G.R. No. L-56174. May 15, 1981
TEODORO S. MAYUGA, PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO MAT. RIODIQUE, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CFI OF BATANGAS, LEMERY BRANCH, LEMERY, BATANGAS, AND GERMAN M. TENORIO, RESPONDENTS.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner Teodoro S. Mayuga, KBL candidate, was
proclaimed on January 31, 1980
as the duly elected mayor of San Nicolas, Batangas by
the Board of Canvassers with a majority of 30 votes following the elections of January 30, 1980.
On February 8, 1980, private respondent German M. Tenorio, the Nacionalista Party
candidate filed an election protest against petitioner, alleging that the
ballots in voting centers Nos. 4-A, 6-A, 8, 9, 9-A, 9-B, 10, 10-A, 13 and 14
were not correctly appreciated.
On March 4, 1980,
private respondent German M. Tenorio amended his
petition by adding voting centers Nos. 2, 2-A and 4-B.
On March 10, 1980,
petitioner Mayuga filed his answer with
counter-protest and interposed as affirmative defense, among others, that the
petition and amended petition were both filed out of time and hence
respondent’s cause of action has prescribed.
On April 29, 1980, petitioner objected to the revision of the
ballots from voting centers Nos. 2, 2-A and 4-B on the ground that the
amendment including ballots from the aforesaid three (3) voting centers, was
filed out of time.
On June 19, 1980,
respondent judge gave due course to the amended protest.
Petitioner then filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
to declare null and void the respondent Judge’s order dated June 19, 1980, insisting that the inclusion of the three (3)
additional voting centers in the amended petition was filed beyond the period fixed by law. In an order dated January 23, 1981, the Commission on Elections dismissed the
petiÂtion on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the
Courts of First Instance.
On February 6, 1981, upon motion of private respondent, the
respondent Judge issued an order setting the revision of ballots from voting
centers Nos. 2, 2-A and 4-B in San Nicolas, Batangas.
Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner claims that
substantial amendments to election protests must be filed within the period for
the filing of the original protest itself.
This position is correct under the cases decided prior to February
26, 1980.
However, by virtue of its
rule-making authority, the Commission on Elections promulgated on February
26, 1980, Resolution
No. 1451, Section 5, Rule II of which provides:
“Substantial and Formal Amendments. – After the case is set for hearing, no amendment to the allegations affecting the
merits of the controversy shall be allowed except by leave of Court and only
upon such ground as will serve public interest.
But such leave may be refused if it appears to the Court that the motion
to amend was made with intent to delay the action. Any amendment in matters of form may be
permitted at any stage of the proceedings” (see Section 185[b], PD No.
1296 or the Revised Election Code of 1978; Sections 2[2] and [8], Art. XII,
1973 Constitution).
Neither the validity of said Resolution
No. 1451 nor the authority of the Commission on Elections to promulgate the
same has been challenged.
Contrary to the pretension of petitioner, the original protest
was filed within the period prescribed by law.
It should be stressed that the amended petition was filed on
March 4, 1980 by virtue of the aforesaid COMELEC
Resolution No. 1451 promulgated on February 26, 1980, long before petitioner,
as protestee, filed on March 10, 1980 his answer to
the protest. In his answer, petitioner
specifically denied paragraph 5 of the amended petition referring to the
questioned voting centers Nos. 2, 2-A and 4-B.
Thus, the relevant portion of the challenged order of the
respondent Judge reads:
“x x x.
“As stated, the protestee filed his
answer to the amended motion of protest on March 10, 1980, specifically denying
paragraph 5 of the amended petition (referring to the allegation concerning
Voting Centers 2 and 2-A of Barangay Calangay and Voting Center No. 4-B in Barangay
Pansipit, San Nicolas, Batangas)
which were not alleged in the original motion of protest. Protestee in his
answer averred —
‘3.1 In Barangay Calangay, Voting Centers 2 and 2-A and in Barangay Pansipit, Voting Center
No. 4-B, there were no marked ballots appreciated by the election committee in
favor of the respondent.
‘3.2 Assuming arguendo
that some ballots contained the word ‘Meralya‘, the
same cannot be considered as identifying marks, but votes intended for ‘Marella‘, a candidate for the Provincial Board.’
“From the foregoing answer of the protestee,
he was not caught by surprise and placed to a disadvantage as to justify a
rejection of the amended motion of protest.
On the contrary, the action of the protestee,
by answering specifically the amendments in question paved the way for the
admission of the amended motion of protest.
As a matter of fact, the protestee has not yet
made an answer to the original motion of protest. No delay was intended by the protestant when
he filed his amended motion of protest.
The truth is he is much more interested in terminating this protest than
anybody else. This situation obtaining
in this case is only one among the different situations confronting the courts
today. This situation occurring in the
past elections, not having been provided for solution by law except by
jurisprudence, must have prompted the Commission on Elections to promulgate on
February 26, 1980, Resolution No. 1451 governing Rules on Election Contest.
“The law providing for a period within which an election
protest should be filed is Mandatory but the law providing for amendments to
the election protest is permissive.
Hence, because this case has not yet been set for hearing when the
amendment was made, the law allows the protestant to amend his motion of
protest even without leave of court.
This, to the mind of the Court is the liberal interpreÂtation of Section
5, Rule III of the Comelec Rules on Election Contest
(Resolution No. 1451, promulgated on February 26, 1980). A contrary interpretation will be repugnant
to the fundamental rule that election laws should be liberally construed.
“x x x“ (pp. 19-20, rec.).
It is clear, therefore, that COMELEC
Resolution No. 1451 of February 26,
1980 has modified the previous rulings on the matter of substantial
and formal amendments. Under the
resolution, as long as the case has not been set for hearing, substantial
amendments affecting the merits of the protest shall be allowed when public
interest could be sub-served thereby and when such amendments are not intended
to delay the action.
In the instant case, the substantial amendment, as heretofore
stated, was effected before any responsive pleading was filed by herein
petitioner, and consequently, the case had not yet been set for hearing on March 4, 1980, because petitioner filed
his answer only on March 10, 1980.
WHEREFORE, FOR LACK OF MERIT, THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee,
Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs
and agrees with Justice de Castro in Pimentel, but the majority ruled otherwise
and that decision is now the law.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
Abad Santos, J., no part.
De Castro, J., see separate
opinion.
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SEPARATE OPINION
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is not a dissent from how the present petition is disposed
of on the merits, for on the assumption that in making such disposition, this
Court is properly exercising jurisdiction, I would fully concur therein. I only wish to reiterate my dissenting
opinion in the case of MARIANO J. PIMENTEL, et al., versus COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, et al., promulgated 19
December 1980, under which I would hold that COMELEC
to which the present petition was originally filed has jurisdiction to
entertain said petition, and should not have dismissed it as it did. My dissenting opinion is quoted hereunder in
full as follows:
“While I am in agreement with the rejecÂtion of the argument
of private respondents in support of their view that COMELEC
has jurisÂdiction to entertain the petition filed by them because it would
trace the said jurisdicÂtion to the Rules of Court, not to a law or the
Constitution which alone can confer jurisdiction, I believe that when the law
conferred appellate jurisdiction on COMELEC (Section
196, Revised Election Code 1978) in election cases originally tried and decided
by the Court of First Instance, which jurisdiction used to pertain to the Court
of Appeals, the law, at least impliedly, transferred along with such appellate
jurisdiction the competence to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, etc. For
any appellate court, such as the COMELEC in election
contests appealed to it from the Court of First Instance, in order to
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, must have at least the
authority to issue such writs in the same manner that such is conferred upon
the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In transferring jurisdiction over appealed
election contests to the COMELEC, it can reasonably
be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, “in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction” conferred on the COMELEC. There is no reason perceivable why the
transfer is only partial, not total, for as stated in 11 Corpus Juris, p. 139, the jurisdiction to issue the writs may be
expressly or impliedly conferred by constiÂtutional or statutory
provision. From this legal approach, the
source of the power or jurisdiction of COMELEC over
petitions such as the petition in question, is the
law, the Revised Election Code of 1978, not the Rules of Court.
“To hold that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari etc. would be to
leave no other court to which recourse may be had than the Supreme Court. But from the provision of the Revised
Election Code of 1978 giving the appellate jurisdiction over election cases
decided originally by the Courts of First Instance to the COMELEC,
and the provision of the Constitution limiting the power of the Supreme Court
to exercising only certiorari jurisdiction over decisions, orders and
resolutions of the COMELEC, I am unable to say that the intention of the 1978
Election Code is to disperse or divide the authority over an election case
filed in the Court of First Instance by giving to the Supreme Court
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against orders of the Court of First Instance but giving to the COMELEC the jurisdiction over the ultimate appeal from the
decision of said court in the very same election case. It is more easy to say, with full legal
rationality, that the grant of appellate jurisdiction over election cases filed
in and decided by the Court of First Instance, carries with it the power to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus when
necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, as indeed, it cannot be denied
that, if it was such aid with the Court of Appeals, it must be so in the same
way with the COMELEC.”
As additional support for the view that COMELEC
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitions for certiorari, etc., in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
the following propositions are submitted:
(1) Section 196 of the
1978 Election Code having conferred on the COMELEC
the jurisdiction to review by appeal “any decision rendered by the Court
of First Instance” in specified election cases, I submit that the
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
issue writs of certiorari, etc., in aid of its appellate jurisdicÂtion,
must co-exist with and be a complement to its appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal the final orders and decisions of the Court of First Instance, in
order to have a complete supervision over the acts of the latter. For it would be highly preposterous to
deprive the COMELEC the power or jurisdiction to
review interlocutory orders of the Court of First Instance, which need
immediate relief thru a petition for certiorari, etc., as the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, but it has such power
or jurisdicÂtion when the question is brought to it by appeal, at a time when,
more often than not, damage has already been done, just because the law failed
to confer expressly said jurisdiction, although, as already adverted to, it can
be fairly inferred from the transfer to it by the Election Code of the jurisdiction
which used to pertain to the Court of Appeals.
(2) While it may be true
that the provisions of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 4, Rule 65,
under which petitions for certiorari, etc., “may also be filed with
the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdicÂtion”, if
standing alone, cannot confer jurisdiction, being neither a constitutional
provision nor a legislative enactment, it should be noted that the aforesaid
provision merely echoed by way of restatement of the provision of Section 30 of
the Judiciary Act, which grants to the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, etc., “in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.” Consequently, it may be permissible to say that the
aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court, being backed up by a substantive
law, is just as good as the law itself.
For, indeed, the provision of the Rules of Court alone and by itself,
cannot confer the jurisdiction referred to independently of the provisions of
the Judiciary Act which gives substantive vitality to the provision of Section
4 of Rule 65, not similarly given to other provisions of the Rules of Court
having no counterpart in law or the Constitution. Hence, reference to certain provisions of the
Rules of Court which are mere reproductions of existing statuÂtory or
constitutional provisions (such as the rights of an accused granted by the
constitution the pertinent provisions of which have been repeated in the Rules
of Court) may well be considered as reference to the law or the constitution
itself.