BALAGTAS REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN PASAY CITY, BURT RAYMOND, YU CHUN HIAN, EDWARD FINLA…

The original petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. 48376-85 entitled
“Balagtas Realty Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel V.
Romillo, Jr. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay
City, Burt Raymond, Yu Chun Hian, Edward Finlan, Jack Lerner, Cor­nelius
Breed, Marsha Baecher, Lourdes Ang, Victoria Teves, and Josephine Ting,
respondents” was decided by this Court in the decision promulgated May
22, 1982 (See 114 SCRA 28) with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside respondent
Judge’s order dated March 30, 1978 in Civil Cases Nos. 5779-P to 5788-P
and ordering immediate execution of the judgment of the Pasay City Court
in Cases Nos. 11967, 11968, 11971, 11973, 11975, 11976, 11977, 11978
and 11979 without prejudice to the appeals taking their due courses.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.”

The above-cited cases for ejectment having been appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXXVII, the Presiding Judge
thereof, res­pondent herein, Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., on December
21, 1982 reversed the decision of the City Court of Pasay City, Branch
IV, ruling thus:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby sets aside
the decision of the lower court dated January 25, 1977 and renders
judgment as follows:

(a) Dismissing the Complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 11967, 11968,
11971, 11973, 11975, 11976, 11977; 11978 and 11979 in toto as well as
the counterclaims of defendants-appellants;

(b) Ordering plaintiff-appellee to credit any sum in excess of
the rentals originally consigned by defendants-appellants with the City
Court to future rentals; and

(c) Releasing the supersedeas bond of the defendants-appellants without pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”

The reversal of the decision promulgated by the lower court, which We
had previously ordered executed pending appeal, rendered Our decision of
May 22, 1982 moot and academic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the decision of respondent Judge. Petitioner likewise moved for the
immediate issuance of writs of ejectment pursuant to the judgment of
this Court. Respondent Judge denied both motions in his Order of
February 11, 1983, holding that “the Court believes it improper to order
the execution of the judgment appealed from considering that it has
already rendered a decision on the appeal reversing the judgment now
sought to be executed. The appeal had already been terminated by the
rendition of the judgment by this Court, such that an execution pending
appeal is now inappropriate and untimely. It should have been pursued
by the then prevailing party (herein movant) during the pendency of the
appeal.”

Petitioner, claiming that respondent Judge deliberately disobeyed this
Court’s final and executory ejectment order and the Interim Rules of
Court, filed a Motion before Us dated February 16, 1983 praying that
respondent Judge be ordered not only to forthwith issue the writs of
ejectment but also to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of this Court. We directed respondent Judge to comment on said motion,
to which he complied.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for review, praying
that the decision of respondent Judge be reversed and that the judgment
of the Trial City Court of Pasay City be affirmed. Petitioner assigns
the following errors:

I. Respondent Judge erred in relying in his decision on private
respondents’ exhibits which were neither offered, much less admitted in
evidence in the trial court nor otherwise legally before him as a judge
of the appellate court.

II. Respondent Judge erred in holding that Exhibit “A” did not
constitute the agreement between the parties, in plain disregard and
contravention of Art. 1320 and 1321 of the Civil Code.

III. Respondent Judge erred in holding that the demand letters
to vacate (Exhs. “E”) served on private respondents were invalid.

IV. Respondent Judge erred in holding that no liquidated damages are due to petitioner.

V. Respondent Judge erred in not holding that even if Exh. “A”
be not considered the agreement between the parties, private respondent
should nonetheless be ejected from the leased premises.

VI. Respondent Judge erred in holding that petitioner has no absolute right to increase rentals.

VII. Respondent Judge erred in holding that the increase in rentals fixed by petitioner was unreasonable.

VIII. Respondent Judge erred in holding that the tenders of payment
and consignation effected by private respondents were valid.

IX. Respondent Judge erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

The principal issue raised in the supplemental petition is whether the
increase in the rental payments demanded by the petitioner as the new
owner of the apartments leased and occupied by private respondents is
reasonable or not. According to the decision of the trial court, the
City Court of Pasay City, “it is clear that the rental rate was P750.00
commencing on June 1, 1975. That P750.00 was in fact the monthly rental
as of June 1, 1975 until the plaintiff (petitioner herein) increased it
to P2,000.00 effective on May 1, 1976 is corroborated not only by
twenty (20) other tenants who paid P750.00 from June 1, 1975 to April
30, 1976 but also by the defendant Yu Chun Hian who has no arrears for
rentals up to April 30, 1976 and the defendants Raymond and Lerner who
updated their accounts at P750.00 monthly from June 1, 1975, as
reflected in the schedule of arrears, Exh. “G”. Otherwise stated,
because the defendants’ evidence was joint and cumulative, the fact that
some of them paid P750.00 from June 1, 1975 has established that the
rental rates from June 1, 1975 to April 30, 1976 was indeed P750.00.”

As to the rentals beginning May 1, 1976, the City Court held that the
lessees became bound by the terms and conditions of Exhibit “A”, the
letter-contract dated April 21, 1976, which became the lease agreement
between each of the lessees and the lessor when each of the lessees
elected to accept by continuing occupancy of their respective premises
beginning May 1, 1976. In its decision, the City Court said:

“It thus appear significant that the material thrust of
defendants’ testimonies tend to corroborate plaintiff’s evidence that as
of April 1976 all the original lease periods in the contracts of the
defendants with the predecessor of the plaintiff had already expired so
that the defendants were on a month-to-month lease basis, in view of
which the plaintiff by its identical letters to each of the defendants,
Exhibits “A” (common to all cases) terminated their respective
month­to-month lease ending April 30, 1976 and in the same letter
offered to each of the defendants a new lease commencing on May 1, 1976
at an increased monthly rental of P2,000.00 payable within the first
three days of each month, with a discount of P1,000.00 when each monthly
rental is paid on time within the first three days of each month.
Exhibits “A” (common in all these cases) gave to each defendant the free
choice to accept or to reject the offer, namely: non-acceptance by
vacating their respective premises on or before April 30, 1976, while
acceptance was by continued occupancy of their respective premises
commencing on May 1, 1976. Each of the defendants notwithstanding
receipt of Exhibit “A”, continued occupancy of their respective premises
on May 1, 1976 so that thereby they respectively accepted Exhibits “A”
as the lease agreement to govern their relationship, the plaintiff as
the lessor and each defendant as the lessee, commencing on May 1, 1976.”

The defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVII, Pasay City, reversing the above finding of the court a quo
ruled that said letter-contract, Exhibit “A”, dated April 21, 1976, did
not constitute an agreement between the parties because, “(t)he
preponderance of the evidence adduced show that there was no meeting of
the minds in respect to the conditions contained therein, or better yet,
no acceptance of the offer made therein by plaintiff-appellee. As a
matter of fact, the same was specifically rejected by
defendants-appellants in their letter-reply to plaintiff-appellee dated
April 30, 1976. We agree with defendants-appellants that as there was
nothing definite as yet between the parties or no agreement on all
material points, there was no meeting of the offer and the acceptance
within the intendment of Article 1319 of the Civil Code, as well put by
an eminent authority.”

Be that as it may, the right of the lessor to increase the rental
payment of the premises occupied by the lessee upon termination of the
lease period is recognized in law and jurisprudence, although such right
is not absolute since the increase must satisfy the test of
reasonableness. We have these legal precedents:

In Pilar G. Vda. de Kraut vs. Manuel Lontoc, 7 SCRA 281, a lease
on a month-to­month basis may be terminated at the end of any month, and
shall be terminated upon the lessee’s refusal to pay the increased
monthly rental demanded by the lessor, provided the same is not
exorbitant.

In Singson Encarnacion vs. Baldomar, 77 Phil. 470, the continuance
and fulfillment of the contract of lease cannot be made to depend
solely and exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the
lessees between continuing paying the rentals or not, completely
depriving the owner of all say in the matter. For if this were allowed,
so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the
payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it;
conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue, the
lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to
terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of
the rentals. This, of course, is prohibited by Article 1256 of the
Civil Code.”

“The rule is settled that the owner of the land leased has the
right not only to terminate the lease at the expiration of the term,
but also to demand a new rate of rent. The tenant or lessee has the
option either to accept the new rent or vacate the premises. (Iturralde
vs. Alfonso, 7 Phil., 576; Iturralde vs. Evangelista, 7 Phil. 588;
Iturralde vs. Magcauas, 9 Phil. 599; Cortez vs. Ramos, 46 Phil. 189).
As plaintiffs, after the termination of their lease, refused either to
pay the new rent or to vacate the lots after the termination of their
lease, they have evidently become deforciants, and can be ousted
judicially without the need of a demand. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil.,
672; Art. 1669, new Civil Code).” (cited in Bulahan, et al. vs. Tuazon,
et al., 109 Phil. 254.)

“Only where the rental demanded is clearly exorbitant or
unreasonable would the courts intervene as a matter of fairness and
equity. The burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is
exorbitant and unreasonable rested upon the lessee, and since the lessee
presented no evidence in substantiation of his claim other than the
original cost to the lessor of the property, he has manifestly failed to
discharge its burden.” (Vda. de Roxas vs. CA, 63 SCRA 302).

In the case at bar, petitioner Balagtas Realty Corporation as the new
owner of the residential apartments located at Balagtas St., Pasay City
and successor­in-interest of the previous owner, the Perez-Rubio Trust,
may terminate, as it did, the old lease agreement under the previous
owner and impose, on a month-to-month basis an increased rental.
According to the letter-contract, Exhibit “A”, dated April 21, 1976, the
respective month­to-month leases ending April 30, 1976 were terminated
and in the same letter offered to each of the lessees a new lease
commencing on May 1, 1976 at an increased monthly rental of P2,000.00
payable to the lessor, petitioner Balagtas Realty Corp., with a discount
of P1,000.00 if paid on time within the first three days of each month.
It further gave to each lessee the free choice to accept or to reject
the offer, namely: non-acceptance by vacating their respective premises
on or before April 30, 1976, while acceptance was by continued
occupancy of their respective premises on May 1, 1976.

Since the lessees rejected the increased rentals and insisted on the old
rate, We must resolve the controversy on the question of the
reasonableness of the rental increase.

The decision herein assailed holds that “after a careful review of the
evidence presented, this Court finds, and so holds, that the increased
rentals of P2,000.00 a month imposed by plaintiff-appellee does not
appear reasonable” and respondent Judge supports his ruling, thus:

“For one, it amounts to an increase of more than 200% from the
previously existing rental. It is not amiss to note that under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 25, a lessor of residential units not exceeding P300.00
can increase his rentals once a year only by 10%. While this Court does
not here state that a rental increase of 10% as mandated by the edict
is squarely applicable or should have been observed by
plaintiff-appellee in demanding its increased rental, it believes,
however, that the rate of increase therein fixed can be used as a
benchmark or as a guideline for aiding courts in determining the
reasonableness of rental increases imposed by lessors. Based upon this
consideration, it is plain that an increase of more than 200% is not
only unreasonable but also unconscionable. Parenthetically, this
conclusion becomes ineluctable if we con­sider the fact that the cited
causes for such a gigantic increase have not been established. On the
contrary, no proof was adduced by plaintiff-appellee to rebut the
evidence submitted by defendants-appellants that certain obligations of
plaintiff-appellee under the lease pertaining to security services and
repairs have not been complied with. Not only that, plaintiff-appellee
likewise did not refute the testimony of Mr. Francisco Tantoco, Sr. on
the reasonable rental valuation of the property.”

On the other hand, the trial court upheld the reasonableness of the increase, citing the following considerations, to wit:

“In accordance with the ruling in Cortez vs. Ramos, supra:
‘Whether or not the rent demanded by the owner is reasonable, is a
question to be decided according to the evidence. The plaintiff
introduced evidence that another person was willing to lease the same’
premises at the new rental rate, the plaintiff’s witness, its manager
Atty. Alcantara, testified that twelve other tenants of the 32
apartments compound were paying the new rental rates under Exhibits “A”,
for which they were not impleaded in ejectment. This is strengthened
by an additional eight of the original nineteen defendants who settled
by paying the said new rate under Exhibits “A”.

Maybe in accordance with the ruling in Cortez vs. Ramos, supra,
that plaintiff’s proof that others were paying the new rate is merely
‘prima facie proof that the increase of the rent is reasonable,’ and
that the defendants’ testimonies to the contrary is ‘no ground’ to
overcome said prima facie proof, while almost each of the defendants who
testified stated that the new rental rate was unreasonable and that the
reasonable rate should be only P750.00; they presented a licensed real
estate appraiser in the person of Francisco P. Tantoco, Sr. under whose
appraisal report Exhibit “112” the reasonable monthly rental rate is set
at P770.00. This Court has observed that while Tantoco in Exhibit
“112” set forth many methods of appraisal, the only one used to arrive
at said P770.00 was the cost approach method. However, in
cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel, the following bases of
Tantoco’s cost approach method were established to be erroneous: while
the land is 10,442 sq.m., Tantoco erroneously used only 7,848 sq.m.
because he overlooked one sheet of the technical description annexes of
his report Exhibit “112”. In connection with the land while his report
appraised the fair market value at P230.00 per sq.m. he admitted on
cross-examination that the fair market value could be double.
Therefore, 10,442 sq.m. at P460.00 per sq.m. divided by the 32
apartments of the compound would mean that the share of each apartment
in the land was P150,000.00. Then, while Tantoco admitted that each
storey floor of each apartment has an area of 80 sq.m., however, in
computing the current construction cost of P1,000.00 per sq.m. he used
only 80 sq.m. and did not multiple 80 sq.m. by three storeys
notwithstanding that each apartment has three storeys. Using Tantoco’s
own formula under the cost approach method whereby 75% of the current
construction cost is deducted by way of depreciation for the thirty
years age of the buildings, the present depreciated value of one
building portion of each apartment would be P60,000.00, arrived at by
multiplying P1,000.00 by 25% by 80 sq.m. by 3. The P150,000.00 for the
land plus the P60,000.00 for the building multiplied by the annual rate
of return of 12% set by Tantoco divided by the twelve months of the year
would amount to P2,100.00 as the reasonable monthly rate per apartment.
Thereby, the defendants’ evidence has instead established that the
P2,000.00 monthly rate under Exhibits “A” is indeed reasonable. And
more so by the P1,000.00 discount given to each tenant who pays on time
within the first three days of the corresponding month, because thereby a
timely paid rental would amount to only 1/2 of the reasonable monthly
rental.”

We find for the petitioner.

The appraisal report, Exhibit “112”, presented by witness Francisco R,
Tantoco, Sr., a licensed real estate appraiser who was presented by the
lessees themselves, is, to Us, crucial in determining the reasonableness
of the increased rentals. As correctly analyzed by the City Court and
observed that the appraiser erroneously used 7,848 sq. meters while the
land is 10,442 sq. meters; that while his report appraised the fair
market value at P230.00 per sq. meter, he admitted that the fair market
value could be doubled or P460.00 per sq. meter; and that while Tantoco
admitted that each storey floor of each apartment has an area of 80 sq.
meters, however, in computing the current construction costs of
P1,000.00 per sq. meter, he used only 80 sq. meters and did not multiply
80 sq.m. by 3 storeys notwithstanding that each apartment has 3
storeys; and moreover, using Tantoco’s own formula under the cost
approach method where­by 75% of the current construction cost is
deducted by way of depreciation for the 30 years age of the buildings,
the present depreciated value of one building portion of each apartment
would be P60,000.00 arrived at by multiplying P1,000.00 by 25% by 80
sq.m. by 3, so that the P150,000.00 for the land plus the P60,000.00 for
the building multiplied by the annual rate of return of 12% set by
Tantoco, divided by the 12 months of the year would amount to P2,000.00
as the reasonable monthly rate per apartment. We agree with the trial
court that the lessees’ own witness has established instead that the
P2,000.00 monthly rate under Exhibit “A” is reasonable. And We affirm
the Court’s observation that “more so by the P1,000.00 discount given to
each tenant who pays on time within the first three days of the
corresponding month, because thereby a timely paid rental would amount
to only one-half (1/2) of the reasonable monthly rental.”

Indeed, the fact that each apartment unit leased to the private
respondents comprises three storeys or levels with an area of 80 sq.
meters each or a total area of 240 sq. meters if leased at P600.00 a
month as claimed by some lessees would render a rental of only P2.50 per
sq. meter a month, P3.125 per sq. meter if leased at P750.00 a month,
the rate claimed by other lessees, whereas if leased at P2,000.00 a
month, the rental would render an amount of P8.33 per sq. meter a month
as demanded by petitioner – has not been given the proper significance
by respondent court.

In the business of renting or leasing apartments in which petitioner is
engaged, being the owner of the row of some 32 apartment units located
in Balagtas St., Pasay City, it is the usual and normal trade practice
in fixing the reasonable rental to take into account the location of the
apartment including the neighborhood, the area per floor or storey, the
number of rooms, bedrooms, kitchen, closet the facilities provided
therefor, and other material factors as the description of the building,
its type and construction, as well as the age of the building. While
neither of the decision of the trial court nor of the Court of First
Instance considered the above factors, We find in the records a brief
description of the apartments in question, thus: “These apartments are
concrete apartments of three-storey building: there is a big space at
the back, it’s a common playground, there is a garage. x x x”
(Memorandum of Private Respondents Raymond and Ang, Rollo, p. 171,
quoting the testimony of the Building Adminis­trator).

In fine, We hold that the respondent Judge erred in reversing the
judgment of the trial court. We find grave abuse of discretion in his
conclusion that the increased rentals of P2,000.00 a month was
unreasonable, a conclusion that is not only without factual basis but
also contrary to the evidence on record. His reliance on Batas Pambansa
Bilang 25 although as a benchmark or as a guideline for aiding courts
in determining the reasonableness of rental increases is arbitrary,
whim­sical and capricious. And by ignoring the correct observation of
the trial court on the appraisal report of the real estate appraiser
specifically referring to the actual land area and the number of storeys
or levels in each apartment unit, the assailed judgment has been shown
clearly to have been based on a misapprehension of facts. Said judgment
must, therefore, be set aside, and that of the trial court reinstated.

However, We find no justification for the award of liquidated damages in
the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid by each of the lessees for there is no
clear showing that the lessees agreed expressly to the payment thereof
under the terms and conditions set forth in the letter-contract, Exh.
“A”.

As to the other alleged errors which are but ancillary or secondary to
the principal issue herein already resolved, We deem it needless and
unnecessary to resolve the same.

Considering the motion for contempt filed by petitioner against
respondent Judge for deliberate disobedience to the final and executory
ejectment order issued by this Court and to the interim Rules of Court,
citing the specific grounds supporting the same, and the comment of the
respondent Judge. We find said motion for contempt without merit as it
is clear that petitioner did not file any motion for the immediate
execution of the decision of the Pasay City Court in cases Nos. 11967,
11968, 11969, 11971, 11973, 11975, 11976, 11977, 11978, and 11979
immediately when this Court rendered its deci­sion of May 22, 1982.
Petitioner filed its motion for writs of execution only on January 29,
1983, or after the respondent court had already rendered its decision on
December 21, 1982 reversing the decision of the Pasay City Court and
dismissing the complaint in the Civil Cases enumerated above. With the
reversal of the City Court’s decision, there is nothing more to execute.

Now to G. R. No. 63387 entitled “Balagtas Realty Corporation vs. Hon.
Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. and Dominga Mapa” which We ordered consolidated
with the first petition, the former being for certiorari with preliminary injunction assailing the order of the same respondent Judge which reinstated the petition for certiorari filed
by private respondent Dominga Mapa after petitioner filed the contempt
charge against respondent Judge for refusing to execute this Court’s
aforecited decision.

In this second petition, petitioner originally filed an action for
unlawful detainer against private respondent Dominga Mapa, who is
similarly situated as the private respondents in G. R. Nos. L-48376-85.
Unlike the private respondents in the latter case, she interposed the
defense of ownership, alleging that the apartment unit she is occupying
could have been her commission if the members of the Perez-Rubio family
who are the stockholders of herein petitioner Balagtas Realty
Corporation did not renege on their intention of selling the properties
to one, Mr. Antonio Roxas Chua.

For her failure to appear in the hearing which was scheduled on May 26,
1976, herein private respondent Dominga Mapa was declared in default.
Subsequently, the Pasay City Court rendered judgment by defaults
ordering herein private respondent: 1. to vacate her apartment; 2. to
pay rentals in arrears and current monthly rentals; and 3. to pay
P12,000.00 liquidated damages.

Private respondent assailed the abovecited judgment, through a petition, for certiorari with preliminary injunction it the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, presided by herein respondent Judge.

On November 15, 1982, respondent Judge motu propio dismissed
the petition on the following grounds: 1. failure to prosecute; and 2.
private respondent resorted to the wrong legal remedy because she should
have appealed the order denying the motion to set aside the order of
default instead of filing a petition for certiorari which is in
effect an appeal from the judgment by default. The order of the
respondent Judge which is fully supported by authorities, reads:

“This case was filed on August 19, 1976; up to this date
petitioner has not even started presentation of her evidence. For the
last three (3) years, i.e., since late 1979 to date, petitioner has not
taken any steps whatsoever to prosecute the case, thereby indicating
lack of interest, and warranting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

It may also be noted from the allegations of the basic Petition that
there is no clear showing of either excess or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion of respondents Judge and Sheriff; in fact,
there is no allegation to that effect; furthermore, the proper remedy of
petitioner appears to have been an appeal from the respondent Judge’s
Order denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Default (Annex “K” of
the Petition, and the Order denying Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Motion for New Trial, Annex “V” of the Petition), as clearly ruled by
the Supreme Court:

‘A proper motion to set aside the judgment by default under
Section 13 of Rule 5 when denied, may give the defaulted defendant the
right to appeal but the appeal in that case would be from the order
denying the motion and not from the judgment by default itself.’
(Strachan & MacMurray, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 62 SCRA 109, 113,
quoting Luzon Rubber Mfg. Co. vs. Estares, 52 SCRA 391).

Petitioner choose not to appeal, hence lost the right to do so. She cannot be allowed to resort to certiorari as a substitute therefor (‘Certiorari cannot
be maintained if appeal is available as a plan, speedy and adequate
remedy.’ – Matanguihan vs. Tenco, 95 SCRA 478). There seems no point
therefore, in continuing with these proceedings.

It is further noted that by filing and maintaining this certiorari case
instead of appealing from the order denying her motion to set aside the
default, petitioner avoided putting up a supersedeas bond to cover the
judgment award up to the date thereof, and avoided depositing the
current monthly rentals, which is a sizeable amount already, considering
the six (6) years this case has been pending. Delay therefore is on
petitioner’s side and renders clear the pattern of delay noted in her
numerous motions for postponements, as well as changes of counsel (note
that Atty. Andresito X. Fornier who personally handled this case for the
original counsel ‘Ablan, Santiago & Fornier’ and then ‘Santiago
& Fornier’ and later ‘Santiago, Fornier and Associates’ is back
handling the case for the firm ‘Santiago, Fornier, Tinga &
Asso­ciates’ after an interregnum during which petitioner’s counsel was
‘Quisumbing, Caparas, Ilagan, Alcantara & Mosqueda’.)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to prosecute, with costs against petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”

Then, on February 11, 1983, respondent Judge completely reversed
himself and issued the following order without any legal or factual
basis therefor, to wit:

“As prayed for by petitioner through counsel, the Order
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute is hereby reconsidered
and set aside.

The instant petition is hereby reinstated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”

Hence, petitioner was constrained to file the instant petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction before this Court, praying for the setting aside
of the order issued on February 11, 1983 on the ground that respondent
Judge was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari a quo, much less reinstate the same without any legal justifications.

The instant petition is impressed with merit. The first order of
respondent Judge dated November 15, 1982 dismissing private respondent’s
petition for certiorari is correct, the same being in full
conformity with the law and jurisprudence as the order itself cites.
But by setting it aside in a subsequent order issued without any legal
or factual basis therefor, respondent Judge acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and frivolously, which is a clear and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The second
order which also reinstated the petition for certiorari must be set aside.

The circumstances under which the order of reinstatement was issued by
respondent Judge in the manner related by petitioner where said order
was issued after respondent Judge had been charged for contempt before
the Supreme Court by the petitioner, may lend belief and credibility to
the allegations of bias and partiality against respondent Judge but We
are not concerned here with the motives of the Judge in issuing the
questioned order. It suffices that the said order, on legal grounds, is
a reversible error.

The records clearly disclose that private respondent Dominga Mapa has
lost her right to appeal since she cannot be allowed to resort to certiorari as
a substitute therefor. The judgment rendered by the City Court of
Pasay City in Civil Case No. 11964 has become final and executory except
that which orders her to pay P12,000.00 in the concept of liquidated
damages, which in conformity with Our judgment herein is set aside.

This We are constrained to order and direct in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the supplemental petition for
review filed in G. R. No. L-48376-85 is granted and We hereby REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the decision of respondent Judge dated December 21, 1982.
The judgment of the Trial City Court of Pasay City is hereby AFFIRMED
but MODIFIED in that the award of P4,000.00 as liquidated damages is
excluded and rejected.

In G. R. No. 63387, the order of respondent Judge dated February 11,
1983 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and We hereby order the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent in
Civil Case No. 5187-P before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Pasay City Branch CX, and the execution of the final
judgment of the City Court of Pasay City, Branch IV in Civil Case No.
11964 as modified herein in that the award of liquidated damages is
similarly excluded and rejected.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, (Chairman), and Abad Santos, JJ., no part.

Aquino, J., in the result.