IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR SANTIAGO SEÑERES, DR. FERNANDO P. HOFILEÑA AND CORAZON DE GUIA-HOFILEÑA, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, …

Appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila in Special Proceedings No. G-00100 dismissing the petition
filed by the therein petitioners – hereinafter referred to as appellants – for
the adoption of the minor Santiago Señeres.

The following facts are not disputed:

Petitioners are husband and wife. 
The husband is a physician and a professor of Pediatrics and Mental
Hygiene at the University of Santo
Tomas; engaged in the practice of medicine since
1948 and he and his wife, have an annual income of around P18,000.00.  They own not only the house where they live
in Manila but also own resi­dential
and agricultural lands in Occidental Negros.  They are childless, but on September 6, 1962, they filed a
petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for the
adoption of the minors Lourdes and
Reynaldo Yusay, children of Dr. Eduardo G. Yusay and Eva Hofileña-Yusay.  On November
14, 1962 the above-named Court granted the petition in a decision
that has long become executory.

On March 23, 1966
appellants filed with the same Court a similar petition for the adoption of
another minor named Santiago Señeres born on May 11, 1961 to appellants’
housemaid, Veronica E. Señeres and a certain Felix Lisondra.  Since
birth said minor had been and has until now remained in the care of appellants
who had become so much attached to him that they finally decided to adopt him
in accordance with law, with the full consent of the minor’s mother.

After the required publication had been accomplished and notices
served in accordance with law to the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Chief, Office of Child Welfare, Social Welfare Administration, the case was set
for hearing and evidence was presented. 
Thereafter, the lower court rendered the appealed decision dismissing
the petition upon the ground that the provisions of Article 335, paragraph (1)
of the Civil Code prohibits the intended adoption because appellants had
already previously adopted the two minors mentioned heretofore.  In the present appeal, therefore, the sole
question to be resolved is whether or not a person who already has an adopted
child may still legally adopt another.

Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code upon which the
appealed decision is based reads as follows:

“ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1)  Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction;“.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that
a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated
otherwise the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning
may be the subject of statutory interpretation (2 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, 3rd Ed., Section 4502, p, 316).

Similarly well known is the rule that words and phrases used in
law which have acquired a precise legal meaning are to be understood in their
proper technical sense unless it plainly appears that they were not so used by
the Legislature (Black Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 182).

The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code in enumerating
the persons who “can not adopt” appear to be clear and unambiguous
and have a clearly defined meaning in law.

“Legitimate children” are those conceived during the
marriage and, in certain cases, those conceived before but born during the
marriage (4 Castan, 6th Ed., p. 6; Article 255, Civil
Code).

“Legitimated children” are those originally natural
children but later considered as legitimate by virtue of their recognition by
both parents and the latters‘ sub­sequent marriage (4
Castan supra; Article 271, Civil Code).

“Natural Children” are children “born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other” (Article 269, Civil
Code).  On the other hand,
“acknowledged natural children” are natural children duly
acknowledged or recognized by the father and mother jointly, or by only one of
them (Article 276, Civil Code).

Finally, “natural children by legal fiction” are
“children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the
beginning” (Article 289, Civil Code).

That “adopted children” do not fall within the meaning
of anyone of the above kinds of descendants seems to be clear.  As a matter of fact, the Office of the
Solicitor General, instead of filing a brief for the Republic of the Philippines
as appellee in this case, submitted for the record
the following:

“M A N I F E
S T A T I O N

COMES NOW oppositor-appellee, through the
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:

1.     
That on March
23, 1961, a petition for adoption was filed with the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court;

2.     
That on June
1, 1966, a decision was rendered by the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioners has
al­ready an adopted child and therefore can no longer legally adopt another;

3.     
That the Republic of the Philippines is the oppositor-appellee in this appeal in­terposed by Dr.
Fernando P. Hofileña and Co­razon de Guia-Hofileña from said decision of the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court;

4.     
That upon a careful study of the issues raised
and discussed in petitioners-appellants’ brief and taking into account on the
following commentaries, to wit:

‘May a person who has an adopted child still adopt another? This ar­ticle
does not prevent him from doing so’.  –
(Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines 1950 ed. Vol. 1, p. 305; Francisco,
Civil Code of the Philip­pines, Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p.
876).

‘A person with an adopted child may still adopt.’ – (Padilla, Civil Law, Civil Code Annotated 1961 ed. Vol. I,
p. 855).

‘The law says that if you have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction, you cannot
adopt.  By implication therefore those
who have adopted children may adopt.’ (Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines,
Annotated, 1965 ed. Vol. I, p. 612).

‘It should be noted that the fact that a person has illegitimate
children, who are not natural, or adopted children, does disqualify him further
from another child.’ (Tolentino Com­mentaries
& Jurisprudence on the Ci­vil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p.
639).

‘Under the doctrine, however, of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, the
illegitimate children, who are spu­rious, and adopted children not having been
mentioned in the enumeration, it is submitted that a person who has an illegitimate
spurious child or an adopt­ed child can still adopt.’ (Coquia, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1959 ed. Vol. 1,
p. 399).

We deem it unnecessary to submit oppositor appellee’s brief, and
on the basis of peti­tioners-appellants pleading, we are submit­ting this case
for decision.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
consider this case submitted without oppositor-appellee’s
brief.

Manila, Philippines,
March 14, 1967.”

It is clear from the foregoing manifestation that the Office of
the Solicitor General agrees with the views expressed by the distinguished
commentators cited therein to the effect that a person who has already an
adopted child may still adopt another.

Reasons for the law to the above effect may perhaps be found in
these considerations:  the persons who,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, can not
adopt are related by blood with the children whose existence prevents them from
adopting any other child; the provision took into account the need to save or
protect the successional or hereditary rights of
living children related to them by blood; upon the other hand, the
adoption of a minor child does not create or establish blood relationship
between him and the adopter; neither does the adopted child become the
legitimate or legitimated or natural child of the adopter, nor does he become a
natural child of the latter by legal fiction; adoption is, undoubtedly, a mere
act of generosity on the part of the adopter and should not prevent the
adopting parent or parents from carrying out another act of generosity by
adopting another child.  True, an adopted
child acquires successional rights by virtue of his
adoption but it is plain to see that such right is not based on the same consideration
– blood relationship – that sus­tains the successional
right of children in relation to their natural parents.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and
set aside and, as a result, judgment is rendered allow­ing appellants to adopt
the minor Santiago Señeres as prayed for in their
petition.  Without
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.