IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF JIMMY LEE TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE, PHILIPPINES. JIMMY LEE, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPEL…

On November 17, 1956, Jimmy Lee, a Chinese national, filed a
petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
(Special Proceedings No. 54), attaching thereto a copy of his
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen, the original of
which was sent, by registered mail, to the Office of the Solicitor
General on October 23, 1953; a copy of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1219 authorizing him to
change his name from Yip Hap to Jimmy Lee, and the affidavit of his
character witnesses.

The Solicitor General, through the City Fiscal of Iloilo, filed an
opposition on the general ground that petitioner did not possess all
the qualifications requisite for naturalization.

On August 15, 1958, after trial, the Court rendered judgment
admitting petitioner to Philippine citizenship upon fulfillment of all
the conditions and requisites provided for by law. The same became
final and executory for the reason that the Office of the Solicitor
General filed the required record on appeal beyond the reglementary
period.

Upon a re-examination of the record of the case in his office, the
Solicitor General discovered that, although petitioner’s declaration of
intention appeared to have been sworn to by him and sent to said Office
by registered mail on October 23, 1953, the required filing fee of
P10.00 was paid only on May 23, 1956 upon demand made on petitioner. In
view thereof, the Solicitor General, on October 29, 1958, filed a
motion to annul the proceedings in the case on the ground that the
one-year jurisdictional requirement provided for in Section 5 of the
Naturalization Law, as amended, had not been complied with, because
petitioner’s declaration of intention was validly filed only on May 23,
1956 when the aforesaid filing fee was remitted, barely 51/2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. The Court
denied the motion in its order of December 6, 1958. Hence, this appeal.

The point raised by the Solicitor General is well taken and should have been sustained by the lower court.

It is not disputed that petitioner’s case is one where, according to
law, a Declaration of Intention should have been filed with the Office
of the Solicitor General at least one year before the filing of the
petition for citizenship in court. On the other hand, Section 21 of the
Naturalization Law authorizes the Secretary of Justice to issue the
necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of said act, while it
similarly authorizes the Solicitor General to prepare and furnish the
necessary naturalization certificate blanks and other forms required to
carry out the provisions of the law, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice. One such regulation requires the pay- ment of a
filing fee of P10.00 upon the filing of the requisite Declaration of
Intention. In this connection, it is not denied that petitioner Lee
limited himself to sending his declaration of intention to the Office
of the Solicitor General by registered mail on May 23, 1956, without
paying the required filing fee. This obviously was not in compliance
with the law and the regulations validly promulgated for the
enforcement of its provisions.

We have held heretofore, in pari materia, that if half only of the
appellate court’s docket fee was deposited and the other half was
tendered after the expiration of the period of appeal, no appeal is
deemed perfected. (Lazaro vs. Endencia, 57, Phil. 552).
Stated otherwise, the ruling means that all steps taken by an appellant
for purposes of appeal, including the partial payment of the appellate
court’s docket fee, become of no legal value if the unpaid balance on
the latter is not paid before the expiration of the period of appeal.
In the light of this ruling, we must conclude that the filing of
petitioner’s declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no
legal effect until the required riling fee was paid on May 23, 1956,
that is, about 5½ months before petitioner filed his petition for
citizenship on November 17, 1956—obviously not in compliance with the
law on the matter.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. As a result, all
proceedings below leading to the rendition of the judgment granting
petitioner’s application for citizenship are declared null and void.
With costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.