A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INC. AND CONSOLIDATED AUTO LINES, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE BORJA, RESPONDENT.

Appeal by certiorari taken by A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. and
Consolidated Auto Lines, Inc. from an Order of the Court of Industrial Relations
in Case No. 6-V Bicol dated May 9, 1960 and its Resolution of August 27, 1960
denying their motion for reconsideration. The dispositive part of the appealed
order is as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner
for the services rendered by the latter in excees of eight hours a day from
January 1, 1952 up to and including March 10, 1957. In connection herewith, the
Chief Examiner and Economist of this Court or his duly authorized representative
is hereby directed to proceed to the premises of the respondents and make the
necessary computations to determine the exact amount due to the petitioner. The
computation of the number of hours worked in excess of eight hours a day should
be based on the inspector’s notebook of the petitioner and/or the abstract
thereof in the possession of the respondents. The count should start from the
first inspection up to the last, as stated in said inspector’s notebooks. But in
no case shall the count be stopped until 6:00 P.M. because if the last
inspection was terminated before said time, petitioner was given investigation
work.

“The bonus of P30.00 a month is to be included as part of the basic salary of
the petitioner, it having been regularly given by respondents since 1951 for
some meritorious work rendered by petitioner and should, therefore, be deemed as
part of his regular salary. However, an allowance of 30 minutes a day for lunch
break should be deducted from the total number of working hours rendered by
petitioner. Further, the work not in excess of eight hours a day, rendered by
petitioner for respondents during Sundays and holidays should not be considered
as compensable overtime work because the respondents are public service
corporations.”

Respondent Jose Borja was employed by petitioners as Supervising Inspector,
with a basic salary of P180.00 a month, P3.00 daily per diems, and a monthly
bonus of P30.00, from January 1, 1952 to March 10, 1957 when he was dismissed
from the service.

On April 15, 1958 respondent filed an action against petitioners in the Court
of First Instance of Albay (Civil Case No. 1905) to recover compensation for
overtime work rendered by him during the above-mentioned period, and damages. In
their answer, petitioners denied respondent’s claim for overtime pay, and
alleged, by way of affirmative defense, that respondent had filed the same claim
with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV at Naga City on May 29,
1957 but the same was dismissed with prejudice upon the letter’s petition, on
April 30, 1958.

Pending trial of the abovementioned case, respondent commenced the present
proceedings in the Court of Industrial Relations substantially reproducing the
claim involved in Civil Case No. 1905. Petitioners, after likewise reproducing
their answer in said case, asserted, by way of additional affirmative defense,
the pendency of Civil Case No. 1905 between the same parties and for the same
cause.

After due trial, the Court of Industrial Relations issued its order of May 9,
1960 and its resolution of August 27, 1960 subject of the present appeal.

To reverse the order and resolution appealed from, petitioner contends that
the Court of Industrial Relations erred firstly, in not holding that
respondent’s cause of action has prescribed; secondly, in taking cognizance of
this case although it had no jurisdiction over the same; the respondent
prohibiting him to work in excess of eight and lastly, in disregarding
petitioner’s memorandum to (8) hours daily.

On the question of prescription, petitioner claims that respondent’s action
was commenced only in December 1958; that in accordance with Republic Act 1994,
amending Commonwealth Act No. 444, any action to enforce a cause of action under
said act shall be commenced within three (3) years after its accrual; that
respondent’s cause of action having accrued more than three years before
December 1958, his action was filed too late.

We find petitioner’s contention to be untenable. The Court of Industrial
Relations made a finding of fact to the effect that respondent had commenced his
action against petitioner before June 22, 1957—the effective date of Republic
Act No. 1994, amending Commonwealth Act No. 444. This finding is not now
reviewable.

But even on the merits, petitioner’s contention is without merit. Respondent
itself admitted in its answer dated May 6, 1959, filed in the above-mentioned
case No. 6-V Bicol, that petitioner had originally filed his complaint with the
Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4 on May 29, 1957. It is clear
therefore that his action had already been commenced before the effective date
of Republic Act 1994, and is covered by the exception provided for therein.

But petitioner contends in this regard that the phrase “actions already
commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions
filed in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow
interpretation, we can not agree. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly
a labor statute and, as such, must be liberally construed in favor of the
laborer concerned. (Art. 1702, New Civil Code) Consequently, the term “actions”
should include every judicial and administrative proceeding intended to enforce
a right or secure redress for a wrong already committed. Since respondent
admittedly first filed his claim against petitioner with the Department of Labor
on May 20, 1957, in accordance with laws then in force, it seems clear that, as
already stated, it is covered by the exception provided for in Republic Act No.
1994, whose date of effectivity was June 22, 1957.

On the question of jurisdiction, petitioner claims that, as respondent sought
to collect overtime wages, and nothing more, this case was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

This is also without merit. The complaint filed by respondent with the Court
of Industrial Relations alleged, inter alia, that he “was separated
automatically from the said employment with defendants, and notwithstanding
pleas for reinstatement defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate
plaintiff”, and, aside from some specific reliefs, respondent herein also asked
that “other reliefs be granted him.”

A reasonable interpretation of respondent’s pleading fully justifies the
opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations to the effect that respondent,
aside from overtime wages, also sought reinstatement. The case, therefore, was
within the jurisdiction of said court.

In connection with its last contention, petitioner claims that the Court of
Industrial Relations erred in disregarding the memorandum of the company
prohibiting respondent from working in excess of eight hours daily. Such
memorandum could not fairly apply to respondent because, according to the Court
of Industrial Relations, there was sufficient evidence showing that inspite of
it, respondent had received verbal instructions from superior authority to
inspect the first trip, noon trip, and last trip; that in this connection he had
submitted to petitioner a daily report of inspection which stated the period or
number of hours he had worked for the day, and that since January 1, 1952 up to
and including March 10, 1957, respondent had been rendering overtime service
with full knowledge of petitioner. All these show conclusively that the Court of
Industrial Relations was right in awarding to respondent the corresponding
overtime compensation.

Wherefore, the order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.