FRANCISCO PINEDA, ET ALS, PETITIONERS, VS. PASTOR DE GUZMAN, JUDGE, COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, AND BEATRIZ D. VDA. DE FELICIANO, RESPONDENTS.

On
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, presid­ed by the respondent Judge, Pastor de Guzman, and pri­vate
respondent Beatriz D. Vda. de Feliciano, to set aside the order issued
by the respondent Judge, dated October 7, 1964, ordering the execution of the
deci­sion rendered in the CAR Cases
Nos. 1187 and 1188, on the ground that the assailed order was issued without
and in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; that
respondent Judge be restrained from enforcing or implementing the aforesaid order; and that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued pending consideration of the instant petition.

On November 10, 1964,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, required the respondents
to answer the petition (not a motion to dismiss), and authorized the issuance
of a writ
of preliminary injunction, as prayed for, upon the pe­titioners’ filing a bond
in the sum of P1,000.00.  The required bond having been posted, the
injunctive writ was issued on November
17, 1964.

From the pleadings and annexes thereto filed by the parties, it
appears that on July 17, 1962,
Beatriz D. Vda. de Feliciano, herein private respond­ent,
filed two petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations docketed Nos. 1187
and 1188, against the herein petitioners, as respondents therein, alleging that
petitioner is the owner of several parcels of land which are tenanted by the
respondents; that said petitioner has duly notified the respondents and the
Agrarian court, within the time and in the manner prescribed by law, of her
intention to mechanize her landholdings; and, prayed that she be authorized to
mechanize her landholdings, and the respondents be ordered to vacate the lands.

The respondents traversed the allegations in the petitions,
specifically averring that petitioner has no sincere intention of mechanizing
her landhold­ings and had filed the cases merely to harass them; that the court
has acquired no jurisdiction over the cases for failure of petitioner to comply with the provision of Section 50, Republic Act 1199,
as amend­ed, regarding the giving of proper notices; and that it is more
economical to continue with the old system of farming, by the use of man-animal
labor.  They prayed that the petitions be
dismissed.

By agreement of the
parties the cases were tried jointly.

After a trial, on February
1, 1964, decision was rendered with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, the court decides this case in favor of the peti­tioner
by giving her authority to eject her tenants above-named from their respect­ive
landholdings also above-described, and to mechanize her said land­holdings.”

Admittedly, the decision
had become final and executory in March, 1964.

On September
3, 1964, the
petitioners, with due notice to the respondents, filed a motion for execution
on the ground that the decision had al­ready become final.

On September
26, 1964, the
respondents opposed the motion on the following grounds:

“(a) That the defendants have already planted their
respective landholdings with palay and some with
sugar cane and a part will be
harvested next month and December, 1964, and January, 1965, and the sugar cane
crops will be har­vested this coming November, 1964;

“(c) That one of the defend­ants (Rozalino
Dizon) sold his landholding before the decision of
these cases to defendant Juanito Ochoa with the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff;

“(d) That these cases were filed and tried during the time when
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263 was still enforced
and a portion of the proceedings including the rendition of the decision was
had after the passage of the Land Re­form Code, Republic Act No. 3844, thus section 168 of the Land Reform Code
allows the said complaint for mechanization and be tried and decided in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1199, as amended;

“(e) That the dispossessed defendants are not willing to be
resettled, and thus the execution of this decision should be held in abeyance
un­til the lapse of one year from date of decision become final.” [Underscoring Ours.]

Resolving the motion for
execution and the opposition thereto, on October 7, 1964, an order was issued granting the execution
of the decision.

A motion for
reconsideration of the order filed by the respondents having been denied, the
instant petition was filed on November 7, 1964.

The herein respondents,
answering the peti­tion, alleged that Section 50 of Republic Act 1199, as
amended, is not the applicable law on the matter, contending that said
provision of the law is appli­cable only – “x x x in so far as the require­ments to make up a case for ejectment on the ground of cultivation by mechanization is
concerned, and ends up to the rendition of the decision.  It does not go to the extent of embracing its
execution, x x x.  After a case for ejectment
is laid before the Court and decision is rendered therein, the Re­vised Rules
of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, which Republic Act 3844 has adopted as
its   procedural vehicle, on the manner
and time of appeal and execution after the finality of the decision, find
application to the ejectment case.  x x x With the enactment of Republic Act 3844, and subse­quently,
the adoption of the Rules of Court, first its original version and later the
Revised Rules of Court, the procedural rule of execution stated in section
50(a), Republic Act 1199, as amended, was abrogated.”

The issue to be resolved,
therefore, is:  May execution issue of a decision of the
Court of Agra­rian Relations dispossessing a tenant of his land­holding immediately
after the lapse of the regle­mentary period to appeal
from the decision, if no appeal has been duly perfected, in accordance with the
provision of Section 1, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, or, should it
be, as in the case at bar, under Section 50(a) of Republic Act 1199, as
amended?

Section 1, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court reads thus:

“Section 1. Execution
upon final judgments or orders. – Execution shall issue only up­on a
judgment or order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding.  Such execution shall issue as a matter of
right upon the expiration of the pe­riod to appeal therefrom
if no appeal has been duly perfected.

“If the judgment has been duly appealed, execution may issue
as a matter of right from the date of the service of the notice provided in
section 11 of Rule 51.”

Section 50(a), Republic
Act 1199, as amended, provides the following:

“Sec. 50. Causes for the
Dispossession of Tenant.- Any of the following, and no
other shall be sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from
his landholdings:

“(a) The bona fide
intention of the landholder-owner or his relative within the first degree by
consanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and equipment and implements.  x x x Pro­vided, further, That in case  any dispossessed tenant is  not willing to be resettled, his possession
(disposses­sion) shall not be enforced 
until the lapse of one year  from
the date the decision  becomes final.  x x
x.” [Underscoring Supplied]

The decision herein rendered authorizing the petitioner-landlord
to mechanize her landholdings and ordering the tenants to vacate the land, upon
the facts obtaining in the cases, appears to be re­gular, and considering that
the tenants did not appeal therefrom, its validity is
beyond question.  But the question is, did the Court act without and in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, in ordering the execution of the deci­sion
in disregard of the provision of Section 50(a) of Republic Act 1199, as
amended?

The respondents attempt to justify the vali­dity of the order
anchoring on the provision of Section 1, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
above-quoted, and argue that the decision having become final and executory, it becomes a ministerial duty of the Court to
order execution.  Respondents further
contend that “With the enactment of Republic Act 3844 (which did not
reproduce the quoted and underscored provision of Section 50(a) of Act 1199, as
amended), and subsequently, the adoption of the Rules of Court, first its
original version and later the Revised Rules of Court, the procedural rule of
exe­cution stated in said Section 50(a), Republic Act 1199, as amended, was abrogated.”

The petitioners take issue with the respond­ents and contend that
the provision of Section 50 (a) of Republic Act 1199, as amended, is
substantive in character, and, therefore, it could not be deemed to have been
abrogated by the approval of the Re­vised
Rules of Court, since the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is limited to the promulgation of rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and admission to the practice
of law, which shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

The consideration of the
problem may be approached from two legal aspects:

1. There can be no debate of the fact that pe­titioners were
agricultural share tenants.  Their status
as such is recognized by the
respondents.

When the Agricultural Land Reform Code, Repub­lic Act 3844 went
into effect as law on August 8, 1963, the CAR Cases
Nos. 1187 and 1188 were still pending trial before the Court of Agrarian
Relations.  Said cases being applications
for mechanization of farmlands, therefore, conformably to the provision of
Section 168 of Act 3844, the same should be “decided in accordance with
the pertinent provisions and requirements of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
Hundred and Ninety-nine, as amended.”

Implicit from the foregoing legal provision, the adjudication of
the said cases Nos. 1187 and 1188 shall be proceeded in accordance with, and
with due observance of, the provisions of Act 1199, as amended, among which,
Section 50(a) of the law, which specifi­cally ordains that the judgment of
dispossession of the tenant shall not be enforced until the lapse of one year
from of the date the decision becomes final.

The reasons behind the
provision of the law among others, is found in Section 4 of Act 3844 –

“x x x
That existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect in any
region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provi­sions
of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, until the end of the Agricultural year
when the Na­tional Land Reform Council pro­claims that all the government
machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold
envisioned in this Code are operating, x x x x.”

The foregoing provisions of the law breathe the breathe of the
spirit of the social justice precept, embodied in the Constitution “to
insure the well-be­ing and economic security of all the people”, such
that, the law has deemed it wise and just to ordain that until the National
Land Reform Council has not yet made a proclamation that all the government
machi­neries and agencies in the region or locality relating to leasehold
envisioned in this Code, are operating, “That the existing share tenancy
contracts may conti­nue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be
governed in the meantime by the pertinent provi­sions of Republic Act No. 1199,
as amended, x x x.”  As there is no showing in the record that the
National Land Reform Council had already proclaimed “that all the
government machineries and agencies” in the region or locality where the
landholdings in question are si­tuated, “are operating”, the law has
prescribed that in the meantime, the provision of Section 50(a) of Act 1199, as
amended, should be followed in the adjudica­tion and enforcement of the rights
of the parties, and, therefore, the dispossession of the tenant, who is not
willing to be resettled, as the herein petitioners have so stated, “shall
not be enforced until the lapse of one year from the date of the decision
becomes final.”

2. The proviso in Section 50(a) of Act 1199, as amended, quoted
hereinabove, is a substantive law in character conferring a substantive right
in favor of persons contemplated to be protected therefrom.  Sub­stantive law is that which creates,
defines and regu­lates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasion.  (Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.)

The adverted provision of the law contemplates giving to the
tenants a protection from a sudden change of condition of livelihood, and it is
a reasonable exercise by the State of its police power to regulate and control
the relationship between landhold­ers and tenants; in compliance with the
principle of social justice embodied in the Constitution.  Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act,
Republic Act 1199, as amended, enunciates the principle of security of tenure
of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and
tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law.  The principle is epitomized by the axiom in land tenure that – once a tenant,
always a tenant.  Attacks on the constitu­tionality
of this guarantee have centered on the con­tention that it is a limitation on
freedom of contract, a denial of the equal protection of the law, and an
impairment of or a limitation on property rights.  The assault is without reason.  The
law simply provides that the tenancy relationship between the landholder and
his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant
and protect him from be­ing unjustly dispossessed of the land.  Its termina­tion can take place only for
causes and reasons provi­ded in the law. 
It was established pursuant to the social justice precept of the
Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote
the common weal.  (Primero v. Court of Industrial Rela­tions, G. R. No.
L-10594, May 29, 1957.)

An aspect of the case which calls for the appli­cation of the
equity rule is manifested from the fact clearly established in the record that
the petitioner-landholder has been guilty of laches.  A common fact of which courts can take
judicial cognizance is that the
planting season of palay, especially in the Central
Luzon, begins during the rainy season, generally in June or July
of every year.  Notwithstanding that the
decision had become final and executory in March,
1964, we fail to find justifiable explanation for the conduct of the
petitioner-landholder for not having asked, as soon as practicable, the execution of the decision, if her
intention really was to obtain posses­sion of the land so that her plan of
cultivation by mechanization of the land could be carried out.  Never­theless, with full knowledge of the
circumstances and conditions then present, the petitioner-landholder had
tolerated, nay, permitted, the tenants to begin with the plowing, harrowing,
cleaning, and sowing of seeds on the land, and when she saw that the plants had
already grown and blooming and almost ready to be harvested, it was then when
petitioner-landholder came before the court to ask for the possession of the
land.  Such an action of the landholder
to take possession of the land from the tenants, at such a time is, to all
intents and purposes, an attempt to enrich herself to
the prejudice of the tenants.  This
conduct can find no sanction in the realm of good faith.

For the foregoing consideration, the order of the respondent
Judge dated October 7, 1964,
is hereby set aside; considering, however, that the one year period from the
finality of the decision has already elapsed, the issuance of a permanent injunction has thus become functus oficio.  Costs against the private
respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.