the evidence
presented by the complainants to substantiate said charges thus:
“Re: Adm.
Case No. 175-J.
“Only petitioner Modesto Kalalang
testified in support of his complaint.
He merely reiterated the recitals of his complaint and his affidavit
annexed thereto.
“Re: Adm.
Case No. 176-J.
“In support of the complaint of Mayor Romeo G. Guanzon, he presented Messrs. Romeo G. Gonzaga,
Jules Rabago, Felipe Lacson,
Luz Datu Lacson
in addition to his testimony.
“Affirming the recitals of his affidavit, Atty. Romeo Gonzaga declared that respondent required the presence of
lawyers as early as 8:30 only to arrive late and then terminated the morning
sessions as early as 11:00 A.M.; that his interpreter often asked attorneys to
postpone their hearings because the respondent Judge was not feeling well;
that at times the respondent Judge was attacked by paroxysms of coughing
thereby forcing him to suspend the session for some time; that he had the habit
of making it appear in his orders that the trial had to be postponed for lack
of material time although such was not the real reason; and that at times
after this witness was through with his hearings in other salas,
he noticed that respondent Judge had not started his hearings.
“Atty. Jules Rabago likewise affirmed
the recitals in his affidavit declaring that he received insulting answers from
a Chinese witness in Civil Case No. 9059; that instead of protection, he got
from the respondent Judge an order to be jailed by the bailiff; that when he
inquired why, respondent closeted himself in his chamber; that he saw the
respondent Judge the next day who suggested that the penalty for contempt
would be set aside, if he should apologize; that he turned down the suggestion
believing he did nothing wrong; that the respondent subsequently disregarded
his order; and that the respondent is sickly and comes to court late and leaves
early.
“Atty. Luz Lacson, likewise affirming
the recitals of her affidavit, declared that respondent Judge heard the
petition for preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 6689 before the amended
complaint could be served upon defendants; that he caused to be garnished
properties of third persons; that the interpreter advised her to settle the
case amicably because they would surely lose the same; that the same interpreter
then offered to sell the car and air-conditioner of respondent for P23,800.00
which she and her husband refused to
buy; that they lost the case thereafter as forewarned; that respondent issued an order for immediate execution, although he had previously assured
her co-counsel that the motion for execution would be denied; that at the hearing thereon, respondent was even arguing in favor of the
motion for execution pending appeal; that she filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order for immediate execution, but the respondent Judge
rendered it moot with the issuance of a supplemental order allowing the
defendants to file a supersedeas bond; that contrary
to usual practice, respondent caused prompt personal service of the decision
and orders. Mr. Felipe Lacson was not presented as a witness, since he would
merely corroborate his wife’s testimony.
“Complainant City
Mayor of Bacolod
declared that respondent’s interpreter tried to intercede for his superior in
settling these administrative cases, but that he refused; and that in
presenting this case, he was motivated by a desire to have judicial cases
speedily disposed of.
“The respondent Judge submitted the cases without testimonial
evidence. He however submitted a written
memorandum with documentary evidence annexed thereto.”
It is to be noted that respondent did not
present any oral
evidence and submitted the case for resolution upon the submission of a
memorandum with annexes, consisting of certain certifications and copies of motions
and orders.
We have gone over the evidence thus submitted by the parties to Justice
Enriquez. We are satisfied that, on the whole, the observations and
conclusions made and arrived at by the investigator in his report are amply supported by the
evidence in the record. So also is the
investigator’s recommendation that respondent be
exonerated from all the charges against him in these cases.
As to the charge of oppression by complainant Kalalang,
We find that the respondent was not without reason to summon said complainant
and require him to explain why he was taking pictures of respondent, without
his consent. Even representatives of the
mass media are not entirely free to take photographs in the premises of the
court, without at least priorly advising the presiding
judge. Actually, respondent did not call
complainant to account necessarily because of the picture-taking. More accurately, what impelled the summons
for a contempt hearing was the
seeming ruse which was practiced by complainant of pretending he would go to
the comfort room only to disappear. It
appears that what respondent actually wanted was for complainant to call the
Mayor, who, incidentally, is the complainant in the other case, so that the
matter of the instructions allegedly given by said Mayor to complainant to
photograph the respondent may be threshed out in a formal hearing. In any event, with the apology given by
complainant to respondent on May 12,
1970, which, according to complainant satisfied respondent, the
matter was considered closed. After all,
from a reading of complainant’s own testimony, We find
that the alleged detention of the complainant in respondent’s chamber for about
thirty minutes is unfounded, for what actually happened was that respondent
merely gave instructions for the complainant to wait therein and not to leave
as other matters had to be attended to by respondent in the meanwhile. Of course, he also told his bailiff that
complainant should not leave without his (the respondent’s) permission. Indeed, We do not see how any administrative sanction can be imposed upon
respondent for such an incident, which the parties themselves considered closed
on May 12, 1970 and made the subject of a
complaint only on July 10, 1970, the same day Mayor Guanzon
filed his own complaint, which parenthetically, appears to have been prepared
since April 17, 1970 and sworn to on May 26, 1970 yet.
With respect to the charges of Mayor Guanzon,
other than the one about the alleged physical and mental incapacity of
respondent to perform the duties of his position, which will be taken up lastly
in this opinion, We approve the findings and
conclusions of Justice Enriquez on the matter, which are contained in his
report as follows:
“2. The
incident leading to the issuance of contempt order against Atty. Jules Rabago has its pros and cons. The quoted portions of the transcript of the
proceedings show some insulting answers from a Chinese witness which
admittedly so incensed Atty. Rabago that he approached the witness with an accusing finger
warning that something untoward would have happened had the incident occurred
outside the courtroom. The respondent
Judge failed to admonish the
witness, striking his gavel when Atty. Rabago
reacted sharply thereto. If respondent
Judge, who is a Tagalog, understood the insulting
remarks spoken in the Hinigayon dialect, his
intervention against Atty. Rabago would be ill-timed
and biased, not justified under Rule 132, Section 19, of the Rules of Court,
calling for the protection of a witness under certain circumstances. It appears though that the reaction of Atty. Rabago upon the answer of the witness as well as of respondent
Judge against Atty. Rabago who was approaching the
witness with an accusing finger followed each other in split seconds before the
insulting remarks of the witness could be translated to English.
“The issuance of the contempt order against Atty. Rabago might not have been motivated by downright malice or
ill will. He admittedly spoke loud
because of his hoarse voice in his desire to be heard. The respondent Judge evidently construed the
high pitch as disrespectful and contemptuous, but that was not all. The order was likewise premised upon his having
allegedly left the trial without the court’s permission before the trial could
be adjourned. On the other hand, the
whole thing appears not so serious as pictured,
because Atty. Rabago did not actually go to jail.
“If there is anything condemnable in the incident, it was
when the respondent Judge shouted at the bailiff to jail Atty. Rabago. He thus
exhibited unrestrained emotion which might be attributed to an uncontrollable
temper characteristic of some nervous ailment. The record of the proceeding does not
reflect how loud or contemptuously Atty. Rabago
spoke. While the substance of his statement
which incensed the respondent Judge to order his incarceration,
seems to bear the humility of a pleader, it could have been said in a manner
characteristic of a lawyer who was just insulted by a witness, if not resentful
for alleged lost cases decided by the respondent Judge. That the respondent Judge left the courtroom
for his chamber aided by his bailiff shows how strongly he was disturbed by
the incident. If this does not show the
impotency of his anger, it manifests to some extent an attempt to check it,
however late it might be.
“3. Except for some personal interest imputed to
the respondent Judge in favor of a Chinese national in Civil Case No. 6689,
which should have been at least personally denied by him were it not the
truth, the facts complained of by Atty. Luz Datu Lacson refer to utterances or representations made by
respondent’s bailiff, interpreter and deputy clerk and the adverse order for
immediate execution despite the assurance given Atty. Lalisan
by respondent Judge. The charges being
penal in nature, the undersigned is not inclined to draw adverse inferences
from the imputations. At least, the res inter alios acta rule would be a deterrent against taking
such actuation of the employees as reflecting
adversely against respondent. It
is true that Judges must like Ceasar’s wife be beyond
suspicion, so to speak, but such
suspicion must be engendered by the Judge’s own acts, not by the words
of others. Complainant should have brought the matter up to the
Judge for confirmation and only thru his reaction may he be judged.
“A neutralizing factor is the unrebutted
insinuation and allegation that complaining witnesses and attorneys are
relatives of losers in cases decided adversely by respondent Judge. No reason has been offered for taking such
serious accusation in silence. It has
not been met even with a denial in petitioner’s memorandum which was
filed in reply to that of respondent.
“With respect to the procedural complaints made against the
respondent in connection with Civil Case No. 6689, suffice it to mention that
no prejudice was alleged to have been suffered from his hearing the petition
for preliminary attachment before the amended complaint could be served upon
the defendants, which prior service was not shown to be extremely necessary;
that the garnishment or attachment of properties of third persons was not the
fault of the attaching or garnishing sheriff and that the remedy under Rule
57, Section 14, of the Rules of Court, was available to such third persons;
that the offer to sell respondent’s car and air-conditioner made by third-parties
who were not shown to have been commissioned by respondent to sell them
particularly to litigants. With the
appealed judgment not actually executed, because Atty. Lacson
filed a supersedeas bond, we see nothing therein for
which the respondent may be dismissed.
“The acts imputed to the respondent Judge could hardly
constitute the grounds alleged for respondent’s dismissal. They are not of such magnitude and gravity
as would establish any of the statutory grounds for dismissal of a Judge of
First Instance – serious misconduct and inefficiency as construed in the cases
of In re Impeachment of Horilleno (43 Phil. 212), Lacson vs. Roque et al. (92 Phil.
456), Ochate et al. vs. Deling
et al. (105 Phil. 389). His reversed
judgments are attributable to errors of judgment rather than wrongful intention. Determination of cases on the merits without
the record of said cases is risky. The mere reversal of decisions by
appellate courts is insufficient
and unjust basis for a conclusion of ignorance of the law of the trial judge,
especially when those affirmed are not considered. No Judge would feel safe if reversal of his
judgment would constitute sure index of his ignorance of the law.”
Coming now to the alleged physical and mental incapacity of
respondent, it must be emphasized that, although the respondent did not
testify before Justice Enriquez, the record suggests that he was present in some parts of the
investigation and the investigator actually had the opportunity to observe his physical condition. Nevertheless, to have further assurance of
the exact physical and mental
condition of the respondent, the Court agreed that the writer of this opinion
personally see the respondent
in Bacolod City,
as, anyway, he was going there for other
purposes.
All relevant things considered, the Court feels that, considering
that respondent has intimated to this writer his determination to retire as
soon as these cases are decided
by this Court and inasmuch as
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Acts 2614 and
5095, on the retirement of members of the judiciary, it is the Secretary of Justice who is
called upon to certify to the permanent physical disability of a judge of the
Court of First Instance, for purposes of immediate retirement with the benefits provided therein,
there is no imperative necessity for this Court to make any express and
specific ruling on the alleged physical
and mental incapacity of respondent.
Undoubtedly, and this is admitted expressly in his own memorandum
in his defense, respondent is suffering from a physical ailment that impairs
his mobility to such an extent that he cannot walk alone. It cannot also be denied that his disease,
which is basically of the nerves, has to a great extent affected his mental
disposition and temperament and even his power of speech. There is no question that further effort on
his part to discharge the heavy burdens and responsibilities of a judicial
magistrate will only aggravate his condition and correspondingly reduce his
remaining capacity for the work required of his position. While it is not proper on the one hand, that
a judge, as a public servant who has been rendering public service continuously
for almost three decades and a half without any serious derogatory record,
should be just unceremoniously cast aside simply because he has outlived his
usefulness, on the other, it is but fair to the public interest that the smooth
and efficient administration of justice should not in any degree be knowingly
allowed to be impaired by the physical ailment and consequent handicaps of an
incumbent magistrate. Public policy
demands that the outcome of judicial proceedings should reflect maximum
efficiency and, as much as possible, excellence of performance on the part of
those who man the courts. Naturally,
these cannot be expected from one who suffers an incurable malady so obviously affecting
the functioning of the nerves as to impair his powers of locomotion and speech
and to cause frequent paroxysms of coughing and what is worse, shortness of
temper. The propensity of a judge to
lose patience without much provocation does not lend to the equanimity and
judiciousness that should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice.
What is obviously happening to the
respondent is that after such a long service to the government, one-half
thereof in the judiciary, and being only fifty-eight years old, he feels that
he should be allowed to render more service to the people, even as he knows the
handicaps that afflict him. To be sure, such an attitude should be
appreciated rather than condemned. Nothing
in the record suggests that respondent is
insisting to continue on the job for any improper motive or
purpose. It is simply that he honestly believes he is still equal to the task assigned to him. We can see,
however, that he is, to put it mildly, already very tired. It is evident that over thirty-four years of
continuous work has told heavily on his health.
As We see it, only a long deserved rest can
save him, and the earlier he gets it, the better. Respondent should realize that by taking
early advantage of the opportunity to rest and to still regain part of his
former self, he will at the same time be rendering a valuable contribution to
the administration of justice to which he has been devoted for so long and
which he must be most interested to promote because then his court will again
be able to function as well as it should under someone better physically fit
for the tremendous and arduous job therein.
In other words, without necessarily finding and holding that
respondent is already permanently disabled to perform the duties of a judge, it
is Our considered opinion that in his present physical and mental condition,
the respondent may well be entitled to his just rewards for his long and
unblemished service to the government and that he would promote in a big way
the best interests of the administration of justice, if he sought the benefits
of retirement with the proper administrative authorities soonest.
IN VIEW OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS, these two
administrative complaints are hereby dismissed.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, J., on leave.