THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMUALDO BATTUNG, JR. Y ASIS AND SEVERINO TAGUINOD Y DEPOLONIA ALIAS “ISLAO”, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

People versus Battung

The Case

This is a criminal case of murder. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Romualdo Battung, Junior and Severino Taguinod, alias Islao, for the killing of Segundino Danga, a policeman of Solana, Cagayan, who was shot dead on a ferryboat by three armed men. The trial court convicted both accused of murder and imposed the death penalty, and the case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review. The decision matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it shows how the Court weighs eyewitness identification against a sketch and against alibi, and it shows the correct treatment of an accused who escapes and files no brief while his co-accused's conviction is under review.

Procedural History

The two accused were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, the information alleging treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and evident premeditation. After trial, that court rendered judgment convicting both accused and sentencing each to death. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, not by ordinary appeal. Only Romualdo Battung, Junior filed a brief, through his counsel de oficio. Severino Taguinod had escaped from the provincial jail of Cagayan on July 12, 1974, and appeared to remain at large, so he filed no brief. The Court nevertheless included him in the review, following the procedure laid down in People versus Cornelio, although the word appellant in the decision refers only to Battung.

Facts

The killing grew out of a bitter political rivalry between former Congressmen Puzon and Ligot. The victim, Segundino Danga, had once been a follower of Congressman Benjamin Ligot but switched to the side of Congressman Puzon. In 1964 he was removed as a policeman by former mayor Cesar Caronan, a supporter of Ligot, and from then on Caronan had him hunted whenever he was in Solana. On the evening of September 11, 1965, Mayor Romulo de Asis, a confidante of Caronan, was fetched to Caronan's house, where he saw Battung, Taguinod, and Erning Ramirez drinking wine and heavily armed. Caronan secretly asked de Asis to help the trio liquidate Danga and Dumo Pagulayan; de Asis refused.

Earlier that evening Danga had arrived home, changed clothes, and gone to the ferryboat bound for Tuguegarao. Shortly after, a jeep carrying Caronan, Battung, and Taguinod arrived at his house. Battung and Caronan asked his wife where he was, and she said he had already left. Caronan was visibly angry. She noticed Battung holding a carbine and Taguinod also carrying a firearm. The group then proceeded toward the ferryboat. There, Battung, Taguinod, and Erning arrived and immediately shot the victim. Battung fired first with a carbine at short distance, Taguinod followed with a .45 caliber pistol, and Erning fired a third time with a .22 caliber long barrel. The three then escaped toward Solana. The shooting was seen by the ferryboat workers Victoriano Guizagan, Sergio Zalun, and Marcelino Gaya; the moon was bright and the ferryboat was well lighted. Danga died of the gunshot wounds.

For some time the eyewitnesses kept silent out of fear, because the killing had heavy political undertones. After martial law was declared, the Philippine Constabulary renewed efforts to solve the murder, and the witnesses gave free and voluntary statements pointing to the appellants. Battung's defense was alibi: that at the time of the shooting he was in barrio Bauan, about nine to ten kilometers away, attending a political meeting to promote the candidacy of Benjamin Ligot.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the eyewitnesses and in finding that the identities of the appellants as the gunmen were sufficiently and convincingly established.
• Whether or not the delay of the eyewitnesses in reporting the killing, and their allegedly precise recollection of details long after the event, destroy their credibility.
• Whether or not the appellant's alibi can overcome his positive identification by the eyewitnesses.
• Whether or not the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation, with the other circumstance serving as aggravating, and whether the death penalty was correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory text; it applies the rules on murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation, on alibi as a defense, and on the crediting of eyewitness testimony, as these were alleged in the information and proven at trial. No provision is therefore quoted verbatim, because none is quoted or set out in the decision text.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the eyewitnesses did see the shooting. The defense relied on a sketch of the ferryboat to show it was impossible for the witnesses to see the gunmen, but the same sketch, as the Solicitor General pointed out, showed the positions of Guizagan, Gaya, and Zalun from which each could easily see the victim being gunned down. The room where the witnesses were was only one and a half meters high, clearly not high enough to block their vision, and upon hearing the gunbursts they must have stood up and stretched their necks to look. The Court preferred the positive assertion of the witnesses over the defense's mere deductions, calculation, and speculation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the delay was satisfactorily explained. The witnesses feared for their lives because the appellants were then policemen, and as they testified, if these men want to kill, they can easily kill you. As for the precision of their testimony, the Court reasoned that a shocking occurrence such as the killing of a man in cold blood would etch its details deeply in the memory of anyone who saw it, and the witnesses knew they would someday be summoned to perform a civic duty. The Court also noted that the witnesses had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants in so grave an offense, and that Gaya, the only one clearly shown to have been mauled by the appellant a year before, testified that he harbored no ill feeling.

On the third issue, the Court held the alibi unavailing against positive identification. Even assuming Battung was in Bauan that night, Bauan was only about nine to ten kilometers from the center, and to go there, leave, and return would take only a couple of hours. The trial court, whose rating of credibility must be accorded weight and respect, also found the alibi doubtful because the supposed barrio captain who hosted the meeting was shown not to be the barrio captain at all.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the crime committed is murder, qualified by either treachery or evident premeditation as alleged in the information and proven by the evidence, with the other circumstance serving as aggravating, upon which the trial court based the death penalty. The appellant did not question the designation of the crime or the penalty imposed.

Doctrine

First, positive identification by eyewitnesses prevails over alibi and over mere deductions, calculation, and speculation drawn from a sketch or from distances. Second, delay in reporting a crime does not impair credibility when explained by a genuine fear for one's life, especially where the perpetrators were themselves policemen. Third, the detailed recollection of a shocking event long after its occurrence is natural, not unnatural, because such an event etches its details deeply in the memory of the witness. Fourth, where an accused escapes and files no brief while a co-accused's conviction is under automatic review, the Court may still include him in the review following the procedure in People versus Cornelio. Fifth, murder is qualified by treachery or evident premeditation, and the qualifying circumstance alleged and proven raises the offense to murder, with the other circumstance serving as aggravating.

Disposition

The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed from and affirmed it in its entirety as recommended by the Solicitor General, with costs de oficio, so the conviction of both accused for murder and the death penalty stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: positive identification by eyewitnesses who had no motive to lie prevails over alibi and over the defense's deductions, calculation, and speculation. Examiners use this case on the weight of eyewitness testimony, the sufficiency of explanations for delay in reporting, and the treatment of an escaped co-accused who files no brief on automatic review.