B. F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EMILIO ACEBEDO, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. in this appeal by certiorari, seeks the reversal of an award of
respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission in favor of respondent Emilio Acebedo for partial permanent disability.  The plea for the setting aside of the above
decision is sought to be justified by the alleged refusal of respondent
Commission to be bound by an opinion of its Evaluation Division to the effect
that inguinal hernia “after repair by surgery” does not call for the
imposition of such a liability.  It would
thus impute to respondent Commission a grave abuse of discretion.  Implicit in such a contention is the view
that respondent Commission must perforce yield unquestioning obedience to
whatever medical opinion may thus be arrived at, even if not brought to the
attention of the claimant, upon pain of its determination being stigmatized as
arbitrary and improvident.  That is not
and has never been the law.  That is to
disregard the standard consistently and uninterruptedly followed by us as to when a decision of respondent
Commission may justifiably be assailed as subject to the condemnation that the
broad discretion conferred on it had been gravely abused.  Petitioner is not entitled to the reversal of
the award sought.  We sustain respondent
Commission.

The decision of August 2,
1968 of respondent Commission, now sought to be reversed, sets forth the facts
thus:  “An examination of the
records of the case reveals that claimant Emilio Acebedo,
a calendar operator of the respondent B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., with an
average weekly wage (including overtime pay) of P115.90 filed with the Regional
Office No. 4, Manila (Sub-Regional Office, Quezon
City), a claim for compensation against the latter on May 9, 1967, for
disability for labor due to recurrent left inguinal hernia sustained while
actually in the performance of his duty; that because respondent in its
Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness submitted to the sub-regional office
on May 29, 1967 has not only indicated its intention not to controvert the
right of the claimant under Section 14 of the Act but also stated that it has
already paid the latter the sum of P715.26, although it made known its
intention of contesting any award of compensation under Section 17 of the same
Act, the Chief of Section issued on August 16, 1967 a letter-computation awarding
disability benefits in the total amount of P5,699.78 in favor of claimant
Emilio Acebedo; and that respondent in its letter
dated August 28, 1967 (which in effect may be considered a petition for review)
vigorously assailed said award on the ground that according to the opinion of
the Chief of Evaluation Division of the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation
inguinal hernia ‘after repair by surgery should not be considered as partial
permanent disability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.’”^[1]

As to the precise and specific issue of the partial permanent
disability, respondent Commission relied on its previous ruling in Opalalic v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.,^[2]
the facts of which, according to the decision now under review, are
similar.  Thus:  “‘Without the least minimizing the medical [significance] of the opinion rendered by the Evaluation
Division, we say that such an opinion may not be taken in consideration where,
the adverse party, the claimant in the case, was not given the opportunity to
object to its admission.  More so, where
on its admission depends primarily a decision of
reversal.  (Magalona vs. WCC and NASSCO, L-21849, December 11,
1967.)'”^[3] The
appealed decision added further: 
“‘Moreover, it does not appear in the case at bar that Opalalic’s inguinal hernia was ever repaired or corrected
by operation.  Neither does it appear
that such operation had proved successful to the point of having any future
recurrence thereof.  For this reason, we
find the much invoked medical opinion to have no application at all.’”^[4]

It is easy to understand, therefore, why the decision did go
against petitioner.  Nor can the
conclusion reached by respondent Commission be repudiated unless “on a
clear showing of failure to consider the evidence on record, or failure to consider
fundamental and patent logical relationships in the evidence, amounting to a
clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of discretion.”^[5]
What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating:  “The task of ascertaining the
credibility and weight of conflicting evidence, is,
however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari.”^[6]
Even if the possibility that the Commission’s conclusions were erroneous could
not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of Justice Dizon
in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
“such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve
any grave abuse of discretion on its part.”^[7]

Deference to the above doctrinal pronouncements calls for the affirmance of the award of respondent Commission.  Petitioner, however, would stress that the
cited decision, Magalona v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission,^[8]
to the effect that the adverse party should be given an opportunity to object
to an admissibility of the opinion of the Evaluation Division of respondent
Commission has been overruled by the later case of Vda.
de Layag v. Republic.^[9]
Petitioner is in error.  The doctrine
announced in the Magalona case, which is in
accordance with the fundamental requirement of due process insofar as the right
of a party to a fair hearing is concerned, is not rendered obsolete at all
unless the cardinal requirement of fairness in administrative proceedings so
explicitly stressed in Ang Tibay
v. Court^[10]
and reiterated time and time again,^[11]
is a thing of the past.  This Court, no
court for that matter, cannot sanction such a deviation from the norm that
justice dictates.

The opinion in the Vda.
de Layag decision is to be
searched in vain for any such implication which petitioner was able to discern
in it.  It speaks for itself.  Thus: 
“The issue posed by the parties is whether or not the cause of
death was service connected.  In
returning a negative conclusion the Commission found that aside from his duties
as chief-cook and the usual chores incidental thereto, such as marketing,
preparing and setting the table, and serving during meals, the deceased performed
no other work, let alone scrubbing the floor, cleaning and painting the boat,
as petitioner alleges; and that the record of his illness does not reveal any
causal relation with his job.”^[12]
Then it went on to state that insofar as the particular ailment from which the
employee died was concerned, the Commission took into account the research and
study made by its senior medical officer. 
The objection that such medical study was not competent evidence because
it was not formally offered and received with notice to the claimant was answered
in the opinion this way:  “The cause
of death here is not disputed:  thrombocytopanic purpose with cerebral hemorrhage and hypoplastic
anemia.  All that the Commission did was
to go into the clinical causes of the disease as revealed by the studies made
by its own medical officer.  This the
Commission could do to properly inform itself on the technical questions
involved, pursuant to one of its Rules (Sec. 9), which provides that ‘in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
the exercise of any duties or powers, the Hearing Officer or Commissioner shall
act according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms, and shall not be bound
by an technical rule of legal
evidence but may inform himself of their merit in such manner as to attain the objectives of the law.’”^[13]

What is immediately apparent is that in the Layag
decision the Commission was sustained; it was not overruled.  Moreover, why in this particular case the
non-compliance with the requirement of notice to the claimant did not have the
significance it would otherwise possess was solely due to the fact that what
was material in such medical study was not the effect of the ailment which
could be the basis for compensation but the “clinical causes”
thereof, about which there could be no controversy thus obviating the need for
notice to the claimant, otherwise essential. 
Viewed as it ought to be, then, it is readily apparent why the principle
in the Magalona case was not found controlling.  That is not the situation that this case
presents.

Moreover, petitioner would ignore this express finding of facts
set forth above.  Thus:  “‘Moreover, it does not appear in the
case at bar that [Acebedo’s] inguinal hernia was ever
repaired or corrected by operation. 
Neither does it appear that such operation had proved successful to the
point of having any future recurrence thereof. 
For this reason, we find the much invoked medical opinion to have no
application at all.'”^[14]
Petitioner did not even aver that respondent Commission was not justified in so
concluding.  Such an omission is fatal to
its plea independently of whether or not the Magalona
doctrine has been overruled.^[15]

It would be a departure,
therefore, unjustified and unwarranted, for this Court not to manifest the same
solicitude and concern for respondent Emilio Acebedo
when invariably it has, accorded the Workmen’s Compensation Act a liberal interpretation inescapable under the
constitutional mandates of social justice and protection to labor.^[16] Petitioner is not entitled to the reversal
of the award sought.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission of August 2, 1968 as well as its resolution of September
4, 1968 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the above decision, are
affirmed.  With costs
against petitioner B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., and Teehankee, JJ., in the result.

Makalintal, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Decision, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 19-20.

^[2]
WC Case No. RO4-1985, July 11, 1968.

^[3]
Decision Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 21.

^[4]
Ibid.

^[5]
Batangas Transportation Company v. Rivera,
L-14427, August 29, 1960.

^[6]
L-16438, November 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 530,
534.

^[7]
L-20614 and L-21517, May 25, 1964,
11 SCRA 60, 67.  Cf. NASSCO v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-22628, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 254; Rio
y Compania v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, L-21467, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1196, and Caltex
(Phil.) Inc. v. Castillo, L-24657, November 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 1071.

^[8]
L-21849, December 11, 1967, 21 SCRA
1199.

^[9]
L-23640, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 646.

^[10]
69 Phil. 635 (1940).

^[11]
The latest case is Sanchez v. Preserver Shoe Company, L-26932, March 28, 1969, citing 27 other
cases.

^[12]
Vda. de Layag
v. Republic, L-23640, May 22,
1968, 23 SCRA 646, 648.

^[13]
Ibid., p. 649.

^[14]
Decision, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 21.

^[15]
Cf. Victorias
Milling Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285, citing Batangas Transportation Company v. Rivera, L-14427, August 29, 1960, and Victorias
Milling Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-25640, March 21,
1968, 22 SCRA 1215.

^[16]
Cf. Francisco v. Consing,
63 Phil. 354 (1936); Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 (1938); Ramos v.
Poblete, 73 Phil, 241 (1941); Caro
v. Rilloraza, 102 Phil. 61 (1957); Liwanag v. Workmen’s Compensation Com., 105 Phil.
741 (1959); De Leon v. Abbas, L-15394, April
29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1268; Bautista v. Murillo, L-13374, Jan. 31, 1962, 4
SCRA 175; Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Com., L-17283, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 765; Agustin v. Workmen’s
Compensation Com., L-19957, Sept.
29, 1964, 12 SCRA 55; Industrial Textile Mfg. Co. v. Florzo,
L-21969, Aug. 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1104; Manila Pest
Control Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Com., L-27662, Oct. 29, 1968, 25
SCRA 700; Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Com., L-26341, Nov. 27, 1968, 26 SCRA 102; Victorias Milling Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Com., L-25665, May
22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285; Operators, Inc. v. Cacatian,
L-26173, Oct. 31, 1969, and La Mallorca v.
Workmen’s Compensation Com., L-29315, Nov.
28, 1969.