MCN ANIMAL HEALTH CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY DABBIE E. CLEMENTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, BRANCH 82 AND FELIPE LIM Y TIU, RESPO…
LIBREA-LEAGOGO, C.C., J.:
Private respondent filed his Comment[3] dated 15 January 2015. Per JRD verification,[4] no reply was filed as per CMIS entry. Thus, the case is submitted for decision.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
It appears that accused Felipe Lim y Tiu was charged with the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information[5] docketed as Criminal Case No. 2976-M-2008 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about the 28th day of September 2005, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as agent of the MCN Animal Health Corporation, with unfaithfulness or grave abuse of confidence, purchased various veterinary feeds and vitamin supplements from said MCN Animal Health Corporation and having collected and received from various customers of the said MCN Animal Health Corporation the full amount of P14,380,024.00 under the express obligation to immediately turn over and deliver said sum of P14,380,024.00 to the MCN Animal Health Corporation but far from complying with his obligation and despite repeated demands for compliance therewith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the proceeds of sale (sic) the said amount of P14,380,024.00, belonging to the said MCN Animal Health Corporation, represented by Dabbie E. Clemente to (sic) damage and prejudice of the said owner.
Contrary to law.”[6]
It further appears that accused filed a Motion to Quash Information on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and there is no probable cause to indict him for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, to which public prosecutor and private complainant filed their Comment/Opposition dated 18 September 2009 and 05 October 2009, respectively.[7] The same was denied for lack of merit; accused was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged; pre-trial conference was conducted; and trial ensued.[8]
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Dabbie E. Clemente, Linorio C. Espinosa, and Katherine E. Clemente.[9] Thereafter, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits[10] dated 01 July 2013, offering Exhibits “A” to “J”, to which the accused filed his Comment[11] dated 06 August 2013. It appears that Exhibits “A” to “J” were admitted by the trial court.[12]
Accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Dismiss)[13] on the ground that the evidence adduced were grossly insufficient to prove the essential elements of the crime of estafa, thus, failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.[14] The prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition[15] dated 11 November 2013. In the Order[16] dated 13 February 2014, the trial court deemed the accused to have waived his right to present evidence as his Demurrer to Evidence was filed without prior leave of court, and submitted the case for decision on the basis of the prosecution’s evidence.
The assailed Decision[17] dated 08 May 2014 was promulgated, acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Pertinent portions of the same read:
“After a careful evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
x x x x
Not all the foregoing elements of the offense were evidently proven. The prosecution has not clearly established that accused indeed has collected and received from the various customers of private complainant, MCN Animal Health Corporation, the total amount of P14,380,024.00 as stated in the (I)nformation to give rise to the obligation to make a delivery or return the same. It was not clearly demonstrated how the accused misappropriated or converted the money of the private complainant company for his personal use.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient proof to show that the proceeds of the sale have been actually and fully received by accused Felipe Lim y Tiu. Thus, his obligation to turn over or remit the same to MCN never arose. Accused could not be said to have misappropriated or converted the said proceeds since it is not clear that he has received the same from the various clients of MCN. The document purportedly a ‘Summary of Accounts’ which pertains to the Acknowledgment Receipt dated September 28, 2005 (Exhibit ‘C’) should not be the only evidence to be relied on or dealt with to prove misappropriation or conversion of the proceeds. The prosecution witnesses even testified that the four (4) checks issued by the accused were for the payment of the latter’s own purchase of veterinary products which indicates that accused tried to pay his obligation as a client of MCN and not as its agent. xxx
x x x x
Although in Estafa under Art. 315 1, (b) of the Revised Penal Code, demand need not be formal or written, (Exhibit ‘J’) the amount that was being required of the accused to settle in the demand letter sent by the MCN Animal Health Corporation dated February 20, 2006, is only P347,075.00 and not the amount of P14,380,024.00 for which the accused stands charged with to turn over. This Court, hence, finds the demand letter confusing as to how much was the outstanding obligation that accused needed to settle with the private complainant.
x x x x
With regard to the civil liability of the accused, xxx, the Court shall also rule on the civil aspect of this case for when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Considering that the prosecution failed to establish the basis of the civil liability of the accused by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds the accused not liable to indemnify the private complainant.
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, accused FELIPE LIM Y TIU is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the (I)nformation.
SO ORDERED.”[18] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
RULING
Petitioner contends, inter alia, that: it is engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing and distributing various types of veterinary feeds and vitamin supplements; in Mindanao, private respondent was the duly appointed agent distributor for its products; it entrusted its products to private respondent and the latter was responsible for taking purchase orders of Mindanao-based clientele, delivering the products ordered and collecting payment for the purchase; on various dates, private respondent placed orders for several Mindanao-based clientele; it delivered to private respondent the corresponding veterinary feeds and vitamin supplements; private respondent was expected to remit payments that he collected; by 2005, the value of veterinary feeds and vitamin supplements entrusted and delivered to him amounted to Php14,380,024.00; private respondent failed to remit said amount; during the meeting on 28 September 2005, the parties reconciled records of deliveries made to and accepted by private respondent and the latter’s outstanding accountabilities; two documents were prepared, listing all Mindanao-based clientele and to whom private respondent made deliveries of its products; the ‘Accounts to be collected’ dated 28 September 2005 enumerates Mindanao-based clientele and the corresponding amount that must be collected by private respondent and remitted to it; the ‘Accounts to be charged to Mr. Lim’ also lists Mindanao-based clientele whose outstanding obligations will be charged to private respondent; said documents were personally signed by private respondent; private respondent again failed to remit what he committed to collect from the clientele; it followed up remittance of collections so private respondent issued four checks as payment for one of the accounts in ‘Accounts to be collected’; however, when said checks were deposited, the same were dishonored for the reason ‘Account Closed’; it summoned private respondent to another meeting where its corporate secretary personally handed the demand letter to him, to make good the checks he issued; its officers went to look for the clients listed in the two documents; it found several of the clients and demanded payment; one of the clients told its officers that he no longer had any indebtedness to it; it filed a criminal case against private respondent for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22; the trial court totally disregarded the essence of the principal-agent relationship between them; the elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC do not pertain solely to actual receipt of monies; private respondent was its duly appointed agent in Mindanao and as agent, it entrusted its products to him as the latter was responsible for taking purchase orders, delivering products to clients and collecting payment thereof; private respondent did not actually receive any monies from it but actually received its products because it entrusted these products to him as agent; assuming he failed to collect or did not receive monies representing the proceeds of the sale of its products, he still had the obligation to account and return for the same as these were its properties; the prosecution established that private respondent failed to remit the sales proceeds and to return the products entrusted to him; the trial court totally disregarded the two documents signed by private respondent which are express admissions of his liabilities; the trial court totally disregarded the testimonies of Linorio C. Espinosa and Katherine E. Clemente; the checks issued by private respondent were a result of its repeated demands and were partial remittance of payments supposed to have been made for the products he received; the unequivocal statements of the witnesses and the documents clearly established the fiduciary relationship between it and private respondent as principal and agent and this was never denied by private respondent; the misappropriation of its products and/or monies collected in payment for the same was proven by the testimonies of its witnesses who established that private respondent failed to remit the value of products or proceeds from its sales, and account for and/or return the products he received from it; when he failed to do so, he issued worthless checks; these acts coupled with his undeniable failure to account for its products or to return the same established the element of misappropriation; the prejudice to it cannot be denied; private respondent took, in trust, its veterinary feeds and vitamin supplements with a total value of Php14,380,024.00; this value has not been recovered by it; and its officers have repeatedly made demands for private respondent to make good his obligation.
Private respondent ripostes, inter alia, that: in order for a petition for certiorari to prosper, it must be predicated on two exceptional grounds, in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process; the present case involves a review of facts and law on the merits done in an appeal which is proscribed by the rule against double jeopardy; petitioner failed to proffer an iota of proof that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion and there is no allegation that the prosecution had been deprived of due process; the Petition does not raise any jurisdictional error committed by the court a quo; the prosecution was given the opportunity to present all its intended witnesses and was able to file a Comment/Opposition to his Demurrer to Evidence; the grounds relied upon in the Petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than a Rule 65 petition; the grounds cited call for this Court’s own appreciation of the factual findings of the trial court on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence in proving estafa; this Court cannot review a verdict of acquittal, which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed by the trial court; the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial court are insufficient to prove the essential elements of estafa and failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; the language of the Information, alleging that he ‘purchased various feeds and vitamin supplements from said MCN Animal Health Corporation’ could not be any clearer that the contractual obligation created between him and petitioner is one of sale or purchase and not of agency or trust agreement, which would have created the obligation to deliver or return the same goods; absent a fiduciary relationship between them, which is an essential element of estafa by misappropriation or conversion, he could not have committed estafa; and the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt after a careful evaluation of the facts and evidence on record.
The Petition is dismissed.
In the Decision of public respondent which is sought to be nullified, private respondent was acquitted of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. As xxx previously held in People v. Court of Appeals, “[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.” True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[19]
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant. Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. xxx[20]
Here, it is clear that petitioner did not file the Petition to merely preserve its interest in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by examining the following grounds relied upon by petitioner for allowance of its Petition, it basically questions the acquittal of private respondent, viz:
“I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS COLLECTED AND RECEIVED THE AMOUNT OF FOURTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND AN (SIC) TWENTY FOUR PESOS (PHP14,380,024.00)II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE DEMAND LETTER RESULTS TO CONFUSION AS TO HOW MUCH WAS THE OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315(b) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE INSTANT CASE”[21]
It is sufficiently clear that petitioner is assailing the criminal aspect of public respondent’s Decision. In fact, it prayed in the instant Petition for the nullification of the said Decision of acquittal and for a new judgment to be rendered by this Court finding private respondent guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Being an obvious attempt to meddle into the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG, (its) recourse, in view of the above-discussed principles, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is therefore the proper party xxx through the representation of the OSG.[22]
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy.[23] The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in (this Court) or in (the Supreme) Court.[24] The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the (petitioner) who (is a) mere complaining (witness).[25]
Furthermore, petitioner committed a gross procedural misstep when it filed the instant Petition without the representation of the OSG. The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in (its) action for certiorari (before this Court). (It) thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to (its) objective being to set aside the trial court’s (Decision) dated (08 May 2014) that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case No. (2976-M-2008). Petitioner’s omission is fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the OSG to (its) petition for certiorari. At the very least, (it) should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, but even that (it) did not do. Thereby, (it) violated Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party”.[26] Although petitioner furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, the same does not clearly suffice. The authority of the (Provincial) Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.[27]
Considering the foregoing disquisition, We find no necessity to resolve the other matters raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, and Sadang, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 03-19; the Petition was initially raffled on 13 August 2014 to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando; she sent it to the ponente on 15 December 2014 as a replacement case for CA-G.R. SP No. 134616 where the ponente inhibited herself
[2] Id. at 20, 22-29; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Alexander P. Tamayo
[3] Id. at 169-187
[4] Id. at 188 (dorsal side)
[5] Id. at 20, 22
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 22
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 121-123
[11] Id. at 124-125
[12] Id. at 22
[13] Id. at 155
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 157-162
[16] Id. at 163
[17] Id. at 20, 22-29
[18] Id. at 26-29
[19] People of the Philippines v. Pedro Banig, G.R. No. 177137, 23 August 2012, citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 383
[20] Dennis T. Villareal v. Consuelo C. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014 (citations omitted)
[21] Rollo, pp. 07-08
[22] People of the Philippines, et al. v. Philip Piccio, et al., G.R. No. 193681, 06 August 2014
[23] Dennis T. Villareal v. Consuelo C. Aliga, supra, citing People v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 524 Phil. 496, 522 (2006)
[24] Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. v. Hon. Edwin Sorongon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178607, 05 December 2012
[25] People of the Philippines, et al. v. Philip Piccio, et al., supra
[26] Jowett K. Golangco v. Jone B. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, 08 September 2009
[27] Id.