LEE BUN TING AND ANG CHIA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE A. ALIGAEN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, 11TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH II; ATTY. ANTONIO D. AMOSIN, AS C…

Lee Bun Ting versus Aligaen

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia against Judge Jose A. Aligaen of the Court of First Instance of Capiz and against the receiver appointed over the land in dispute. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul several orders of the trial court that refused to dismiss a second suit over a parcel of land in Roxas City, a suit that merely repeats questions already finally settled between the same parties many years before. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of the doctrine of res judicata against the pull of a later, contrary ruling: a change in jurisprudence does not reopen a case that has long become final.

Procedural History

The controversy began with a judgment of the Supreme Court in June 1956 in the earlier case of Rafael Dinglasan and others versus Lee Bun Ting and others, which denied the vendors' attempt to recover the land. Twelve years later, in July 1968, the Dinglasans filed a new complaint for recovery of the same parcel before the Court of First Instance of Capiz, which was docketed as Civil Case No. V-3064. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, but the trial court denied the motion in October 1968, relying on the later ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation versus Lui She. A motion for reconsideration was denied in November 1968. The trial court later denied a motion to simplify the issues and to strike out certain testimony, and in May 1969 it appointed a receiver over the property. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, and the Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the trial court and the receiver.

Facts

In March 1936, the Dinglasans sold a parcel of land at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street in Capiz, now Roxas City, to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen and the predecessor in interest of the petitioners. The price was 6,000 pesos. Lee Liong built a concrete building on the land for his lumber business and partly as a residence. The vendors later claimed the sale was conditional, but both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found it absolute.

The vendors also claimed the sale was void because it violated the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of land. In its 1956 decision, the Supreme Court held that even granting the sale was void, the equally guilty vendor could not recover the land, applying the principle of pari delicto, meaning that where both parties are at fault the law leaves them where it finds them. The Court also noted that the action had prescribed, and it called the attention of Congress to the absence of a policy on such sales.

In 1967 the Court decided Philippine Banking Corporation versus Lui She. Relying on that new ruling, the Dinglasans filed a fresh complaint in 1968, offering to return the 6,000 pesos and asking for the land, possession, and damages. The petitioners pleaded res judicata, but the trial court refused to dismiss, and later placed the property under receivership.

Issues

• Whether or not the questions already decided in the 1956 case may be relitigated in the new civil case in view of the later ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation versus Lui She.
• Whether or not the requisites of res judicata are present between the two cases.

Applicable Provisions

Section 49, paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same title and in the same capacity.

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Paragraph (b) states the concept of bar by prior judgment, which the Court applies because the two cases share identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. The 1956 decision is a bar to the new civil case, which should have been dismissed as a mere relitigation of issues finally adjudged between the same parties or their privies over the same subject matter. The Court held that a posterior change in doctrine cannot be applied retroactively to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding, whether civil or criminal. The 1956 determination became the law of the case and may not be disputed by reopening the same questions.

On the second issue, the Court found all the requisites present. The first case was tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The parties are substantially the same, the subject matter is the same parcel covered by the same certificate of title, and the causes of action and reliefs prayed for are identical, namely the annulment of the sale and the recovery of the land. The Court explained the doctrine as follows:

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been juridically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Doctrine

Res judicata bars a second action where, between the pending action and one finally settled, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Under paragraph (b) of Section 49 of Rule 39, the prior judgment is an absolute bar to the subsequent action. A later reinterpretation of the law applies only to new cases and cannot reopen a case finally and conclusively determined; the prior ruling becomes the law of the case, binding on all inferior courts.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the challenged orders of the trial court were annulled and set aside, and Civil Case No. V-3064 was ordered dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a subsequent change in doctrine cannot retroactively reopen a case that has already become final, for the prior ruling is the law of the case. Examiners use this case to test res judicata, the law of the case, and the prospective operation of judicial doctrines.