THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BENJAMIN AGUILAR Y PEREZ AND JOSE OLIVEROS Y OLAT, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On June 24, 1955, in the Municipal Court of Manila, the defendants-appellees
were charged in an information as follows:

“The undersigned accuses Benjamin Aguilar y Perez and Jose Oliveros y Olat of
the crime of multiple slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of April, 1955, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the drivers and persons inchaa-ge of a
passenger jeepney bearing Plate No. TPU-2271 (Manila), and Liberty taxicab with
Plate No. 3165 (Rizal), respectively, did then and there unlawfully drive,
manage and operate their respective vehicles along the corner of Requesens and
Oroquieta streets, in said city, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner,
by then and there giving their respective vehicles a rate of speed greater than
was reasonable and proper and without taking the necessary precautions to avoid
accident to persons and damage to property considering the condition of
vehicular traffic at the time at said place, causing as a consequence of their
carelessness, recklessness, imprudence and want of precaution the said vehicles
so driven, managed and operated by them respectively in the manner above set
forth to bump against and collide with, as they in fact bumped against and
collided with each other, and as a result of the impact the following passengers
of the said passenger jeepney 1. Erlinda Saludes y Alfonso, 2. Renato Saludes y
Alfonso, 3. Rosa Almario (Umali) Amistoso, 4. Leonisa Amistoso and 5. Avelino
Miranda-sustained physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a
period of more than one (1) but not more than nine (9) days and which have
incapacitated them from engaging in their customary labor for the same period of
time.”

Motions to Quash the information were presented by the defendants on the
ground that reckless imprudence is punishable only if the acts complained of
constitute a grave or less grave felony. The municipal court granted the motion.
The City Fiscal appealed, and the Court of First Instance of Manila sustained
the order granting the Motions to Quash and dismissing the case. This is an
appeal from said order.

The People contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on^he
ground that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense
and that the law did not provide a penalty therefor. The pertinent portions of
Article 365 of the Kevised Penal Code, under which the defendants-appellees were
charged, provide as follows:

“Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.-Any person who, by reek-less
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional; would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correctional in its minimum period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by
a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.”

The cited provision, therefore, punishes (1) an act by reckless negligence,
which if intentional, would constitute a grave felony or a less grave felony;
(2) an act by simple negligence, which if intentional, would constitute a grave
felony or less grave felony; (3) a negligent*act resulting in the damage of the
property of another; and (4) an act by simple negligence, which if maliciously
done, would constitute a light felony. Verily, the article does not include an
act of reckless imprudence, which if done intentionally, would have constituted
a light felony, like slight physical injuries. The rule of inclusio unius
est exclusio alteruis fittingly operates in the present case, and courts
should not consider as crimes by inference or implication, acts or omissions
which are not expressly and clearly punishable’by law. In effect, after noticing
that the Revised Penal Code did not punish slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence, the Legislature, in 1957, filled the hiatus found in
article 365, by providing the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period, for light felony committed thru reckless imprudence or negligence
(Republic Act No. 1790, promulgated on June 21, 1957).

This notwithstanding, inasmuch as the information in the case at bar
heretofore quoted, describes equally reckless and simple negligence, the
principle enunciated in the case of People vs. Benigno Lingad 103
Phil., 980; 55 Off. Gaz. (48) 10062, where the accused was prosecuted for slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, should be similarly made to apply in
the present case. In that case, this Court said:

“* * *. In sustaining the motion to quash, the trial court relied on the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macario Ande y Marino, 51 Off.
Gaz., p. 5222, wherein it held that ‘The law does not declare as a crime and
does not provide any penalty for the execution of an act-more serious as it
is-committed thru reckless imprudence which, if intentional, (only) amounts to a
light felony.’ And this decision is predicated on a portion of Article 365>
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that ‘A fine not exceeding 200 pesos
and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.’

We have no quarrel with the above citation. The same is in accordance with
law. But the question is: Bo the acts alleged in the information not fit into
the framework of said decision, or do they not come under the above quoted
portion of Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code?

The answer is obviously in the affirmative if we carefully examine the
averments of the information. While the information gives the designation of the
crime as ‘slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,’ the body thereof
does not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the crime
charged, for it merely alleges that it was committed ‘in a careless, reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner * * * causing by such careless, recklessness,
imprudence and lack of precaution,’ the collision which resulted in the injury.
Under such vague allegation of the imprudent act, one may infer that the act may
have been committed either thru reckless or simple negligence, depending upon
the nature of the evidence that.may be presented by the prosecution. And even if
what was intended was to qualify the crime with reckless imprudence, still it
cannot be said that the same is not punishable by law for it may still be shown
during the trial that the accused committed the act only thru simple negligence
upon the theory that what is more or graver includes the less or lighter, in the
same manner as a serious physical injury includes a slight injury, or robbery
includes the crime of theft. The question, therefore, in the last analysis may
boil down to a matter of evidence. In other words, the elements of the two kinds
of negligence are practically the same, the only difference lies in the degree,
and this can bte substantiated by proper evidence.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court erred in sustaining
the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.”

In view hereof, we hereby set aside the order appealed from, and direct that
the case be remanded to the trial court, for hearing on the merits. No
costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Order set aside.