G.R. No. L-22013. November 28, 1969
PASTOR ESCALANTE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO AS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER, HON. ALEJANDRO ROCES AS SECRETARY OF EDUCATION AND BENIGNO ALDANA AS DIRECTOR OF PUBL…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by petitioner Pastor Escalante, from a decision,
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, denying the writ prayed for in his
amended petition herein and dismissing this case, without special pronouncement
as to costs.
Said petitioner was Division Superintendent of Schools for Albay from July 16, 1956 to June 30, 1962 and, thereafter,
for Camarines Sur. In a letter, dated November 25, 1959, the
Director of Public Schools advised the petitioner that, according to a report
of the Chief Supervising Auditor on detail in the Department of Education, an
inspection of the industrial arts shop in his (petitioner’s) Division had
disclosed certain irregularities therein in relation to the purchase of
carpentry tools. After quoting portions
of said report, the Director of Public Schools required the petitioner to
explain “why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken”
against him for:
“(1) Not
utilizing the services of industrial arts supervisors in processing
requisitions for tools needed by industrial arts classes in violation of
General Letter No. 24, s. 1951;
“(2) Circumventing
Department Order No. 4, s. 1951, by splitting requisitions to less than P2,000.00;
“(3) Purchasing tools and equipment at exorbitant
prices without consulting the local school officials in violation of paragraph
2-e of the aforementioned Department Order; and
“(4) Keeping these tools in bodegas where they are
gathering dust, thus wasting government funds.”
Petitioner seasonably explained:
(1) that he had always sought the advice of the industrial arts
supervisor, concerning requisitions of tools for industrial arts classes; (2)
that his office files do not show any splitting of requisitions to less than
P2,000.00; (3) that he has no control over the prices of the articles
purchased, the same having been approved by the Bureau of Supply; (4) that
tools were kept in the Division office bodega “only pending their being
checked by the office of the Provincial Auditor and payment”; and (5) that
he had moreover issued a confidential memorandum to district supervisors and
principals urging the immediate distribution of tools to schools in need
thereof.
After due notice, a formal investigation was conducted by special
investigators of the Bureau of Public Schools, who submitted their report,
dated September 29, 1960, to the Director thereof, in effect finding that
petitioner had substantially, although not strictly, complied with applicable
rules and regulations, and recommending that the charges be “dropped”
and that petitioner be admonished, however, “to comply more faithfully
with existing regulations, particularly with General Letter No. 24, s.
1951,” and “likewise, to check with extreme care his requisitions so
that only the best articles available will be bought.” In a 1st indorsement of October 5, 1960, this report was forwarded
to the Secretary of Education by the Director of Public Schools, who concurred
in the foregoing recommendation. So did
the Acting Secretary of Education, in his second indorsement,
dated December 12, 1960,
transmitting, to the Commissioner of Civil Service, said report of the
investigators and the 1st indorsement of the Director
of Public Schools.
On April 18, 1962, G. G. de Jesus, Department Legal Counsel of
the Civil Service Commission, rendered, “for the Commissioner” of
Civil Service, a “decision” adopting the aforementioned findings and
dropping the charges against petitioner herein, but, admonishing him “to
comply more faithfully with existing regulations particularly with General
Letter No. 24, series of 1951, and further to check much more carefully the
requisitions so that only the best articles available will be purchased.”
Notice and copy of this decision were received by the petitioner on the same
date.
Over nine (9) months later, or on February 8, 1963, respondent Abelardo Subido, as Acting
Commissioner of Civil Service, issued an “order”, addressed to the
Secretary of Education, stating that “the authority to discipline
subordinate officers and employees in the civil service is inherently a
quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of discretion which cannot legally
be delegated”; that the delegation of such authority to the Department
Legal Counsel, by an office order, dated April 12, 1962, “is void ab initio“;
that the decision rendered by said Counsel, on April 18, 1962, is, therefore,
“void” and “of no effect”; that, upon a review of the
evidence, herein petitioner was “found guilty as charged” and
“dismissed from the service effective on his last day of office with
pay”; and that “in the public interest”, it was ordered that
such “decision is executed immediately.”
Thereupon, or on February 12, 1963, petitioner commenced, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, the present action against respondents Abelardo Subido, as Commissioner
of Civil Service, Hon. Alejandro Roces, as Secretary
of Education, and Benigno Aldana,
as Director of Public Schools, with the prayer that, pending the determination
of this case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte “ordering the respondents to desist and
refrain from dismissing and separating the petitioner from his present
position”, and “that, after due notice and hearing, a writ of
prohibition issue commanding the respondents to desist absolutely and
perpetually from removing the petitioner from office, with costs.” Soon
later, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a restraining order enjoining
respondents to abstain from performing the acts above mentioned during the pendency of the present case.
Duly summoned, respondents filed their joint answer reiterating
the view of respondent Subido, in his order
complained of, regarding the alleged illegality of the delegation of power
made in favor of the Department Legal Counsel of the Civil Service Commission,
and the nullity of his decision of April 18, 1962, as well as setting up the
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, petitioner not having
appealed from said order, either to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, or to
the President of the Philippines.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered the
decision appealed from, sustaining the aforementioned defense and dismissing
the case, as well as denying the writ prayed for. A reconsideration of said decision having
been denied, petitioner interposed the present appeal, which is well taken.
Although it is well-settled that, in general, courts of justice
will not interfere with or review decisions of administrative officers or
organs, unless the aggrieved party shall have first exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him, this rule is subject to exceptions,
among which are those cases involving purely legal questions[1] –
particularly when the contested act is patently illegal or has been performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction[2] –
and those calling for urgent action.[3] The case at bar falls under these exceptions. Indeed, the order complained of directed the
immediate execution of the decision dismissing petitioner from office. Then, again, said order hinges upon two (2)
questions, which are purely legal in nature, namely: (1) whether the authority to render the
decision of April 18, 1962 could be validly delegated to the Department Legal
Counsel of the Civil Service Commission; and (2) whether said decision was
subject to review by the Commissioner of Civil Service on February 8, 1963.
As stated in the order complained of, “in an Office order dated
April 12, 1962, the former Commissioner of Civil Service delegated to the
Department Legal Counsel the authority to sign, among others, decisions in
Administrative Cases where the respondent shall be exonerated or where the
recommended penalty is reprimand and warning.” Respondents maintain that
said office order was an absolute nullity because the power to discipline subordinate
officers and employees in the civil service is inherently a quasi-judicial
power involving the exercise of discretion which cannot be delegated. This pretense would be correct, in the absence
of a law authorizing such delegation, but, the same is sanctioned by the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260), Section 20 of which reads:
“Sec. 20. Delegation in the Civil
Service Commission and to the Agencies. – The Commissioner may, at his
discretion and in the interest of the public service, delegate to Chiefs of
Divisions or other heads of primary units in the Civil Service Commission,
or to the Heads of Departments and agencies of the National Government,
provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities of the
Republic authority to act on personnel matters and to enforce the
provisions of this law in accordance with standards, guidelines and regulations
set by the Commissioner: x x x Periodic review of actions
in the discharge of delegated authority shall be made by the Commissioner to
insure compliance with standards or regulations, x x x.”[4]
Respondents argue that the delegation contemplated in the
foregoing provision must be understood to refer exclusively to ministerial
functions. This is, however, a mere
assertion, devoid of any legal or other justification, apart from the fact
that it cannot be accepted without reducing the enactment of said Section 20 to
an exercise in futility. Indeed, without
said provision, the Commissioner of Civil Service could delegate the power to
exercise ministerial acts to any of his subordinate officers or employees, as
provided in Section 4 of the Revised Administrative Code.5
Moreover, respondents’ theory would have the effect of amending
this section, insofar as it applies to the Civil Service Commission, without
any reason therefor, and, worse still, with absurd consequences. Indeed, under such theory, the Civil Service
Commissioner would have to discharge personally all functions requiring the
exercise of judgment or discretion, and, although he is authorized to delegate
those which are ministerial in nature, he may do so in favor only of
“Chiefs of Divisions or other heads of primary units in the Civil Service
Commission,” apart from the “Heads of Departments and agencies of the
National Government, provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities of the Republic.” The result would be that all other
officers and employees of the Civil Service Commission – and this means the
bulk of its personnel – would thereby be left without any duties whatsoever
to discharge. Surely, the framers of
Republic Act No. 2260 could not have intended, and did not intend, to create
such a ridiculous situation.
On the contrary, the pre-existence of said section 4 of the
Revised Administrative Code, conferring upon public officers the general
authority to delegate ministerial functions, indicates that the only possible
reason for the insertion of the above-quoted Section 20 in Republic Act No.
2260 was to permit the delegation of non-ministerial duties or functions, such
as those involving the exercise of discretion or judgment in connection with “personnel
matters”, within the limits prescribed in appropriate “standards,
guidelines and regulations.” Indeed, it is humanly impossible to expect
the Commissioner of Civil Service to attend personally to the matter of
appointment, promotion and discipline of hundreds of thousands of officers and
employees in the Civil Service.
It is true that, pursuant to Section 16(i)
of the said Act: “It shall be among
the powers and duties of the Commissioner of Civil Service – x x x (i)
Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service x x
x.” It should be noted, however, that this
“final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension”
of said officers and employees, is subject to the qualification “except
as otherwise provided by law”, and that the of
aforementioned Section 20 partakes of the nature of such exception. Moreover, the delegation authorized in Section
20 does not necessarily detract from the “final authority” of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to seasonably review the acts of his
delegates. On the contrary, the
“final” character of his aforementioned authority is in itself an
indication that others may, also, have the same authority, although subordinate
to that of the former, who has the last say on the subject-matter
thereof. Otherwise, the term
“final” would be meaningless, if not improperly used. Hence, in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice,
rendered on February 17, 1961, upon the request of the very Commissioner of
Civil Service, the former expressed the view that:
“Under the law adverted to, the Commissioner of Civil Service ‘may,
at his discretion and in the interest of the public service, delegate to
Chiefs of Divisions or other heads of primary units in the Civil Service
Commission, or to the Heads of Departments and agencies of the National
Government, provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities
of the Republic authority to act on personnel matters,’ including ‘transfer,
demotion, separation and reinstatement,’ or somewhat broadly expressed,
matters involving the imposition of disciplinary measures upon erring civil
servants. (See Section 20 in connection
with Section 24). Thus, what used to be
the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of the Civil Service Commissioner over the
imposition of administrative penalties under Section 695 of the Revised Administrative
Code has been reduced to ‘final authority’ to pass upon the removal, separation
and suspension of public officers and employees, but with the accompanying
obligation ‘to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the
administration of discipline.’ (See Republic
Act No. 2260, Section 16(i).
“This being so, I fail to see any reason why similar
delegation of power may not be made in favor of the Deputy Commissioner of
Civil Service, the next ranking official in the Civil Service Commission who,
aside from enjoying the rank of a department undersecretary, is appointed in
the same manner and required to have the same qualifications as the
Commissioner himself. (Ibid., Section 7, 14).
Incidentally, I must state that this conclusion is consistent with the
underlying policy of the law to enable the Civil Service Commissioner to farm
out his multifarious functions among responsible subordinates in the interest
of efficiency and dispatch.”
Upon the other hand, even if said Commissioner has the
“final authority” to pass upon matters of discipline of officers and
employees in the competitive and classified service, and, consequently, the
power to review and revise the acts of his delegates in connection therewith,
it does not follow that he can do so at any time. When rendering a decision, in pursuance of an
authority lawfully delegated to him, the Department Legal Counsel acts for and
on behalf of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the former’s
decision is, in legal contemplation, that of the latter. Pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No.
2260, such decision “may be appealed by the respondent to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals within thirty (30) days after receipt by him of the
decision.” That rendered by the Department Legal Counsel, on April 18,
1962, was served upon petitioner herein on the same date, so that it became
final on May 18, 1962. On February 8, 1963, the Commissioner of
Civil Service had no more authority to revise or modify said decision and his
order of that date, in effect reviewing and reversing it, is, accordingly, null
and void.
We note that Honorable Alejandro Roces,
Jr. and Benigno Aldana are
still named as respondents in this case, in their respective capacities as
Secretary of Education and Director of Public Schools, at the time of the
institution of the present case, although, since then, they have long ceased to
hold said offices, the incumbents of which are now Honorables
Onofre D. Corpuz and Juan
L. Manuel. The latter should therefore,
be deemed to have substituted their respective predecessors in office as
respondents herein, in their aforementioned official capacities.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,
and another one shall be entered perpetually prohibiting respondents herein
from enforcing said order of February
8, 1963, without special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
[1] Tapales v.
The President, L-17523, March 30, 1963;
Pascual v. Provincial Board, L-11959, October 31, 1959.
[2] Mangubat v. Osmeña,
L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio v. Rodriguez,
L-11078, May 27, 1959.
[3] Fernandez v. Cuneta, L-14392, May 30, 1960; Reeber v. Rossell,
91 F. Supp. 108. See also: Oklahoma
Natural Gas v. Russell, 261 U.S.
290; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.
620.
[4] Underscoring ours.
5
“SEC. 4. Authority of officer to act through deputy. – A ministerial act which may be lawfully
done by any officer may be performed by him through any deputy or agent
lawfully created or appointed.”