AGUEDO INGCO, PETITIONER, VS. RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 212 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY, MARIE GERALDINE G. MACAP…

Ingco versus Capco-Umali

The Case

This is Ingco versus Capco-Umali, a petition for certiorari filed by Aguedo Ingco against Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, in her capacity as presiding judge of a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, and against Marie Geraldine Macapagal and the sheriff Antonio Anatolio. Ingco asks the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court that affirmed the dismissal of his complaint for ejectment or forcible entry over a condominium unit. The case matters for two reasons: it is a clean lesson on the proper mode of appeal from a Regional Trial Court acting in its appellate jurisdiction, and it is a clean lesson on the elements of forcible entry, particularly the requirement that the deprivation of possession be attended by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

Procedural History

Ingco filed a complaint for ejectment or forcible entry with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. In a decision dated 24 February 2011, that court dismissed the case for lack of merit, holding that the defendant had a better right of physical possession over the subject unit. Ingco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, which, through the assailed decision dated 22 August 2012, denied the appeal and affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court in its entirety. Instead of filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, Ingco went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

On 13 September 2005, the board of directors of Wack-Wack Twin Towers Condominium Corporation passed a resolution declaring ownership of condominium units whose owners or possessors had been delinquent in paying monthly dues. Unit 505-A, then registered in the name of Oscar and Haydee Badillo, was among the units offered for sale, and Ingco purchased it through bidding. He was issued a certificate of sale and thereafter took possession of the unit in the concept of an owner.

Unknown to him, or at least notwithstanding what appeared on the title, the condominium certificate of title in the name of Badillo carried annotations of a notice of levy upon attachment and of a certificate of sale in favor of Westport, both relative to a case in San Juan. As early as 2001, therefore, there was already notice that the unit was under litigation, and Ingco acquired and took possession of it subject to that limitation.

On 28 October 2009, Ingco received a writ of possession over the unit, addressed to Haydee Badillo and all persons claiming rights under her, issued by a branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan in the case of Macapagal, doing business under the name Westport Lending Investor, against Badillo. Ingco claimed that the writ was implemented with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, and that he was bodily removed from the unit together with his son and their belongings. He then filed the ejectment case. Macapagal answered that the complaint stated no cause of action and that, if there was any deprivation of possession, it was through a lawful order of the court, namely a writ of possession issued and implemented by the sheriff.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry.
• Whether or not the elements of forcible entry are present where the dispossession was effected through a writ of possession issued by a court and implemented by a sheriff.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, governs the appeal from a Regional Trial Court acting in its appellate jurisdiction:

An appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may be taken by a petition for review.

This fixes the proper mode of appeal and is the basis for dismissing Ingco's recourse, because he chose certiorari instead of a petition for review.

Supreme Court Circular Number 2-90, quoted in the decision, specifies the modes of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts:

Appeals to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, appeals by certiorari will not lie with the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court from Regional Trial Courts may be taken: a) by writ of error (ordinary appeal) where the appealed judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the regional trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; or b) by petition for review where the judgment was rendered by the regional trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

The same circular supplies the consequence of choosing the wrong mode:

Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

This is the provision that seals the dismissal of the petition on procedural grounds.

Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as cited in the decision, addresses the remedy of a third party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor:

Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the possession of the foreclosed property may be awarded to the purchaser or highest bidder unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.

This shows that Ingco was not without a remedy, since a third party may resort to a terceria or to a separate action to vindicate ownership or possession.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition was improper. Under Section 1, Rule 42, an appeal from a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is by petition for review to the Court of Appeals. Appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Certiorari cannot substitute for an appeal, especially where the loss of the remedy was occasioned by the party's own negligence or error in choosing the remedy. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion. On this score alone, the petition should be dismissed.

On the second and third issues, the Court held that even setting technicality aside, the petition must fail. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession, deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed within one year from the time the owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation. Even granting that Ingco was in prior possession in the concept of an owner, the dispossession was not by Macapagal but by a lawful order of the court through a writ of possession implemented by the sheriff. The foundation of a possessory action is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who entered without right, and the words force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth include every situation under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who had prior possession. The presumption of regularity attaches to the official act of the sheriff in implementing the writ. The Court also noted that the annotations on the title showed the unit was under litigation since 2001, and that a summary action for ejectment was not the appropriate recourse, since Ingco could file a terceria or a separate action to vindicate his claim. Finally, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion, which it described as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Doctrine

First, the modes of appeal are mandatory and mutually exclusive. A decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction must be elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Section 1, Rule 42, and an appeal taken by the wrong mode shall be dismissed. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for appeal, and it will not lie where an appeal is available, even on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Second, the elements of forcible entry are prior physical possession, deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and filing within one year from knowledge of the deprivation. Where the dispossession is effected through a writ of possession issued by a court and implemented by a sheriff, the element of force, intimidation, strategy, or stealth is absent, and the presumption of regularity attaches to the sheriff's official act. A third party claiming the property adversely to the judgment debtor must resort to a terceria or a separate action, not to a summary action for ejectment.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was dismissed, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 22 August 2012 stands. Macapagal and the sheriff prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: certiorari is not a substitute for appeal, and where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case to test the proper mode of appeal from a Regional Trial Court acting in its appellate jurisdiction, and to test the elements of forcible entry where the dispossession was made through a writ of possession implemented by a sheriff.